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Abstract
This dissertation comprises of three chapters on mutual funds. The first chapter es-
tablishes the role of managers in the deceptive practice of window dressing. Employing
comprehensive career history of U.S. mutual fund managers, I find strong jointly sig-
nificant manager fixed effects, which are robust after addressing endogenous matching
concerns. I use the connected sample instead of the classical movers sample to substan-
tially enlarge the sample size and reduce the selection bias that long exists in the stream
of literature. The estimated manager fixed effects are significant in making out-of-sample
predictions. Further I establish that mutual fund interlocks through common managers
are important channels that spread window dressing. The second chapter studies the
investment strategies of mutual funds regarding their use of credit default swaps (CDS).
Matches between mutual funds CDS positions and their underlying portfolio in the hold-
ings facilitate a new approach in identifying CDS strategies that complements the macro
level analyses in the existing literature. I find risk reducing incentives are dominated by
speculative incentives, especially those to increase credit exposure via naked short CDS
contracts. Experienced fund managers tend to take on more credit risk, while female
managers are more likely to hedge comparing with their male peers. The third chap-
ter employs the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the resulting sudden closures of CDS
positions as a natural experiment to examine the risk and performance implications of
mutual funds CDS investments. Funds on average load up on a significant amount of
tail risk by trading CDS. While CDS users benefit when market conditions are favorable,
they suffer during periods of clustered defaults. Funds forced to resolve their Lehman
CDS contracts exhibit persistent inferior performance in the post-crisis period comparing
8
with their matched peers.
Keywords: Mutual Fund; Window Dressing; Manager Fixed Effects; Social Network;
Credit Default Swap; Lehman Brothers; Fund Performance; Tail Risk
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Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus drei Kapiteln u¨ber die Investmentfonds. Das
erste Kapitel befasst sich mit der Rolle der Fondsmanager in der Bilanzverscho¨nerung.
Auf Basis der Analyse der Karrierewege von amerikanischen Fondsmanagern werden sig-
nifikante zusammenwirkende Manager-Fixed-Effects identifiziert, die nach der Kontrolle
der endogenen Matching-Probleme immer noch robust sind. In dieser Studie wird eine
zusammenha¨ngende Stichprobe statt der klassischen gebildet, um den Stichprobenum-
fang zu vergro¨ern und die in der vorangegangenen Literatur existierende Auswahlverzer-
rung zu reduzieren. Die gescha¨tzten Manager-Fixed-Effects haben signifikante Einflu¨sse
auf die Out-of-Sample-Vorhersagen. Auerdem wird festgestellt, dass die Verriegelun-
gen der Investmentfonds, die von gemeinsamen Managern verwaltet wurden, wichtige
Kana¨le fu¨r die Bilanzverscho¨nerung verursachen. Das zweite Kapitel bescha¨ftigt sich
mit den Investmentstrategien der Fonds im Hinblick auf die Nutzung von Credit De-
fault Swaps (CDS). Die Zuordnung der CDS-Positionen der Investmentfonds zu ihrem
Bestandportfolio bietet eine neue Methodik zur Identifizierung der CDS-Strategien und
kompensiert somit die Analysen der existierenden Literatur auf der Makroebene. Die
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Anreize zur Risikoreduzierung die Spekulationsanreize do-
minieren, insbesondere, wenn die Kreditexposition durch ungedeckte Leerverka¨ufe der
CDS-Vertra¨ge erho¨ht wird. Die erfahrenen Fondsmanager tendieren dazu, mehr Kred-
itrisiko in Kauf zu nehmen, wa¨hrend es fu¨r die Fondsmanagerinnen wahrscheinlicher als
fu¨r ihre ma¨nnlichen Kollegen ist, gegen das bestehende Risiko abzusichern. Der letzte
Teil nimmt die Pleite von Lehman Brothers unter die Lupe, um sich mit der daraus resul-
tierenden unerwarteten Schlieung der CDS-Positionen als einem natu¨rlichen Experiment
10
auseinanderzusetzten. Diese Studie dient zur Untersuchung der Risiko- und Leistungsim-
plikationen der CDS-Investments der Fonds. Die Investmentfonds besitzen bei ihren
CDS-Transaktionen im Durchschnitt einen beachtlichen Teil Extremrisiko. Wa¨hrend die
CDS-Nutzer von guten Gesamtmarktlagen profitieren, erleiden sie unter Verlusten bei
geclusterten Ausfa¨llen. Insofern sind diejenigen Fonds, die ihre Lehman CDS-Vertra¨ge
zwangsla¨ufig auflo¨sen mussten, durch eine permanente schlechte Fondsperformance in
der Nachkrisenzeit gekennzeichnet im Vergleich zu ihren Konkurrenten.
Stichwo¨rter: Investmentfond; Bilanzverscho¨nerung; Manager-Fixed-Effect; Sozialnet-
zwerk; Credit Default Swap; Lehman Brothers; Fondsperformance; Extremrisiko
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Outline
The dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters on mutual funds.
Chapter 1: Window Dressing Contagion through Interlocked Fund Management Teams
The first chapter studies the manager fixed effects in mutual fund’s controversial practice
of window dressing. The research question is motivated by observing the fair amount of
manager turnover within the mutual fund industry, the intensive interconnection among
funds through managers, and the quasi-legal nature of the window dressing practice. I
employ a comprehensive date set on the manager career history of all U.S. equity fund
managers to establish that manager effects, in terms of both Bertrand and Schoar (2002)
type of manager fixed effects and Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) manager fixed
effects, are significant in explaining window dressing. The first method relies on manager
turnover to estimate manager fixed effects with the presence of fund fixed effects, while
the second greatly enlarges the sample from the movers to the connected. The switch
of the method improves the estimation power, and at the same time partially addresses
the concern that the Bertrand and Schoar (2002) estimation is biased towards movers.
There are certainly endogeneity concerns, for which I tackle with a number of robust-
ness tests. The estimated manager fixed effects are significant in making out-of-sample
predictions. Further, by matching funds according to their manager links, I establish
fund interlocks through common managers spread window dressing in the sense that a
fund is more likely to window dress if its interlocked fund has previously window dressed.
12
Chapter 2: Mutual Fund CDS Strategies
The second chapter and the third chapter deal with the derivative use of fixed-income
funds. The focus of chapter 2 is to classify and document CDS strategies of fixed-income
funds and to take a trial on analyzing cross-fund-within-family CDS strategies. For the
first time I reveal mutual fund CDS strategies on transaction level by matching U.S.
fixed income mutual fund’s Credit Default Swap (CDS) holdings collected from SEC fil-
ings with their reported portfolio holdings from Morningstar. Previous literature either
makes informed predictions based on aggregate CDS and bond market data, or does not
have the match between CDS and their underlying. Therefore it was impossible to in-
spect the CDS trades in terms of the intended strategies. CDS strategies are classified to
one of the five categories: negative basis trading, hedging, bond synthesizing and specu-
lating via naked long or short CDS positions. Risk reducing incentives are dominated by
speculative incentives, especially those to increase credit exposure via naked short CDS
contracts. I additionally check the fund and manager characteristics that are correlated
with each of the strategies. I confirm the existence of cross-fund-within-family trades
facilitated by CDS by matching naked CDS positions with the portfolio bond holdings
of other funds in the family. Between the two hypotheses that explain the cross-fund
trades, I find supportive evidence for the family level strategic concerns.
Chapter 3: Tail Risk, Fund Performance and Credit Derivatives Trading:
Evidence from the Lehman Collapse
The aim of the third chapter is to assess the risk and performance implications of CDS
trades. In addition, I analyze the universe of U.S. bond funds’ CDS holdings which is the
most comprehensive data set to date. A natural challenge of the research is the endo-
geneity concerns. Apart from concurrent events and other missing factors that prevent
13
one from establishing causal relationships, the reverse causality that funds may opt to
trade CDS in anticipation of future risk and return profiles is also a valid concern. We
reduce the level of endogeneity in this problem by the identification that utilizing the
collapse of Lehman Brothers as well as the resulting sudden closure of mutual fund’s
CDS holdings with Lehman as the counterparty as a natural experiment. Treated funds
are defined as those with sufficient Lehman CDS exposures. Control funds are propen-
sity score matched funds with similar pre-event characteristics as the treated funds but
without Lehman exposure. CDS users perform well outside of the crisis periods, but suf-
fer from significant losses during the crisis, which suggests they are taking on excessive
credit risks. Both difference-in-differences (DiD) and event study methods are used to es-
tablish that the sudden drop of CDS positions of the treated introduces lower annualized
5-factors alpha for these funds comparing with their matched peers post crisis.
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Chapter 1
Window Dressing Contagion
through Interlocked Fund
Management Teams
Abstract
Employing the comprehensive career history of U.S. mutual fund managers, we an-
alyze the effect of heterogeneous and idiosyncratic manager style on mutual fund’s
deceptive practice of window dressing. We find strong jointly significant manager
fixed effects, which are robust after addressing endogenous matching concerns. We
use the connected sample method instead of the classical movers sample method
to greatly enlarge the sample size and reduce the selection bias that long exists in
the stream of literature. The estimated manager fixed effects are strong in mak-
ing out-of-sample predictions on window dressing. We establish that mutual fund
interlocks through common managers are important channels that spread window
dressing.
Keywords: Mutual Fund, Window Dressing, Manager Fixed Effects, AKM Method,
Social Network
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JEL classification: G11, G23, G28, G41
1.1 Introduction
As per the requirement of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the SEC, all
mutual funds fall into the justification of the Investment Company Act of 1940 have to
report their portfolio holdings periodically1. The practice of window dressing emerges
as mutual funds alter their holdings towards reporting period end in order to record
their manipulated compositions. Window dressing has long been noticed by both the
regulators and the market participants. For example, Paul Roye, the director of the
SEC’s investment management division, made several public speeches during the 2000-
2001 period that mentioned how the SEC had always kept an eye on window dressers in
the mutual fund industry.
We also are concerned about the misleading practice known as ”window dressing”...OCIE
is examining trading patterns to detect violations in this area. We view this as an anti-
fraud violation. Investors are misled if they are told that the fund is investing consistent
with prospectus disclosure when it is not. —Paul F. Roye, Director, Division of Invest-
ment Management U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission2
Not only did the SEC concern about the behavior, they filed cases against window
dressers in 2005. Although it is usually very difficult to prove that the funds intention-
ally misled investors, the SEC manage to do that in the following case:
The Securities and Exchange Commission (”Commission”) announced that on April
1The holding reports have to be filed semi-annually before 2004 in NCSR and NCSRS reports and
afterwards quarterly in NQ as well as the above mentioned annual and semi-annual reports
2Speech by SEC Staff: The Exciting World of Investment Company Regulation [https://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/spch500.htm, visited on 27.08.2015], see also [https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch412.htm] and [https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch438.htm] for the other SEC staff speeches
concerning window dressing.
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6, 2005, it filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania against...In particular, ... In order to conceal the effect of their
trading, which otherwise would have been disclosed in monthly account statements, ...
sold the unauthorized positions before month-end, and repurchased them shortly there-
after. This strategy of ”window dressing” prevented clients from discovering the scheme.3
We need to make a clear distinction among portfolio re-balancing, window dressing
and portfolio pumping. There is nothing illegal for mutual funds to trade just before the
reporting period ends per se, it is the motivation and consequences of such actions that
complicate their legal implications. Window dressing is of deceptive nature. Mutual
funds window dress in order to hide their held portfolio during the reporting periods,
such that they can charm investors, attract inflows or obey their investment objectives.
If such manipulations further pumped stock prices towards the direction in favor of fund-
s, then they are manipulating stock prices and conducting the illegal practice of portfolio
pumping.
Starting from documenting the turn-of-the-year effect, evidences of window dressing have
long been discussed. While the turn-of-the-year effect is not the focus of this paper, the
abnormal returns generated by small cap stocks around year ends have been documented
in the early literature, for example Rozeff and Kinney (1976) and Roll (1983). Two com-
mon explanations of this phenomenon are tax-loss-selling and window dressing incentives.
Although there is no general consensus regarding which of the two incentives best explain
the turn-of-the-year effect, window dressing motive is present even in the papers that
claim tax-loss-selling is the more important attribute4. Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler and
Vishny (1991) notice US pension funds disproportionately sell poorly performed stocks,
especially towards year ends. In a comprehensive paper on window dressing Agarwal,
3SEC Litigation No.19170 [https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19170.htm, visited
on 27.08.2015]
4See for example Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler and Vishny (1991), Sias and Starks (1997), O’Neal
(2001), Meier, Schaumburg et al. (2004) and Sikes (2014) for mixed evidences.
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Gay and Ling (2014) propose a rationale such that window dressing may exist with the
presence of rational investors. Yet we still need to bridge the gap between the window
dressing literature and the manager fixed effects literature to exam the role of mutual
fund managers in window dressing. Given the private and quasi-legal nature of window
dressing, it is highly unlikely the practice is originated independently in each fund. Thus
looking at managers’ role may help us understand the mechanism whereby the practice
is transmitted among funds, and will have policy implications afterwards.
The purpose of this article is to provide evidences that managers do play a role in
window dressing and the fund interlocks through common manager contribute to the
spreading of the practice.
Employing the classical method of Bertrand and Schoar (2002) to detect manager fixed
effects with the presence of fund fixed effects as the first step, we find strong evidence
that managers are related to funds’ decisions to window dress. The F statistics for joint
significance are high, suggesting an important role of managers.
Getting beyond the sample of funds with manager turnover, which is the key of identi-
fication in Bertrand and Schoar (2002) and other papers with similar methodology, we
also confirm the results with a Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) structured sam-
ple. The new method significantly enlarges the sample from the movers sample to the
connected sample. All managers, movers or not, who work for funds that have at least
one manager moving to other funds will be included in the sample. The estimations
are more powerful with the connected sample. And more importantly, this partially ad-
dresses the selection bias concern of Bertrand and Schoar (2002), which is criticized for
not taking care of the potential fundamental differences between movers and non-movers.
Mutual funds and managers are endogenously matched such that it is possible mutual
18
funds intentionally hire managers with certain characteristics just in order to window
dress. If this is the case, the observed manager effects would rather be fund effects.
We partially address this endogenous matching issue with a propensity score matched
sample as well as a number of robustness checks.
We conduct several sub-sample tests and get statistically similar results. We confirm
that even for those bottom 20% performing managers, they also play an role in window
dressing. It is very unlikely that mutual funds hire those bad performers in order to
window dress. We continue to address this issue with placebo tests, in which we find
distortions in manager-fund matches significantly reduce the manager fixed effects de-
tected, indicating managers lead the changes instead of the opposite. Because if firms
hire managers to window dress, they should have already started before managers join
thus stronger manager fixed effects should be detected.
In addition, we test whether fund governance affects managers’ decisions to window
dress and find that even in restricted funds, managers’ justifications are also important.
The manager fixed effects we find are not just proxies for fund governance. The com-
plicated structure of management teams may bias the results against us, so that the
detected manager fixed effects could be the lower bounds. We check the sample of single
manager funds and indeed find more significant results in favor of our hypothesis. Single
managers matter even more in making funds’ decisions to window dress.
We find the estimated manager fixed effects can make powerful out-of-sample predic-
tions. Identified window dressers tend to significantly increase funds’ probability to
start window dress, even out of the sample that defined those managers as pro window
dressing.
To the extent that managers’ ”fixed effects” may vary over time, then our previous
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analyses will underestimate the importance of managers in window dressing. We take
a different approach and find fund interlocks by common managers significantly explain
funds’ initiation of window dressing, suggesting a potential mechanism of how window
dressing spread across funds.
In order to open the black box of the estimated manager fixed effects, in Appendix
A we exam in detail which manager attributes are among the important factors in these
fixed effects. In particular we investigate whether managers’ career networks play a role
in their window dressing behaviour. We find managers with higher number of Linkedin
connections are likely to window dress. We provide several explanations to address this
issue. We additionally check if manager education, tenure and career development con-
tribute to the manager fixed effects. The Agarwal, Gay and Ling (2014) paper argues a
mutual fund is making a risky bet on its performance during the reporting delay period
when it decides to window dress, and the practice itself, e.g. holding winning stocks,
serves as a signal to the market. We hypothesize if the managers decide to send signals
to market participants in quarterly reports, they may try to signal the market through
other channels as well, for example their personal education. We cannot find strong
evidence to support this view.
This article makes several contributions to the existing literature in term of window
dressing, spreading of negative practices and more broadly managerial behavior. First
of all, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that looks at the relationship
between manager characteristics and window dressing. Existing literature explains win-
dow dressing by fund characteristics including alpha, size, turnover ratio, expense ratio,
trading activeness...etc. This is certainly not the whole picture. Patel and Sarkissian
(2013) is the only paper we find that looks at window dressing and managerial structure,
but they are only concerned with the team versus single manager implications. Second,
inspired by Bizjak, Lemmon and Whitby (2009), we provide evidences on how common
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managers and fund interlocks can contribute to the spreading of window dressing. The
spreading of negative practices is generally more eye-catching in the finance literature
and particularly interesting for regulators. Better understanding in this regard helps
to shape policy that better incentivize managers, enforce accurate reporting, improve
transparency and protect investor rights. Third, we take a further step on the literature
of manager fixed effects by asking which specific manager characteristics constitute the
estimated manager fixed effects. Fourth, we follow the debate on whether managers
have skills. Since the seminal paper of Bertrand and Schoar (2002), numerous papers
find managers matter in various corporate policies. However, the stream of literature is
attacked for the following reasons. For one thing, the matches between managers and
funds are certainly not exogenous. In a paper directly addressed to the Bertrand and
Schoar (2002) paper, Fee, Hadlock and Pierce (2013) find that firm policy changes are not
significantly related to CEO exogenous departures. We try to address this endogeneity
issue in the analysis. For another thing, the sample restriction of Bertrand and Schoar
(2002) casts doubt on the power of the tests, we extend the sample selection following
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and several other very limited number of papers
in finance thereby increasing the generality of the results. While we are not aiming at
tackling the big question of whether managerial behaviors matter, our study does shed
light on this broad issue from a special perspective.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview of re-
lated literature on window dressing and managerial style, from which we derive our
testable hypotheses. Section 3 details our data sources, sample selection process and
some brief summary statistics. In Section 4 we exam the manager fixed effects and check
whether managers matter in funds’ decisions to window dress. We also conduct several
robustness checks to address the potential endogeneity concerns. In Section 5 we take a
different perspective and check how the level of interlocks affects the spreading. Section
6 concludes. Furthermore, a discussion on which specific manager characteristics con-
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tribute to the displayed manager fixed effects is given in Appendix A.
1.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis Developmen-
t
1.2.1 Managerial Behavior and Firm Policy
Classical researches on window dressing implicitly assume no role of managers, or man-
agers are homogenous and selfless, as is usually assumed by neoclassical economics mod-
els. However, this is counter-intuitive. It is an empirical question whether managers
have discretion in corporate decision making. In an early influential paper Murphy and
Zimmerman (1993) study financial policy making surrounding CEO departures and find
no strong evidence that manager discretion matters. Instead, the poor performance of
firms before CEO departures seems to drive the updating of policies.
The seminal paper of Bertrand and Schoar (2002) opens a whole new area of explor-
ing managerial behavior. The most important methodological contribution of the work
is showing how to separately examine the effects of managers and firms on firm policies.
When firm fixed effects are controlled for, detection of manager fixed effects is possible
when there is manager turnover. They find managers are with style in shaping firms’
spending, acquisition, leverage, dividend policies...etc. Following the paper, a series of
papers study various other firm policies and generally find supporting evidences that
managers do have discretion and style in the decisions.5
Bertrand and Schoar (2002) make several assumptions and one of the most important
5See for example Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005), Frank and Goyal (2007) and Graham, Li and
Qiu (2012)
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is that the inherent manager style does not change overtime, nor does it change across
different employers. Apart from this, they acknowledge that they have no say on which
manager characteristics are related to the effects they observe, and on whether there are
casual relationships. These problems are rooted from the agency models which either
1. assume managers do have discretion, but their idiosyncratic management styles are
limited by the heterogenous levels of firm governance; 2. managers differ by their match
quality with firms, so that the idiosyncratic management styles exhibited are purpose-
fully chosen by firms6; or 3. market conditions drive corporate decision making as well
as hiring decisions, so that management styles are nothing but projections of economic
environments.
In order to address the problem of endogenous matching, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach
(2009) randomly allocate block-holders’ ownership stake into two subsets, and assume
in one of the subsets block-holders acquire their stake one or two years before the actual
transaction date. Comparing the block-holder fixed effects estimated from the hypo-
thetical sample and the actual sample, no conclusive evidence can be found regarding
the correlation between the two sets of fixed effects. The authors interpret it as sug-
gesting firms do not seem to seek out target block-holders in order to change certain
firm policies. Fee, Hadlock and Pierce (2013) tackle the problem using exogenous CEO
departures, and find no significant firm policy changes following the departures. In con-
trast, they do detect policy variations after endogenous CEO departures. Their results
suggest managers are selected in order to execute firms’ intentions.
Acknowledging the difficulties to deal with endogenous matching, Pool, Stoffman, Y-
onker and Zhang (2014) take a different perspective and check how shocks to mutual
6There are a fair amount of empirical studies that examine mutual fund manager turnover, see for
example Khorana (1996) on top mutual fund management turnover, Chevalier and Ellison (1998) on
different career concerns of mutual fund managers, Kostovetsky (2007), Nohel, Wang and Zheng (2010)
and Deuskar, Pollet, Wang and Zheng (2011) on human capital movement between mutual funds and
hedge funds and their side by side management.
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fund managers’ personal wealth affect their risk taking behavior in portfolio investments.
More specifically they document a both statistically significant and economically mean-
ingful decrease in the risks of the funds when those managers’ home values substantially
declined.
1.2.2 Window Dressing
The primary focus of our paper though, is not trying to engage in the big discussion
of whether managers matter. We aim to provide first evidence on how window dress-
ing is transmitted across funds through common managers and fund interlocks. The
finance literature realizes the so-called turn-of-the-year effect before documenting win-
dow dressing. Window dressing is proposed in for example Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler
and Vishny (1991) to explain the effect, alongside the alternative hypothesis of tax-
loss-selling. Replacing the buy and sell intensity, Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008)
come up with a measure to quantify window dressing, the backward holding return gap
(BHRG). Assuming the reported portfolio holdings have been held for the entire period
between current report date and prior report date, the gap between the implied return
and the actual return of funds serves as a proxy of window dressing. Agarwal, Gay and
Ling (2014) conduct a determinants study of window dressing and establish that fund
performance, size, turnover ratio and trade cost are correlated with BHRG. They run
intraquarter and December tests to confirm that the detected window dressing is not just
momentum trading. More importantly, they establish the existence of window dressing
with rational investors. There can be an up to 60 days delay when funds file reports,
thus window dressing is comparable to a risky bet. If the fund performances of window
dressers during the delay period are good, then investors may perceive the manipulated
favorable reports as genuine reflections of manager skills; while if the fund performances
during the delay period are bad, then funds lose the bet and investors realize the reports
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are misleading.
1.2.3 Hypotheses
There are at least three reasons we believe why window dressing could be a manager
matter, in addition to a fund matter. To begin with, as is argued by Bizjak, Lemmon
and Whitby (2009), this is a negative and private practice. Given its nature it is very
unlikely that managers acquires the knowledge regarding window dressing through pub-
lic channels especially in early years. In this regard, when managers travel from one fund
to another, they will most likely carry their knowledge on window dressing with them,
consider the possibility of window dressing when making investment decisions before re-
porting period ends, and share the knowledge with their colleagues in the management
team. Second, window dressing is not easy to implement. Being on the edge of legal
and illegal, managers have to possess skills in order to hide their true intention while
at the same time avoid pumping up stock prices.7 Third, numerous studies establish
that managers do have styles even after accounting for possible endogeneity. Our first
testable hypothesis is:
Hypothesis I: Idiosyncratic manager style matters for window dressing. In particular,
managers’ willingness to connect positively contribute to window dressing.
We explore further the mechanism window dressing is spreading across funds. In the
literature on firms’ board connectivity, for example Davis (1991) and Bizjak, Lemmon
and Whitby (2009), scholars find a number of corporate practices, for example poison
pills and option backdating, spread across firms through board connections. Not only
does board connectivity matter, but its influence is stronger with tighter interlocks. For
7We do not believe it is the trading desk who possesses the skill, because in the end managers will
decide which stocks to trade.
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any fund periods in the sample, we define the level of interlocks between fund i at time
t with fund j at time k as:
Λ(it)(jk) =
CN(it)(jk)
Nit
+
CN(it)(jk)
Njk
t− k + 1 (1.1)
Where Λ is the interlock measure, N is the number of managers of each fund period,
and CN is the number of common managers for the fund-period pair. Notice we require
t ≥ k. The measure is normalized by dividing its standard deviation after subtracting
the mean. We formulate hypothesis 2 as follows:
Hypothesis II: Inherent manager styles help explaining the spread of window dressing
across funds. A fund’s probability to start window dress is higher when there is a pro
window dressing manager joining. Further, the closer the interlock between fund periods,
the higher the probability that a fund starts to window dress conditional on the matched
fund is a window dressing fund.
1.3 Data and Sample Construction
The primary data source of this research is Morningstar Direct, from which we extract
the complete history of manager career for all U.S. equity funds. We keep only open
end equity funds following previous literature, but keep the passively managed funds as
well. Passively managed funds are usually excluded in previous mutual fund studies but
in our case even they can engage in window dressing. Considering it is even harder for
passively managed funds to over perform their benchmarks, they may as well have the
incentive to window dress8.
8For example, they could temporarily deviate from their investment objectives, and window dress
just before reporting period ends in order to comply with the regulations.
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We keep Morningstar fund ID as the primary fund identifier. We keep only data from
September 1998 due to data limitations in CRSP Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund
Database from which we get the fund level data. We drop managers that appear only
once in the sample as they are difficult to interpret especially given the sizes of mutual
fund management teams. The match between the Morningstar and CRSP databases is
completed through tickers and CUSIPs. We follow the common practice to deal with
multiple share classes in CRSP, so that fund size is the aggregate TNA across all share
classes and other variables like fund return are TNA-weighted average values.
In order to compute the backward holding return, we acquire mutual fund holdings
from Thomson-Reuters Mutual Fund Database. MFlinks provides the match between
the Thomson database and CRSP Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund Database. Here
we use Rdate as the effective date of reports. Additionally we need stock price series
from CRSP and merge them with the holding database to get implied fund returns. The
implied backward holding returns are computed by the adjusted holding stock returns
during the period weighted by stock values, where stock values are number of shares
times raw stock prices at the beginning of each period. Then the backward holding
return gap, our primary measure for window dressing9, would be:
BHRG = Implied backward holding return− (Actual fund return + Fund expense ratio)
(1.2)
We proxy fund governance by the number of restrictions they face as reported in N-
SAR filings.10 We follow Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman (2004) and use funds’
leverage, derivative trading and illiquid asset holding restrictions to come up with an
aggregate measure of fund restrictions for each fund period.
9We also use rank gap in the manager fixed effects analyses and find very similar results. For the
rest of the paper we keep BHRG as the major measure for window dressing.
10We thank Laurenz Klipper for generously providing us the data.
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Our final sample comprises of 3976 managers, 1566 U.S. open end equity funds and
9346 unique manager-fund combinations. Our panel variable, unless stated otherwise,
is manager-fund pairs. So that the data is structured on manager(fund)-time level. In
Table 1.1 we summarize the big picture of manager-fund matches.
[Table 1.1 about here.]
We see from panels A and B that roughly half of the managers (49.6%) in the sample
appear only once during their entire career within our sample period11. These managers
are stayers. The movers, who are critical for the identification strategy, account for the
other half. The benefit of Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999)’s model is examined
in panel C. More than half of the funds have more than 50 movers, this significantly
enlarges the sample that we can use to identify manager fixed effects, while only 86
funds have never had one mover during the sample period. We visualize such mutual
fund connections in Figure 1.1.
[Figure 1.1 about here.]
Funds and fund families are intensively connected by moving managers. A large number
of managers switch jobs even across fund families. It is therefore interesting to check
whether managers carry their styles during such switches, and how do fund interconnec-
tions facilitated by managers shape fund decisions.
11It does not necessarily imply that half of the present day fund managers worked for one fund since
managers may drop out of the sample if they move to other industries.
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1.4 Manager Fixed Effects
1.4.1 The Classical Approach
We quantify manager fixed effects first with the presence of fund fixed effects. Notice
when there is no manager turnover, manager fixed effects and fund fixed effects would
be perfectly collinear. Our baseline specification is:
y(ij)t = βxit + δt + αi + γj + (ij)t (1.3)
Where y(ij)t are the window dressing measures for the ij’s fund-manager pair, xit are
fund level control variables, δ are time fixed effects, α are fund fixed effects, and γ are
manager fixed effects12.
Applying the empirical framework that is similar to Bertrand and Schoar (2002), we
report manager fixed effects in Table 1.2. Notice since a fund can have multiple man-
agers, and a manager can work for multiple funds at the same time, the regressions will
be multi-dimensional as opposed to Bertrand and Schoar (2002).
[Table 1.2 about here.]
We estimate the baseline regression in panel A. Each row represents a regression. All
coefficients and significance levels of control variables are not reported here as at the
moment we are concerned with the joint significance of manager fixed effects. The F
statistics is 7.05 with the high level of degrees of freedom, rejecting the null that man-
ager fixed effects are not jointly significant. Further when comparing the adjusted R
squared between row 1 and row 2, we find adding the almost 4000 manager dummies
slightly increases the power of the regression. The increase may seem minimum but this
12In unreported analysis, we first replicate the analysis of Agarwal, Gay and Ling (2014) on the
determinants of window dressing, without manager fixed effects, in order to make sure that our sample
is consistent with previous studies. Our results are similar to those of Agarwal, Gay and Ling (2014) in
terms of both statistical significance and economic magnitude.
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R squared is adjusted for the number of explanatory variables. We find similar patterns
when replacing the dependent variable by BHRG 10%, a dummy variable that equals to
one if the BHRG is among the top 10% across all funds for the period.
Recall we have multi-dimensional regressions, and this potentially can be a problem
if there is a cluster of manager turnover as teams moving all together. It does not
change our results regarding the importance of manager fixed effects but does change
the interpretation. Also for funds with a large management team, it is difficult to judge
and rationalize the observed manager fixed effects. We restrict the sample to funds with
a single manager in panel D so that we can have a cleaner set up. Similar message
reveals, with an even higher F statistic.
A major critic to the empirical setting above is it cannot rule out the possibility of
endogenous matching, so that funds may seek managers with window dressing style or
skill in order to start window dressing themselves. While we will further address this
important issue later in Section 1.4.4, we tackle this problem by a sub-sample analysis
in panel C that considers only the bottom 20% performing managers. It is very unlikely
that mutual funds hire those bad performers in order to window dress. The F statistic
is 3.54, which is still significant. We are not ambitious to claim the endogenous match-
ing story is ruled out as a proper identification strategy will be needed to make that claim.
In addition, for the sub-sample tests of restricted funds in panel B, manager fixed effects
still explain variation in BHRG. Thus it is unlikely that the observed manager styles are
just proxies of fund governance. Given the vast existence of manager fixed effects, there
is no good reason to believe those idiosyncratic manager style would disappear with
tight fund governance, rather than being compressed. We also rule out the possibility
that more restricted funds and managers with less style are better matches so that those
funds intentionally hire low window dressing probability managers.
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1.4.2 The AKM Approach
Now we move from the Bertrand and Schoar (2002) set up to the AKM set up. Start
from our baseline specification13:
y(ij)t = βxit + δt + αi + γj + (ij)t (1.4)
Denote Fijt as a dummy that equals to one if manager j works for fund i at time t, and
zero otherwise, equation 1.4 can be rewritten as:
yijt = βxit + δt +
I∑
i=1
Fijtαi + γj + ijt (1.5)
Now take the average over t and i for each manager j to get:
y¯j = βx¯j + δ¯t +
I∑
i=1
F¯ijαi + γj + ¯j (1.6)
Now we can eliminate the manager fixed effects by within transformation:
yijt − y¯j = β(xit − x¯j) + (δt − δ¯t) +
I∑
i=1
(Fijt − F¯ij)αi + (ijt − ¯j) (1.7)
Fund fixed effects are now identified using managers that move (Fijt − F¯ij 6= 0). Now
recover manager fixed effects after estimated the above α and β:
γˆj = y¯j − βˆx¯j −
I∑
i=1
F¯ijαˆi (1.8)
13The discussion on the methodology of AKM method follows from Graham, Li and Qiu (2012) and
Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015).
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As long as a fund has one mover, fund fixed effects can be estimated thus all managers
in that fund, both movers and stayers, would have manager fixed effects recovered. The
Bertrand and Schoar (2002) specification puts firm and CEO dummies into the regression
and estimate them all together. Thus only movers are included in estimating whether
CEO effects can explain cross sectional variation in corporate policy variables. Here the
AKM method extends the sample from the ”mobility” sample to ”connected” sample.
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) formally prove that connectedness is necessary
and sufficient condition for the separate identification of person and firm fixed effects.
There are at least 3 advantages employing the AKM method: First of all, it partly ad-
dresses selection bias. Since we do not know if there are systematic differences between
movers and non-movers, estimation results based on the movers sample may introduce
a selection bias. By enlarging the sample to include a significant portion of non-movers,
this bias is reduced. Second, the larger sample size provides more estimation power.
Third, there exists a more efficient computing algorithm since the regression we are esti-
mating has a design matrix that is only a fraction of the original in terms of dimension14.
In addition to the joint significance levels of manager fixed effects, we also decompose
the model sum of squares to check the fraction that can be attribute to manager fixed
effects following Graham, Li and Qiu (2012):
R2 =
cov(yijt, yˆijt)
var(yijt)
=
cov(yijt, βˆijtxit + δˆt + αˆi + γˆj)
var(yijt)
=
cov(yijt, βˆijtxit + δˆt)
var(yijt)
+
cov(yijt, αˆi)
var(yijt)
+
cov(yijt, γˆj)
var(yijt)
(1.9)
We expect a significant portion of model variation can be captured by the last term. We
report our estimation results in Table 1.3.
[Table 1.3 about here.]
14See Cornelissen et al. (2008) for the detailed description on the computing algorithm of the Stata
package ”felsdvreg” which implements the AKM method. We use this package to estimate the AKM
regressions.
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Implementing the AKM method gives qualitatively similar and quantitatively stronger
results than those in the Table 1.2. Starting from panel A where we consider the full
sample, the manager fixed effects account for over 12% of the total variation of the mod-
el. While the F statistics seem moderate, taking the high level of degrees of freedom
resulting from the almost 4000 managers into consideration makes it easily rejecting the
null15. Fund fixed effects are still important, and they are almost just as important
as manager fixed effects judging from the fraction of variation in our window dressing
measure explained. Overall, panel A suggests that managers play an important role in
deciding whether or not to window dress, in addition to fund level factors.
We confirm our confidence in suggesting the important role of managers in panel B
and panel C. As explained before in Section 1.4.1, in panel B we use the subsample
of restricted funds to address the concern that the observed manager fixed effects are
just compressed by the fund restrictions to the extent funds allow them to show, which
makes it hard to interpret whether the observed effects are fund or manager fixed effects.
And in panel C, we use the subsample of worst performing managers in order to check
whether funds intentionally hire candidate managers in order to window dress. There is
no strong reason to believe that funds would hire those bad performers just to window
dress. We find significant F statistics for manager fixed effects in both panel B and C.
While the portion of sum of squares explained by managers now is smaller especially
with the restricted funds subsample, it is nonetheless still meaningful.
In panel D we restrict the sample to single manager funds in order to have a clean
interpretation of the results. Mutual funds can have large management and advisory
teams. It is difficult to judge who of them play important roles, and who are only sup-
porting staff. Restricting to single manager funds, however, do provide us with a clearer
set up. We find strongly significant F statistic for the joint significance of the manager
15Checking the F table we can find the critical F statistics at this level of degrees of freedom are all
slightly higher than 1.0000, and it does not vary much with 1%, 5% or 10% of significance levels.
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fixed effects in this subsample. More importantly, these manager fixed effects explain
more than 35% of the variation, much higher than those of the fund fixed effects, which
account for only 7% of the explanatory power. Literature on team versus single mutual
fund manager has long suggested there are at least two counter effects in determining
fund policies. On the one hand, single managed fund has less coordination problem. On
the other hand, team managers may have extra expertise in window dressing that single
managers do not process (Adam and Guettler (2015)). Our finding that single managers
have material impact on funds’ decisions to window dress tend to suggest that single
managers do have a lot of discretion, and this discretion could be the dominant effect
when making investment decisions. We additionally test how manager fixed effects of
a single manager in restricted funds differ from their unrestricted funds counterparties.
While single managers in unrestricted funds do exhibit slightly higher explanatory power
in explaining window dressing, we also observe significant F statistics with their restrict-
ed peers.
1.4.3 Out-of-Sample Forecast
If managers are important in shaping window dressing decisions, we might expect to
detect a higher likelihood for a fund to start window dress when a pro window dressing
manager joins. Thus we conduct an out of the period prediction and check whether our
estimated manager fixed effects are meaningful in predicting fund managers’ decision to
window dress. We split the sample period into 2, before and after December 2006, and
estimate manager fixed effects in the first period using the AKM method we used above.
We define managers as pro window dressing if they are ranked in the top 30% in terms
of coefficient16 on manager fixed effects, and the bottom 30% as anti window dressing17.
16The individual significance level of manager fixed effects does not matter since we are estimating so
many manager dummies, it is the relative ranking of coefficients’ economic magnitude that counts.
17The threshold 30% here is self-determined. In unreported tests we conduct a sensitivity analysis
and choose 10% and 20% as thresholds. The estimated manager fixed effects have qualitatively similar
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Using this definition, we check what happens when a pro window dressing manager joins
a mutual fund in the second period. For each fund period, the net number of joining
pro window dressing managers is equal to the number of pro window dressing manager
joining minus the number of pro window dressing manager leaving plus the number of
anti window dressing manager leaving minus the number of anti window dressing man-
ager joining.
We test the prediction power in a multi-variant quasi DiD set up18. The baseline speci-
fication in column (1) of Table 1.4 is:
Yit = αt + βTreatedi + σPost× Treatedit + γXit + θj + it (1.10)
Where Y is the window dressing measure for fund i in quarter t. X is a set of fund
level controls. α denotes the quarter fixed effects. θ is the style fixed effects. Notice the
dummy for post is omitted since time fixed effects are included.
[Table 1.4 about here.]
The regressions in columns 1 and 2 are on fund-period level. All standard errors are
adjusted since we use estimated regressors. We find a significantly positive coefficien-
t on the quasi-difference-in-differences estimator. Economically, a joining pro window
dressing manager increases the probability of the fund to start window dress by almost 3
percent. This prediction power is even stronger if the manager is promoted. In column
2, we find an even higher probability for funds to start window dress when a joining
pro window dressing manager moves from a smaller fund. One interpretation could be
since managers are promoted, they may be more confident about their old strategies thus
continue to window dress in the new fund. Here we estimate using linear probability
model instead of the logistic model. Since we have some interaction terms, using linear
models make the coefficient readily interpretable.
power in predicting funds’ window dressing behavior as those estimated using the 30% threshold.
18We do not have a common event time since managers join funds in different time periods.
35
In columns 3 and 4 we directly put in our definition of pro and anti window dressing
manager and estimate on manager(fund)-period level. Again we find pro window dress-
ing managers, as defined by first period regressions, increase the probability of funds to
window dress in the second period by 6.4%. We account for the time varying fund fixed
effects by including fund-time fixed effects, the results are robust after including these
terms.
1.4.4 Endogeneity
A potential concern with the manager story is that the match between managers and
funds certainly is a choice variable and can be endogenously determined by funds. If the
factors that lead funds to seek out window dressing manager candidates do affect the
funds’ decisions to window dress, then the manager effects we detected could be driven
by those omitted factors. In this case, the manager effects would actually be fund effects.
Following the spirit of Adam, Burg, Scheinert and Streitz (2014) we employ a propensity
score matching model and find the probability of a fund to have pro window dressing
managers in the team. As a first step we collapse our data set to fund level and estimate
this probability within the sample of first time period by regressing it on various fund
characteristics. Agarwal, Gay and Ling (2014) find that fund performance, size, expenses
and turnover ratio are significantly correlated with window dressing. We include these
variables in this first stage regression. In addition, we hypothesize when funds are older,
more established and more reputable they are less likely to window dress. As such we
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also include fund age and Morningstar rating19 in the first stage20. Second, we predict
in the second period sample the probability of a fund to have pro window dressing man-
agers by utilizing the estimated first-period coefficient in the first stage. Assuming there
is no structural change, the estimated coefficient will be applicable in the second peri-
od as well. We make out-of-sample predictions again to avoid the potential mechanical
effect between having a pro window dressing manager and funds’ decisions to window
dress. Third, we match, in period 2 and according to the predicted probability of having
window dressing managers, funds that having window dressing managers in reality and
those funds that do not. Finally, we repeat the regression specification in columns 3 and
4 of Table 1.4 in this matched sample.
[Table 1.5 about here.]
We find pro window dressing managers increase funds’ probability to window dress by
over 6%, similar to the estimation results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.4. As a result,
the out-of-sample test is robust after controlling for endogenous choice of fund manager-
s. If the manager-fixed-effects-estimated definition of pro and anti window dressing can
predict out-of-sample funds’ decision to window dressing, we are more confident in at-
tributing window dressing as a manager story in addition to a fund story.
If funds intentionally hire managers to window dress, they could add managers at a
different rate comparing to those that do not window dress. We therefore test whether
the managers in window dressing and non window dressing funds differ in terms of the
duration of their positions hold. We find no evidence to support this counter argument.
We also conduct a placebo test in order to further address the endogeneity concern.
19Since data on Morningstar ratings are limited we estimate both specifications with and without
the ratings and get similar results. The estimated probability we use in the matching results from the
specification without the ratings.
20In untabulated results we find poor performing funds, larger and older funds are more likely to
have a pro window dressing manager, while Morningstar ratings are not significant in explaining the
probability.
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If funds seek out managers to window dress, we would expect they may have already
started window dressing even before the actual joining date of their candidates. Oth-
erwise if the manager lead the changes, then it must happen after she/he joined the
fund21. We assume managers join funds 3 years, 2 years, 1 year, 6 months, and 3 months
before the actual joining date. The more distortion we introduce to the match between
managers and funds, the less manager effects we should detect22. We report the results
of the placebos in the following table:
[Table 1.6 about here.]
Following previous discussion we use the single manager sample in order to have a clean
set up. From panel E where we assume managers join 3 months before their actual join-
ing date to panel A where managers join 3 years before, there is a clear trend in terms
of the estimation power of manager fixed effects. The explanatory power of manager
fixed effects decrease monotonically with more distortion to the manager-fund match.
Moreover, the correct specification in panel F has the highest estimation power of man-
ager fixed effects among all. The results support our conjecture that manager leads the
changes to funds’ window dressing behavior.
1.4.5 Additional Concerns
Managers may drop out of our sample when they move outside the mutual fund industry.
If such drop-out is correlated with whether they window dress, a potential survivorship
bias emerge. We therefore check the duration of positions hold for window dressing and
non window dressing managers. Window dressing managers on average hold the current
21See for example Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) for a similar implementation in a different con-
text.
22Consider we assume the manager join 3 months before the actual joining date, if we check the entire
career history of this manager, the portion that is correctly specified is after the actual joining date as
well as three months before the actual joining date. Thus the more distortion we introduce, the less the
portion of the career history that is correct.
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position for 2.33 years, while others on average hold the current position for 2.29 years.
The difference is not statistically significant.
One additional concern with our set up is that we have nearly 4000 managers, which is
significantly more than those of the previous studies on manager fixed effects for example
Bertrand and Schoar (2002), Graham, Li and Qiu (2012) and Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf
(2015). Since we are testing against the null that all of managers are not significant in
explaining window dressing, then if at least one of the manager is sensitive in making
window dressing decisions, theocratically we should detect significant joint effect of sig-
nificance for all managers. Thus we randomly split the managers into 10 groups with
number of managers in each group comparable to those of previous literature, and check
for the managers’ role in each individual subgroup. We re-estimate using the AKM
method and the results are reported below:
[Table 1.7 about here.]
In Table 1.7 we run 10 regressions, one for each group, using the AKM method. We find
manager fixed effects are jointly significant in all of the 10 randomly split groups. The
percentage of variation explained by the manager fixed effects vary from about 7% to
25%, with most fall into the 10% to 16% range. This is consistent with the results from
the full sample test. With the number of managers comparable to previous studies, we
confirm that manager fixed effects are jointly significant.
We provide a supplementary validity test of our estimated manager fixed effects by
splitting the sample into 10 groups ranked by these effects. We then estimated the AKM
manager fixed effects in each of these 10 groups. By construction, if our ranking (and
implicitly our estimated manager fixed effects) is valid, we should expect manager ef-
fects to be most active in the groups with the highest and lowest full sample estimated
manager fixed effects.
[Figure 1.2 about here.]
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We confirm this hypothesis in Figure 1.2 where we find the subgroup 1, in which the
managers have the most negative full sample manager fixed effects, and the subgroup
10, in which the managers are pro window dressing with the most positive full sample
manager fixed effects, have both the higher F stats and explanatory power in terms of
their within group manager fixed effects estimation. An U shape trend is observed from
ranked group 1 to group 10. This adds to our confidence that our estimated manager
fixed effects in Section 1.4.1 and Section 1.4.2 are meaningful in explaining managerial
activeness in window dressing.
We further this analysis by completely randomize manager career history. Instead of
drawing random samples, we drop the manager variable and assign 1000 randomized
artificial managers to all of the observations. The simulation exercise is repeated for 10
times. If the concerns, that the manager fixed effects can be easily significant given we
are testing against the null that none of the many managers are significant, is valid, then
we would expect significance even in these randomized simulation results.
[Table 1.8 about here.]
None of the 10 randomized tests give significant manager fixed effects. The F statistics
vary each time the model is simulated, but they remain insignificant. In the above table
with one of the simulations23, we find the manager fixed effect explains only a tiny per-
cent of variation (0.5%), and the F statistic is only 0.93. Thus the manager fixed effects
we detected with the real data are highly unlikely to be present by coincidence.
23Here only one simulation is shown since each simulation will give different results. The point is all
of the simulations given consistently insignificant manager fixed effects.
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1.5 Fund Interlocks and the Spreading of Window
Dressing
By definition manager fixed effects can be detected only if the manager characteristics
inherent do not vary over time. If managers’ ”fixed effects” vary over time, then our
previous analyses will only find the lower bound of how manager would matter. We are
still confident about our detected manager fixed effects because this bias is against us. In
order to tackle this problem, in this section we take a different approach and test whether
the level of interlocks, derived from number of common managers between fund periods,
affects funds’ decisions to window dress. The technique is straight forward. For every
fund in our sample, we formulate fund period pairs. That is, we have an interlock mea-
sure for each and every fund period pair in the sample. Of course if in these two periods
the two funds do not share any common manager, then their interlock level would be zero.
We re-estimate our baseline regression on fund-period-pair level, adding levels of in-
terlocks and appropriate interaction terms, dropping manager fixed effects. The results
are reported below:
[Table 1.9 about here.]
Various specifications give similar results. In column 2 for example, interlock is insignif-
icant with an economically small positive coefficient. However, the interaction term of
interlock and paired fund period’s window dressing measure is highly significant and
economically meaningful. If BHRG pair equals to one, meaning that the paired was
window dressing, then the higher the interlock level, the higher the possibility the new
fund starts to window dress. If BHRG pair equals to zero, then interlock level is not
important in explaining window dressing. This intuitive result suggests that the practice
of window dressing is indeed spreading across funds through interlocks, or the number of
common managers, or, in the end, managers. We find the results are robust in both the
switcher sample, in which the interlock between funds is established through manager
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turnover, and the multi-tasker sample, in which the interlock is established by managing
multiple funds simultaneously. We do not find the spread of window dressing is more
likely when the funds that manager worked for share geographical locations. Fund in-
terlocks through common managers constitute a channel through which the practice of
window dressing spread. They get exposed to the investment styles of different funds
and carry the information when switching jobs.
One particular concern with this approach is spurious correlation. Since we use fund
return to identify window dressing, this potentially introduces a correlation between the
interlock and window dressing measures if managers select funds according to fund re-
turn patterns. However, there is no difference in return correlation between interlocked
funds that window dress and those do not24.
1.6 Conclusion
Employing comprehensive data set on manager career history of U.S. equity fund man-
agers, we establish the connection between manager characteristics and the controversial
and quasi-legal practice of window dressing. Going beyond the classical literature of
window dressing which treats manager as homogenous and without any style, we find
strong evidence that mutual fund managers significantly contribute to firms’ decision to
window dress. The result is robust after addressing endogenous matching concerns and
powerful in making out of the sample predictions. Further we find fund interlocks affect
window dressing decisions such that window dressing is spreading across funds through
common managers.
Our analysis is meaningful especially for regulators. Mutual fund managers’ compen-
24Return correlation between interlocked funds that window dress is 0.1889, and between interlocked
funds that do not window dress is 0.1920. The difference in correlation is -0.0031 with a z score of
-0.2269 and a p value of 0.8205.
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sation is traditionally tied to their asset under management with a trend switching to
performance based. If the quasi-legal practice of window dressing is a manager thing
in addition to a fund thing, then the process of switch is very helpful since it reduces
managers’ incentive to window dress. Window dressing is certainly a negative practice
at the cost of investors, and regulators may better incentivize managers not to window
dress by enforcing performance based manager compensation.
Although we address the endogenous matching between managers and funds in several
attempts. Ultimately we would need exogenous variations. Information on exogenous
CEO departures, retirement or death are important in order to establish a clean test of
causal relationship. In addition, testing the performance of pro and anti window dressing
managers is also valuable, as the question of whether adding a pro window dressing man-
ager is good or bad news for funds and for investors is crucial in maintaining a healthy
and transparent industry in this regard.
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Appendix
1.A Appendix A: Manager Attributes
As noticed in Bertrand and Schoar (2002), manager fixed effects themselves are not infor-
mative regarding what specific manager characteristics are important for their decision
to window dress. It is therefore worthwhile to further address this issue by decomposing
the black box of manager fixed effects. In particular, we hypothesize that managers’
personal social network is an important factor in the spreading of window dressing espe-
cially in the current context of movers. We use the number of Linkedin connections as
a proxy for managers’ social and career network.
It is an open question whether managers with more Linkedin connections would be
more or less likely to window dress. On the one hand, managers with more Linkedin
connections are usually considered to be more reputable on average, and as such they
should treasure their reputation and network to a larger extent than those with smaller
number of Linkedin connections by refraining from window dressing. In addition, given
the semi-private nature of window dressing, managers with more Linkedin connections
are likely to be under the spotlight and therefore more cautious regarding such quasi-legal
investment strategy. On the other hand, if the number of Linkedin connections can be a
proxy for managers’ personal characteristic to connect in the industry, it is possible that
managers with more Linkedin connections are exposed to more information including
the detailed ”technique” of window dressing. Moreover, people tend to be more active
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over Linkedin when they have career needs. Managers with more Linkedin Connections
are likely those moved more frequently between employers, thereby exposing to the in-
vestment style of different funds and carrying these information when switching jobs.
If this is the case these managers with more Linkedin connections would have a higher
possibility to window dress.
We extract the number of Linkedin connections, education background as well as bache-
lor’s graduation year for all managers that once took the sole responsibility in managing
a fund in our sample directly from their Linkedin pages25, during which we require their
Linkedin-listed career history to match those recorded in our data base26. We provide
the summary statistics of the number of Linkedin connections in the table below.
[Table 1.10 about here.]
Notice when there are more than 500 connections, Linkedin shows the number of connec-
tions for such profiles as ”500+”. We therefore provide summary statistics for samples
that including and excluding these cases. Over one quarter of the managers have a
Linkedin profile with more than 500 connections. We additionally observe a high stan-
dard deviation in the number of connections among managers. In the analysis below we
use two proxies, the number of Linkedin connections and a above average dummy, both
coming from the data set that includes those ”500+” profiles.
The Agarwal, Gay and Ling (2014) argument on window dressing as a risk bet with
the presence of rational investors also imply that window dressing can be a signaling
device. We hypotheses that personal education is a signaling device, and managers with
a MBA or Ph.D. degree, or those graduate from prestigious universities are more likely
to window dress. We are concerned if the number of Linkedin connections are proxies
25Notice we have only a snapshot of these data(cross sectional) and it is correct as of 30.06.2017. We
expect them to be sticky variables.
26For cases we are not 100 percent certain, we extract the data with a question mark. Our results are
robust to including those uncertain data points.
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of manager entrenchment and therefore also include manager age or tenure to control
for such effects. We also included the S&P 500 return of each manager’s career start
year as one of the manager characteristics. The logic behind is managers who start their
career during market down time would be more cautious in making investment decisions
as they spent greater amount of efforts in climbing to the current positions.
[Table 1.11 about here.]
We test these hypotheses in Table 1.11 along with a number of other manager charac-
teristics. Managers with above median number of Linkedin connections have on average
significant 2.93% higher backward holding return gaps even after controlling for man-
ager entrenchment, suggesting managers window dress more when they are exposed to
more information including the detailed ”technique” of window dressing due to larger
career network, or these managers work for more number of different funds, are educated
and carry their style along the way. These effects dominate their reputation as well as
cautiousness concerns when they have more Linkedin connections. Although we do find
managers with Ph.D. are less likely to window dress, the power of estimation is limited
by the number of managers that have a Ph.D. in the sample. We cannot find strong
evidence to support the view that the stock market return of managers’ career start year
affects their window dressing behaviour. In untabulated results we also include whether
the fund is incorporated in a liberal state or whether the manager is educated in a liberal
state27. We have limited data and do not find these variables significantly explain fund
window dressing behaviour.
These results shall be interpreted with caution and we are not making a causal statement
here. The observed number of manager Linkedin connections could be the result of the
endogenous matching between funds and managers. Funds may seek certain package of
manager skills that happens to match that of a window dressing manager. While it is
27Following common practice we define a liberal state as one of the following: DC, VT, MA, DE, NY,
HI, OR, ME, CA, NJ.
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highly unlikely that the number of Linkedin connections is one of the factors when funds
consider their candidates, the fact that certain managers have more Linkedin connections
imply these managers may expost be selected more often than their peers. This imply
these managers may have certain characteristics that matches funds’ needs. And if the
profile that funds are seeking coincide with those of window dressing managers, then the
observed number of Linkedin connections can be endogenously determined.
While we cannot fully rule out this possibility, we provide a subsample test to argue
for the generality of our results. We repeat the regression on manager attributes in a
sample of bottom 20% performing managers. It is highly unlikely these managers possess
the characteristics that the funds are actively seeking. We still find statistically signif-
icant coefficients on the number of Linkedin connections as well as the above median
dummy.
1.B Appendix B: The Joining Effect-An Example
In this appendix we give an example that illustrates the joining effect of a pro window
dressing manager.
[Figure 1.3 about here.]
We estimate manager fixed effects using the sample of the first period and detect the pro
and anti window dressing managers. Manager A is among those pro window dressing
managers. Manager A joins fund FSUSA004PD in January 2007, and stays in the fund
until the end of 2012. We see the fund’s tendency to window dressing suddenly improves
after A joined the fund, suggesting the first period identification that A is a pro window
dressing manager is meaningful.
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1.C Appendix C: Are Manager Fixed Effects Fixed?
We show a figure on the persistence of window dressing measure. Of course we cannot
draw any conclusion from this univariate analysis, but the average backward holding
return gap is around zero before managers’ first window dressing. After it shoot up at
the first date managers start to window dress, which is by construction, it seems that
managers consistently behave differently than before.
[Figure 1.4 about here.]
Figure 1.4 is consistent with the interpretation that window dressing is an inherent
manager characteristic. Before exposing to window dressing, managers either do not
have the knowledge, or do not possess the skill to window dress. They acquire necessary
information and skill the first time they window dress. Although this is at odds with
the Bertrand and Schoar (2002) assumption that manager style stays constant, which
suggests we may have underestimated the importance of managers in window dressing.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics on the Manager-fund Matches
The table reports the summary statistics on the matches between managers and funds.
Movers are managers who have worked for more than one fund within the sample period,
while stayers are those who have never moved. The sample comprises of 3976 managers,
1566 U.S. open end equity funds and 9346 unique manager-fund combinations between
September 1998 and December 2014.
Panel A: Number of Funds Managers Ever Worked for
Funds Freq. Percent Cum.
1 1972 49.60 49.60
2 842 21.18 70.77
3 462 11.12 82.39
4 253 6.36 88.76
5 150 3.77 92.53
... ... ... ...
Panel B: Number of Movers, 1=Mover
Mover Freq. Percent Cum.
0 1972 49.60 49.60
1 2004 50.40 100.00
Panel C: Number of Movers per Fund
Movers per Fund Freq. Percent Cum.
0 86 5.49 5.49
1-5 99 6.32 11.81
6-10 68 4.34 16.16
11-20 150 9.58 25.73
21-30 112 7.15 32.86
31-50 267 17.05 49.94
51-100 446 28.48 78.42
>100 338 21.58 100.00
49
Table 1.2: Manager Fixed Effects on Window Dressing
The table lists the F test for joint significance of manager fixed effects. The dependent
variables are BHRG, the backward holding return gap measure of window dressing, or
BHRG 10%, a dummy variables that equals to one if the value of BHRG falls into the
top 10% in each period. In panel A, the sample is the full (manager fund) year panel.
Each row represents a regression. In each panel, the first row is the unrestricted model
without manager fixed effects, and the second row is the restricted model with manager
fixed effects. In each regression the control variables other than manager fixed effects
are not displayed. The control variables include 3 months Carhart 4 factors alpha prior
to the reporting date, fund trading activeness measure forward holding return gap, total
net assets, expense ratio, turnover ratio, time fixed effects and fund fixed effects. In the
cell of F statistics, the first number corresponds to F stat, with p values in the brackets.
In panel B, the sample is divided to 2 parts according to the fund restriction measure of
Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman (2004), and the more restricted fund periods
are included in the regression. In panel C, the sample is restricted to the funds for which
managers with bottom 20% prior Carhart 4 factors alpha joined. In panel D, the sample
is restricted to fund periods that are managed by a single manager.
Panel A: Full Sample
DependentVar F test on manager fixed effects N R2
BHRG 138825 0.269
BHRG 7.0495415(<<0.01) 138825 0.276
BHRG 10% 138825 0.281
BHRG 10% 12.3352416(<<0.01) 138825 0.299
Panel B: Restricted Funds
DependentVar F test on manager fixed effects N R2
BHRG 83682 0.117
BHRG 3.2718603(<<0.01) 83682 0.113
Panel C: Bottom 20% Performing Managers
DependentVar F test on manager fixed effects N R2
BHRG 28063 0.263
BHRG 3.5426173(<<0.01) 28063 0.261
Panel D: Single Manager Funds
DependentVar F test on manager fixed effects N R2
BHRG 11755 0.352
BHRG 12.2951363(<<0.01) 11755 0.394
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Table 1.3: Manager Fixed Effects on Window Dressing using the AKM Method
This table reports the estimation results of the baseline regression using the AKM method. The dependent variables are BHRG,
the backward holding return gap measure of window dressing, or BHRG 10%, a dummy variables that equals to one if the value of
BHRG falls into the top 10% in each period. Each row represents a regression. Restricted model is the specification with manager
fixed effects, while unrestricted model is the specification without manager fixed effects. Cov \V ar denotes the fraction of the model
sum of squares that can be attributed to manager or fund fixed effects. In each regression the control variables other than manager
fixed effects are not displayed. The control variables include 3 months Carhart 4 factors alpha prior to the reporting date, fund
trading activeness measure forward holding return gap, total net assets, expense ratio, turnover ratio, time fixed effects and fund
fixed effects. In the cell of F statistics, the degrees of freedom are shown in the brackets. F statistics are given after the equal sign.
Panel A utilize the full sample. In panel B, the sample is divided to 2 parts according to the fund restriction measure of Almazan,
Brown, Carlson and Chapman (2004), and the more restricted fund periods are included in the regression. In panel C, the sample
is restricted to the funds for which managers with bottom 20% prior Carhart 4 factors alpha joined. In panel D, the sample is
restricted to fund periods that are managed by a single manager.
Panel A: Full Sample
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG No F(1435,133714)=8.62 F(1566,133714)=8.62
BHRG Yes F(3975,133714)=3.5 0 .12904091 F(1435,133714)=7.94 .20700029 F(5410,133714)=9.76
BHRG10 Yes F(3975,133714)=3.91 0 .18550102 F(1435,133714)=6.11 .17333261 F(5410,133714)=9.56
Panel B: Restricted Funds
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG Yes F(2912,76160)=2.73 0 .06044505 F(907,76160)=6.35 .23538444 F(3819,76160)=8.23
Panel C: Bottom 20% Performing Managers
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG Yes F(3590,23248)=2.23 0 .16288776 F(1254,23248)=3.01 .26729491 F(4844,23248)=3.65
Panel D: Single Manager Funds
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG Yes F(676,10802)=6.37 0 .35164997 F(307,10802)=2.31 .07095909 F(983,10802)=7.88
Panel D.1: Single Manager Restricted Funds
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG Yes F(482,7102)=5.66 0 .34319022 F(188,7102)=1.39 .02742369 F(670,7102)=6.38
Panel D.2: Single Manager Unrestricted Funds
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG Yes F(241,1978)=6.71 0 .46169618 F(76,1978)=2.11 .11634308 F(317,1978)=7.75
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Table 1.4: The Joining Effect of Window Dressers
The table presents the multivariate analysis on window dressing. The dependent variable
is BHRG 10%, a dummy variables that equals to one if the value of BHRG falls into the
top 10% in each period. Column 1 is a quasi-difference-in-differences estimation. Treated
is a dummy variable that equals to one if a fund has increased amount of managers, and
at the same time the net amount of joining window dressing managers identified by first
period regressions is positive. Treated is equal to zero if a fund has increased amount of
managers and the net amount of joining window dressing managers is not positive. Post
is equal to one after the joining date. Promoted is equal to one if the joining managers
move from a fund that has a TNA that is one standard deviation below the joining fund.
All controls variables including the dummies of treated and promoted are not reported
but included. The post dummy is not included. In each cell the reported are coefficients
and t statistics. All standard errors are clustered at fund level. These regressions use
linear probability model that estimated by least square. The stand errors are adjusted
using bootstrap.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BHRG10 BHRG10 BHRG10 BHRG10
Post*Treated 0.028∗∗∗
(7.41)
Post*Treated*Promoted 0.033∗∗∗
(6.58)
ProWD 0.064∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗
(5.78) (2.00)
AntiWD -0.009 -0.011
(-1.46) (-0.95)
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 64214 64214 91140 91140
Time fe Yes Yes Yes No
Style fe Yes Yes No No
Fund fe No No Yes No
Time-Fund fe No No No Yes
Std Errors Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap Bootstrap
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: The Joining Effect of Window Dressers with the Matched Sample
The table shows the second stage regressions of the propensity matched sample. The
dependent variable is BHRG 10%, a dummy variables that equals to one if the value of
BHRG falls into the top 10% in each period. The regressions are estimated in period 2,
while the variable to construct the matching criteria, the probability for a fund to have
pro window dressing manager(s), is estimated by a first stage regression (not tabulated)
that uses the sample of period 1. ProWD and AntiWD is defined in the same manner
as in Table 4 from the estimation results of period 1 sample manager fixed effects. All
fund level control variables are included in this second stage. In each cell the reported
are coefficients and t statistics. All standard errors are clustered at fund level. These
regressions use linear probability model that estimated by least square. The stand errors
are adjusted using bootstrap.
(1) (2)
BHRG10 BHRG10
ProWD 0.063∗∗∗ 0.069∗
(4.62) (1.77)
AntiWD -0.023* -0.003
(-1.66) (-0.12)
Fund Controls Yes Yes
Observations 16396 16396
Time fe Yes No
Style fe No No
Fund fe Yes No
Time-Fund fe No Yes
Std Errors Bootstrap Bootstrap
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Placebo Tests of Manager Fixed Effects on Window Dressing
The table lists the F test for joint significance of manager fixed effects, in which we assume managers join funds 3 years, 2 years, 1
year, 6 months, and 3 months before the actual joining date. The sample is the single manager fund manager-fund-year panel. The
dependent variable is BHRG, the backward holding return gap measure of window dressing. Each row represents a regression. Each
row represents a regression. In each regression the control variables other than manager and fund fixed effects are not displayed.
The control variables include 3 months Carhart 4 factors alpha prior to the reporting date, fund trading activeness measure forward
holding return gap, total net assets, expense ratio, turnover ratio, time fixed effects and fund fixed effects. In the cell of F statistics,
the degrees of freedom are shown in the brackets. F statistics are given after the equal sign.
Panel A: Manager join 3 years before actual joining date
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG Yes F(454,8357)=6.88 0 .29058611 F(230,8357)=2.66 .09091353 F(684,8357)=7.22
Panel B: Manager join 2 years before actual joining date
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG Yes F(511,9552)=6.94 0 .3248104 F(255,9552)=2.61 .07318743 F(766,9552)=7.92
Panel C: Manager join 1 year before actual joining date
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG Yes F(532,10216)=6.94 0 .33208657 F(273,10216)=2.37 .06395732 F(805,10216)=7.98
Panel D: Manager join 6 months before actual joining date
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG Yes F(624,10601)=6 0 .33795209 F(304,10601)=2.13 .0728677 F(928,10601)=7.66
Panel E: Manager join 3 months before actual joining date
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG Yes F(609,10628)=6.43 0 .34162285 F(300,10628)=2.27 .0783856 F(909,10628)=8.14
Panel F: Actual joining date
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG Yes F(676,10802)=6.37 0 .35164997 F(307,10802)=2.31 .07095909 F(983,10802)=7.88
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Table 1.7: Manager Fixed Effects in Random Split Samples
This table reports the estimation results of 10 randomly split sample tests using the AKM
method. The dependent variable is BHRG, the backward holding return gap measure
of window dressing. Each row represents a regression. Cov \ V ar denotes the fraction
of the model sum of squares that can be attributed to manager fixed effects. In each
regression the control variables other than manager fixed effects are not displayed. The
control variables include 3 months Carhart 4 factors alpha prior to the reporting date,
fund trading activeness measure forward holding return gap, total net assets, expense
ratio, turnover ratio, time fixed effects and fund fixed effects. In the cell of F statistics,
the degrees of freedom are shown in the brackets. F statistics are given after the equal
sign.
Dependent Var: BHRG
Group F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar
1 F(388,11228)=3.82 0 .1489408
2 F(389,13733)=4.63 0 .1059992
3 F(393,12370)=5.19 0 .14282442
4 F(382,12670)=4.79 0 .15518244
5 F(387,13521)=4.46 0 .16975771
6 F(406,13677)=4.66 0 .07559424
7 F(414,14938)=4.13 0 .10148427
8 F(425,12909)=5.91 0 .25717685
9 F(387,12805)=4.92 0 .17005989
10 F(395,12744)=4.57 0 .15604634
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Table 1.8: Randomized Managers and Simulation Results
This table reports the estimation results of the baseline regression using the AKM method, while the managers are simulated. The
original manager variable is removed, and all of the observations are randomly assigned one of the 1000 artificial managers. The
dependent variable is BHRG, the backward holding return gap measure of window dressing. Restricted model is the specification
with manager fixed effects. Cov \ V ar denotes the fraction of the model sum of squares that can be attributed to manager or fund
fixed effects. The control variables other than manager and fund fixed effects are not displayed. The control variables include 3
months Carhart 4 factors alpha prior to the reporting date, fund trading activeness measure forward holding return gap, total net
assets, expense ratio, turnover ratio, time fixed effects and fund fixed effects. In the cell of F statistics, the degrees of freedom are
shown in the brackets. F statistics are given after the equal sign.
DependentVar Restricted Model F Manager Prob > F Cov \ V ar F Fund Cov \ V ar Fund F Both
BHRG Yes F(999,136662)=.93 .9354 .00504442 F(1565,136662)=28.45 .24784946 F(2564,136662)=17.85
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Table 1.9: Fund Interlock and Window Dressing
The table presents the multivariate analysis of fund interlocks on window dressing. The
regressions are on fund period pair level. The dependent variables are BHRG, the back-
ward holding return gap measure of window dressing, or BHRG 10%, a dummy variables
that equals to one if the value of BHRG falls into the top 10% in each period. Interlock
is defined as above in the text and normalized by dividing its standard deviation after
subtracting the mean. Location is equal to one if the fund period pair share the same
geographical location (U.S. states). In column (5) we restrict to the multitasking sam-
ple. In each cell the reported are coefficients (except for column (2)) and t statistics. All
standard errors are clustered at fund level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BHRG BHRG10 BHRG BHRG BHRG
Interlock -0.00321∗∗∗ 0.00212 -0.00335∗∗∗ -0.00417∗∗∗ -0.00124
(-3.60) (0.14) (-3.69) (-4.04) (-1.50)
BHRG pair -0.00837 -0.0123∗∗ -0.0129∗∗ 0.0165
(-1.39) (-1.99) (-2.04) (0.56)
Interlock × BHRG pair 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0459∗∗∗
(3.12) (2.69) (2.87) (4.23)
BHRG10 pair 0.114∗∗∗
(7.66)
Interlock × BHRG10 pair 0.0413∗∗
(2.25)
FF4F -0.0303∗ -0.00424∗ -0.00415∗ -0.00266
(-1.81) (-1.65) (-1.66) (-0.78)
FHRG -0.611∗ -0.397∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗
(-1.89) (-8.01) (-7.66) (-7.69)
log(TNA) 0.0185∗ 0.00835∗∗∗ 0.00893∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗
(1.81) (3.50) (3.65) (4.37)
ExpenseRatio 17.35∗∗∗ 2.329∗ 2.251∗ 4.959∗∗∗
(4.13) (1.76) (1.79) (3.18)
TurnoverRatio 0.0184∗∗ 0.0115∗∗ 0.0106∗∗ 0.0204∗∗∗
(2.55) (2.58) (2.38) (5.10)
Location 0.00223
(1.46)
Method ols clogit ols ols ols
Marginal effects No YES No No No
Sample Switcher Switcher Switcher Switcher Multitasker
Observations 160488 135354 135354 123729 25178
R2 0.571 0.630 0.632 0.620
Adjusted R2 0.567 0.627 0.629 0.602
Time fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Std Clustered Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Summary Statistics on Single Manager Linkedin Connections
This table reports the summary statistics of the number of Linkedin connections for
single managers. The statistics for the sample that includes and excludes managers
with ”500+” Linkedin connections are displayed separately. The data is extracted from
managers’ Linkedin profile, with career history matches those recorded in our data base.
The data is provided as a snapshot and is correct as in 30.06.2017.
Including 500+ Excluding 500+
Statistics Number of Connections Statistics Number of Connections
N 868 N 620
Mean 274.932 Mean 184.9048
SD 189.6229 SD 148.1549
MIN 0 MIN 0
p25 100 p25 46.5
p50 271 p50 161.5
p75 500 p75 300
MAX 500 MAX 498
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Table 1.11: Manager Attributes and Window Dressing
The table presents the multivariate analysis of manager characteristics on window dress-
ing. The dependent variables are BHRG, the backward holding return gap measure
of window dressing, BHRG 10%, a dummy variables that equals to one if the value of
BHRG falls into the top 10% in each period, or BHRG 20%, a dummy variables that
equals to one if the value of BHRG falls into the top 20% in each period. Number of
connections is the number of Linkedin connections for each manager. Above median is a
dummy variable that equals to one if the number of Linkedin connections of the manager
is above median. S&P 500 is the yearly return on S&P 500 in the career start year of
the manager. Tenure is calculated by the year difference between each year and the
manager’s career start year. In all 4 regression we include fund and time fixed effects,
but not manager fixed effects. In each cell the reported are coefficients and t statistics.
All standard errors are clustered at fund level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BHRG10 BHRG20 BHRG BHRG
FF4F Alpha -0.00172∗ -0.00609 -0.000173∗∗∗ -0.000173∗∗∗
(-1.66) (-0.26) (-2.72) (-2.60)
FHRG 1.093∗ 1.355∗ 0.105 0.105
(1.79) (1.76) (1.56) (1.56)
ln(TNA) 0.0314 0.0546 -0.00209∗ -0.00209∗
(0.84) (0.90) (-1.84) (-1.85)
ExpenseRatio -32.21 -21.72 -4.451∗∗ -4.451∗∗
(-1.44) (-0.68) (-2.10) (-2.10)
TurnoverRatio 0.0457 0.187∗∗ 0.0131∗∗ 0.0131∗∗
(0.81) (2.62) (2.37) (2.37)
Number of Connections 0.000283∗∗ 0.000707∗∗∗ 0.0000426∗∗∗
(2.35) (3.69) (3.33)
Above Median 0.0293∗∗∗
(3.33)
MBA -0.00417 -0.00894∗ -0.0000352 0.0000963
(-1.28) (-1.95) (-0.09) (0.24)
PHD -0.0770∗∗ -0.138∗∗ -0.00453∗∗∗ -0.00408∗
(-2.24) (-2.28) (-2.63) (-1.93)
S&P 500 -0.00502 -0.00957 0.00484∗ 0.00466∗
(-0.26) (-0.37) (1.76) (1.77)
Tenure -0.00330 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.00168∗∗∗ 0.00121∗∗∗
(-1.30) (4.76) (5.54) (4.16)
Observations 3592 3592 3592 3592
R2 0.322 0.409 0.294 0.294
Adjusted R2 0.257 0.352 0.226 0.226
Time fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager fe No No No No
Std Clustered Fund Fund Fund Fund
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 59
Figure 1.1: The Network of Mutual Funds Connected by Common Managers
The graph plots the mutual fund networks in terms of connected common managers.
Each node represents a fund family (instead of mutual funds to make it visible) and each
solid connecting line represents at least one manager that ever worked for both families.
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Figure 1.2: Explanatory Power and F Stats of Manager Fixed Effects–Random and
Ranked Subsamples
The graph depicts the explanatory power and F stats resulting from the AKM manager
fixed effects estimation for the random and ranked split samples respectively. Random
and ranked split samples are as defined in Section 1.4.5. The ranking is determined by
previous stage full sample estimation of manager fixed effects. The ranked group 1 has
the lowest (negative) previous stage estimated manager fixed effects, while the ranked
group 10 has the highest. F statistics and explanatory power are depicted on the left
and the right axis respectively.
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Figure 1.3: What Happens When a Pro Window Dressing Manager Joined?
The graph depicts the backward holding return gap after a pro window dressing manager
joined with one particular example (Morningstar fund ID FSUSA004PD). The identified
manager joined this fund in Jan 2007. The variable on the X axis is time, and the
variable on the Y axis is the backward holding return gap of this fund.
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Figure 1.4: Manager Window Dressing Following the First Occurrence
The graph depicts average managers’ window dressing after their first practices. For all
managers in the sample we find their first window dressing date, as defined by BHRG
10% and shown as time equals to zero above, and tract them through time. The variable
on the X axis is months before and after their first window dressing, and the variable on
the Y axis is the average of backward holding return gap across managers.
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Chapter 2
Mutual Fund CDS Strategies
Abstract
By matching U.S. fixed income mutual fund’s Credit Default Swap (CDS) hold-
ings collected from the SEC filings with their reported portfolio holdings from
Morningstar, we examine the intended strategies when these CDS contracts are
entered into, namely negative basis trading, hedging, bond synthesizing and spec-
ulating via naked long or short CDS positions. We find risk reducing incentives
are dominated by speculative incentives, especially those to increase credit expo-
sure via naked short CDS contracts. While other strategies are wide-spreading
among CDS-using funds, negative basis trading motivated trades are, within the
time frame of our estimation period, concentrated in few funds with highest total
net assets. Experienced fund managers tend to take on more credit risk, while
female managers are more likely to hedge comparing with their male peers. We
confirm the existence of cross-fund-within-family trades facilitated by CDS. Fund
family level strategic concerns overweight in-family fund tournament story in such
trades.
Keywords: Mutual funds, Credit default swap, Portfolio management, Risk Man-
agement
JEL classification: G11, G23, G28
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2.1 Introduction and Hypothesis Development
The U.S. mutual fund industry provides a justified laboratory to study the trading in-
centives of Credit Default Swaps (CDS). In order to pin down the motivation behind
the CDS trades, it is essential to map the full portfolio set of these CDS-trading market
participants, especially whether they hold the underlying of the CDS. This informa-
tion is otherwise difficult to collect as CDS was traditionally traded over the counter
with minimum transparency1. A few previous studies, notably Oehmke and Zawadowski
(2016), acquire transaction level data of CDS from Depository Trust & Clearing Corpora-
tion (DTCC) and inspect CDS trading incentives by market-existing CDS positions and
bond positions. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016) find CDS is used for both hedging and
speculation. Using bond outstanding volume as a proxy for hedging, and using analyst
earnings forecast dispersion as a proxy for speculation, they find more CDS are traded
on issuers that have more bond outstanding and for cases when analysts have disagree-
ment regarding the reference entities’ future performance. However, no direct evidence
can be provided by these ”macro” level analyses without looking from each market par-
ticipants’ perspective as they are eventually the entities making the investment decisions.
CDS involves the exchange (swap) of fixed-income securities’ credit risk between CD-
S buyers and CDS sellers. Within the swap contract term, the buyer makes periodic
payments to the seller and in return the seller compensates the buyer in credit events
as defined in the contract. By the end of 2007, the outstanding CDS amount was 62
trillion USD, more than the total notional of all bonds outstanding. It had fallen to
29 trillion USD by the end of 2011 yet still plays a significant role in credit risk trad-
ing. One of the distinguishing features between insurance and CDS is that CDS may
be held naked, i.e. without holding the underlying securities2. This feature amplifies
1This is gradually changing due to recent regulation changes, including central clearing and the
introduction of swap execution facilities. However, CDS trades have not been incorporated into swap
execution facilities yet.
2Except for naked long CDS positions written on EU sovereign debt starting from November 1, 2012,
according to Regulation No.236/2012 of the European Parliament.
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the concern over funds’ ability to generate high implicit leverage at low costs through
short CDS positions. AIG, Bear Stearns, Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund, among
other funds, suffered from significant losses trading CDS during the global financial cri-
sis. It is therefore worthwhile to ask what is the motivation that initiated the CDS trades.
The mutual fund industry is strictly regulated by the Investment Company Act 1940
(ICA) as well as its following amendments. All U.S. mutual funds have to report their
portfolio holdings to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) in N-Q
portfolio filings, semi-annual filings and annual filings3, in which they need to detail
all holdings, including derivative positions, as of each respective reporting period end.
This provides us with an unique opportunity to match their CDS holdings with possible
underlying bond holdings. For example, purchasing CDS on an existing bond portfolio
could be of hedging motivations, while selling CDS and investing the corresponding no-
tional into treasuries could synthesize a bond position. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper to facilitate such a match and investigate the CDS investment
strategies on transaction level4.
We start from the data set of Adam and Guettler (2015), detailed CDS contract in-
formation for the 100 largest U.S. corporate fixed income mutual funds from 07.2004 to
12.20105. For each of the CDS holdings we identify the issuer of the underlying secu-
rity that falls into one of the following categories: corporate, government, asset backed
security (ABS), CDS index or bond index. We are able to identify 790 issuers in to-
tal. We then collapse the CDS data set from issue level to issuer level for each fund
quarter because CDS are usually standardized contracts and even underlying and CDS
3The reporting frequency standard has been lifted in 2004. After 2004 funds have to file NCSR,
NCSRS and N-Q reports with quarterly intervals.
4Jiang and Zhu (2015) and Aragon, Li and Qian (2017) also have detailed mutual fund holdings of
CDS for periods 2007-2011 and 2004-2009 respectively. Yet there is no match between the underlying
with the CDS and therefore one can only infer strategies by observing the buy/sell direction.
5For data extraction process and detailed sample description please refer to Adam and Guettler
(2015) and Galkiewicz and Ma (2017). Out of these 100 funds, 66 have at least one CDS position
outstanding during the sample period.
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positions with different coupon rate and maturity can formulate combined strategies as
well. We restrict to single name corporate CDS in order to have a clean analysis of
CDS strategies6. For each fund quarter we match the issuer-level-collapsed CDS data
with issuer-level-collapsed portfolio holdings data extracted from Morningstar Direct.
For each change in the CDS positions we define it to be one of the following strategies:
negative basis trading, hedging, speculation via naked long CDS, synthetic bonds, and
speculation via short CDS (including speculation via naked short CDS, outright CDS).
We define the CDS strategies according to the changes in the CDS positions, the cor-
responding changes in the underlying positions (if there is any), the time sequence of
these changes, the basis between the CDS market and the cash bond market when such
changes occur, and the liquidity of the CDS and the underlying bond. Detailed features
of these strategies are discussed in Section 2.2. CDS are usually standardized instru-
ments with contracts following the guideline of the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) master agreement. They have 5 years time to maturity when ini-
tiated and the most common practice to close existing CDS positions is to enter into
offsetting positions. As a result, we separately consider cases when the entering long
(short) CDS position offsets the previously held short (long) CDS position on the same
issuer.
We formulate a number of testable hypotheses motivated by previous empirical and
theoretical research on mutual fund investment strategies. There is mixed evidence on
whether mutual funds use derivatives for hedging or speculation and yield chasing pur-
poses. Koski and Pontiff (1999) and Cici and Palacios (2015) propose that equity mutual
6The majority of multi-name CDS are written on CDS indices and bond indices. Of course even with
multi-name CDS we can also define CDS strategies in a way that is similar to our single-name CDS
strategy definitions. For example, we could match CDS written on iBoxx USD Liquid HY to all bonds
that are among the constituent of iBoxx USD Liquid HY index. However, this is not a practical solution
as the matching will be contaminated by uncertainty. And the matching is even more questionable with
CDS written on CDS indices, as the credit profile of CDS indices is correlated with those of the bond
portfolio.
67
funds use derivatives primarily for risk reduction. This is consistent with the public per-
ception that mutual funds as strictly regulated investment companies use derivatives
mostly for hedging purposes. Complicated trading strategies like negative basis trading
are traditionally considered as a hedge fund strategy. Two international studies Johnson
and Wayne (2004) and Marin and Rangel (2006), however, document the risk increasing
of mutual funds following derivatives transactions. Although there is no direct evidence
on the CDS strategies of fixed-income mutual funds, it has been confirmed in a number
of previous papers (Adam and Guettler (2015), Jiang and Zhu (2015), Galkiewicz and
Ma (2017) and Aragon, Li and Qian (2017)) that bond mutual funds are on average net
seller of CDS7. Our first hypothesis is therefore related to funds’ strategies in trading
CDS.
Hypothesis 1: Fixed-income mutual funds trade single name CDS for various reasons
including to trade negative basis, to hedge, to speculate via naked long CDS, to synthe-
size bonds, and to speculate via short CDS, among which the short speculative strategy
is the dominant strategy.
In contrast to the public perception, we find hedging motivated transactions constitute
only 6.22% of all mutual funds’ single name CDS trades. Instead, speculative strategies,
especially selling naked CDS, are the dominant strategies during the sample period. In
the time periods leading to the financial crisis, speculative strategies, especially via short
CDS, gained enormous popularity. These positions declined rapidly post crisis. On the
long side, CDS purchases are more likely to be negative basis trading or speculating via
naked long CDS than hedging. Negative basis trading was most widely used immediately
following the crisis when there is convergence of the CDS basis.
We formulate testable hypotheses regarding the determinants of the defined strategies.
7Galkiewicz and Ma (2017) notice the possibility of funds using CDS to bypass the 5% diversification
rule, that funds cannot invest more than 5% of their TNA to securities of one single issuer.
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First, CDS is a complicated credit derivative and CDS trading would require expertise to
implement. Additionally, a typical CDS contract has a size of 5 million U.S. dollars and
therefore would be more conveniently used by larger funds (Adam and Guettler (2015)),
we therefore hypothesize that larger funds would engage in more CDS strategies. Invest-
ment grade funds would potentially use less CDS since their assets are relatively safe
with less rationale in hedging. And their profit from gaining credit risk exposure via
short CDS is also limited by the quality of CDS they sell. However, Adam and Guettler
(2015) find investment grade funds hold more junk CDS (in percentage of total CDS
held) than their junk bonds (in percentage of total bonds held), while high yield funds
hold less junk CDS comparing with their junk bond holdings. They also document in-
vestment grade funds are more likely to trade CDS, and are insignificant in explaining
net short CDS positions. The authors attribute the results to investment grade funds
may have more incentive to shift risk since their performances are clustered, therefore
a minor change in performance is meaningful. It is therefore an open question how do
investment grade funds use CDS comparing with high yield funds and we speculate that
investment grade funds trade more CDS for risk reduction purpose since they wish to
minimize price impact, and trade less CDS for speculative purposes due to credit risk
control8.
Second, we formulate hypotheses on a number of manager characteristics. Young and
less established managers are more risk-averse than their established peers due to higher
termination risk (Chevalier and Ellison (1999a)). The compensation of longer tenured
managers is less sensitive to their performance. Additionally, investors seem to punish
more established managers less when their funds underperform because of trust and rep-
utation (Wu, Wermers and Zechner (2016)). It is therefore reasonable to hypothesize
older managers and those with more experience would trade more speculative CDS po-
8This is not necessarily inconsistent with Adam and Guettler (2015). For example, an investment
grade fund invest 10% of its TNA into junk bonds, and 90% into investment grade bonds. Now the
fund purchases CDS to protect its 10% junk bond position. In this case, the fund would have 100% of
CDS invested in junk CDS.
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sitions, e.g. selling CDS to load up on credit risk. Chevalier and Ellison (1999b) argue
that quality of education (and hence professional network) matters for manager decision
making. Given the complexity in CDS trading, we propose that better educated man-
agers use more CDS strategies that are unorthodox (i.e. other than hedging). There is
a stream of literature on whether there is prejudice towards women in management and
how female managers perform in comparison with male managers. Some view men as
more overconfident than women and female managers tend to make risk-averse invest-
ment decisions (Odean (1998), Barber and Odean (2001) and Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007)). We therefore hypothesize that female manages tend to hedge more and trade
less speculative CDS strategies. However, also notice Atkinson, Baird and Frye (2003)
find female mutual fund managers do not exhibit significantly different managerial style
comparing with men.
Hypothesis 2a: A number of fund characteristics are correlated with the propensity to
trade CDS with various strategies. Larger funds are more likely to trade CDS. Invest-
ment grade funds are less likely to speculate but more likely to hedge with CDS.
Hypothesis 2b: Older and more experienced managers trade more speculative CDS e-
specially naked short CDS (Outright CDS). Managers graduated from prestigious uni-
versities or with advanced degrees are less likely to hedge when they use CDS. Female
managers in contrast take on more CDS for hedging purposes.
We investigate the above hypotheses regarding the determinants of CDS strategies in
a probit panel set up on fund quarter level. While we find funds with larger TNA are
more likely to trade negative basis, through data inspection we find negative basis trades
are concentrated in only two funds while all other CDS strategies are relatively wide-
spread. In terms of managers’ effects on CDS strategies, we find older managers, more
experienced managers and those with top educational background are more likely to buy
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naked, sell naked or to synthesize a cash bond. Older and more experienced managers
hedge less of their underlying comparing with their younger peers. Female managers
have 7.9%, 17.4%, and 9.6% higher probabilities to trade negative basis, to hedge, and
to purchase naked long CDS respectively.
CDS strategies could be a proxy of broader fund family level strategies. In the Ap-
pendix A of this article we examine cross-fund-within-family trading strategies facilitated
by CDS, whether they exist, and how do we interpret them. There is a sizable literature
on fund competition and corporation within families9. One the one hand, fund fami-
lies would be better off if their fund portfolio have diverse investment styles because of
the well-documented convex flow-performance relationship (Sirri and Tufano (1998) and
Chevalier and Ellison (1997)). It provides the rationale to achieve family level diversifi-
cation and product differentiation. Family level strategic trading, cross-fund trading and
cross-fund subsidization emerge as a result. On the other hand, starting with Brown,
Harlow and Starks (1996) who record mid-year losing funds gamble for end of the year
returns10, tournaments within families are also discussed. We are concerned if the naked
positions that we defined are truly naked, i.e. if the underlying can be matched in oth-
er funds in the family to formulate cross-fund strategies or to reveal fund competition.
If the tournament hypothesis dominates the cross-fund CDS trades, we would expect
funds with risk-averse managers to take opposite directions in trading CDS when their
performances are close (Basak and Makarov (2014)). However, if the fund level strategic
decision story is more relevant, we should observe diverging performance for funds trade
in opposite direction with one of them purchasing naked long CDS and its peer holding
the underlying.
9See for example Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006), Evans (2010), Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004),
Massa (2003), Bhattacharya, Lee and Pool (2013), Brown and Wu (2016), Eisele, Nefedova and Parise
(2016), and Cici, Jaspersen and Kempf (2017) on family level strategies, cross fund trades and subsi-
dization; Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996), Kempf and Ruenzi (2007) and Basak and Makarov (2014)
on fund tournaments.
10It can also be attributed to the convex flow-performance relationship.
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Hypothesis 3: Cross-fund trading and subsidization story better explains cross-fund matched
CDS trades.
We are able to match the underlying with similar notional in other member funds in
122 cases (out of 895) for naked long CDS positions, and 89 cases (out of 912) for naked
short positions. Funds taking naked short CDS positions are classified as in the same
trading direction with their matched peers in the family that hold the underlying bond.
Similarly, funds entering into naked long CDS positions are classified as in the opposite
trading direction with their matched peers. We find funds with opposite directional
trades facilitated by CDS exhibit a statistically significant 0.38% quarterly 5-factors al-
pha difference on average.
Our paper extends the existing knowledge over several streams of literature. First of
all, our paper is related to the effort in explaining strategies and motivation behind CDS
trades. By matching CDS with their underlying held concurrently by market partici-
pants, we add to this literature by defining CDS strategies on transaction level without
having to refer to the aggregate market volume of CDS and bonds, or to make informed
projections by observing the buy or sell signs of CDS only. Oehmke and Zawadowski
(2016) find the number of bond outstanding predicts the CDS outstanding, which likely
suggests that CDS is used for hedging. At the same time more CDS are observed on
reference entities that analysts have disagreement regarding their future performance.
The authors attribute this to speculative activities. Fontana (2011) and Bai and Collin-
Dufresne (2011) document the negative CDS basis during the global financial crisis and
attribute the basis to funding risk, funding cost, collateral quality, counterparty risk,
and liquidity factors. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015) model CDS as a non-redundant
security due to their lower trading costs. The model predicts negative CDS basis. These
researches on negative basis trading motivates us to check the strategy from the market
participants’ perspective.
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Second, the article adds to the literature on the use of CDS by financial institutions
as well as mutual funds’ derivative use. Mutual fund industry is considered as a minor
player in CDS trading, yet the severe losses to the industry during the financial crisis
due to CDS should remind us of the importance in understanding the details of these
positions. There are a number of papers that cover mutual funds’ derivative use. Koski
and Pontiff (1999) and Cici and Palacios (2015) provide diverging evidences from John-
son and Wayne (2004) and Marin and Rangel (2006) on whether there are differences
in performance and risk between equity mutual funds that use and do not use deriva-
tives, predominantly options. The first two document risk reduction in using options,
while the latter two international studies state the opposite. There is also a stream of
literature that looks at the use of CDS and other financial institutions. Mahieu and
Xu (2007) and Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2005) study the use of CDS by banks.
However, due to adverse selection and moral hazard problems the CDS market for usual
bank exposures is relatively illiquid. Hirtle (2009) finds bank credit supply is positively
related to greater CDS use only for large term loans, which may suggest the results are
accruing to large firms with established reputation. In a paper that studies the risk and
performance implications of hedge funds’ use of stock options, Aragon and Martin (2012)
suggest hedge funds possess significant timing and picking skills. The underlying stock’s
return and volatility can be predicted by the option holdings of hedge funds.
The papers that are most closely related to this article in terms of the subject of in-
vestigation are Adam and Guettler (2015), Jiang and Zhu (2015), Galkiewicz and Ma
(2017) and Aragon, Li and Qian (2017). However, our paper has a very different research
focus. Adam and Guettler (2015) focus on the performance and risk of team managed
CDS using funds and compare them with those of single managed CDS using funds.
The argument is on the costs and benefits with teams, i.e. more expertise, experience
and skills vis-a´-vis coordination problems. The financial crisis is employed as a natural
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experiment as long decision times are extremely costly during adverse and rapid chang-
ing markets. Jiang and Zhu (2015) provide evidences on the liquidity provision role of
the CDS market. Galkiewicz and Ma (2017) study the manager characteristics that are
correlated with funds’ CDS use, yet CDS strategies are proxied by long and short CDS
positions only. Aragon, Li and Qian (2017) exam a number of hypotheses related to
general CDS use in the mutual fund industry with a focus on counterparty risk. We add
to this literature by pinning down the CDS strategies of mutual funds and relate the
detailed strategies to fund and manager characteristics11
Third, we shed additional light on cross-fund trading and subsidization with a specific
type of transaction. Each single name CDS has a specific underlying security that may
be held by other funds in the family. A natural and direct link therefore can be estab-
lished on transaction level. Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004) show fund families benefit
from diverse investment strategies across funds by attracting more fund inflows. This
is consistent with the convex flow-performance relationship of Sirri and Tufano (1998)
and Chevalier and Ellison (1997). A number of papers, including Massa (2003), Gaspar,
Massa and Matos (2006), Bhattacharya, Lee and Pool (2013), Brown and Wu (2016),
Eisele, Nefedova and Parise (2016), and Cici, Jaspersen and Kempf (2017) document
the existence of cross-fund trading, learning and subsidization from various aspects12.
However, none of them provide direct evidence on transaction level. We fill the gap in
this regard.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data sources
and sample construction. In Section 3 we formally define the CDS strategies based on
the match between CDS with its underlying security and provide summary statistics.
The question what strategies do mutual funds employ when trading CDS is answered in
11See for example Chevalier and Ellison (1999a), Wu, Wermers and Zechner (2016), Chevalier and
Ellison (1999b), Odean (1998), Barber and Odean (2001), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Atkinson,
Baird and Frye (2003) for behaviour stories in the mutual fund industry.
12Basak and Makarov (2014) formulate a theoretical framework to study these issues.
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this section. Determinants studies on CDS strategies are presented in Section 4. Section
5 concludes. Appendix A deepens our analysis to the cross-fund level.
2.2 Data and Sample Construction
The primary data set is quarterly CDS holdings of the top 100 U.S. fixed-income mu-
tual funds for the sample period 07.2004 to 12.2010, which is identical to Adam and
Guettler (2015)13. This information has been gathered from NQ, NCSR, NCSRS filings
recorded in SEC Edgar database and the commercial Edgar Pro database. Given the
CDS data is available quarterly after 2004, we keep all other data matched to the CDS
data in quarterly intervals whenever possible. The definition of the top 100 fixed-income
bond funds is based on their TNA as of the end of quarter two of 2004, and for funds
that fall into the following Lipper category: corporate debt funds A-rated, corporate
debt funds BBB-rated, short investment grade, short-intermediate investment grade, in-
termediate investment grade, multi-sector income, and high current yield (Adam and
Guettler (2015)). Among mutual funds CDS are primarily used by fixed-income funds
by their design. And the top 100 bond funds already capture the majority of the mar-
ket capitalization of all U.S. bond mutual funds during the sample period (Adam and
Guettler (2015)). These 100 funds were followed towards the end of the sample period to
avoid survivorship bias. Unique identifiers are assigned and kept as the primary match
key. For each CDS position, its notional, market value, buy/sell sign, counterparty and
underlying information are extracted from the filings. Please refer to Adam and Guettler
(2015) for detailed discussions on the CDS data extraction of this sample.
We need fund holding data in order to inspect the match between CDS and its un-
derlying. In order to facilitate the cross-fund match, we gather fund holdings not only
13We are grateful for the data provided by Adam and Guettler (2015).
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for the top 100 sample funds, but also all funds that belong to the families of these 100
funds. This data set has been acquired from Morningstar14. Fund level characteristics
such as fund name, family, manager(s), TNA, daily and monthly returns, turnover ratio,
expense ratio, fund class, and shares held by institutional investors are obtained from
CRSP survivorship bias free mutual fund database. The CRSP data is collapsed from
share class level to fund level following common practice. Variables are TNA-weighted
when appropriate. Fund TNA is the aggregate across all share classes. For managers
of the sample funds we follow Galkiewicz and Ma (2017) to collect manager level char-
acteristics from Morningstar, with Bloomberg, fund reports, and fund official websites
as supplements. In particular, we gather manager’s age, experience (in years) working
for the top 100 funds, gender and educational background. Manager characteristics are
team-adjusted as in Galkiewicz and Ma (2017)15.
We extract CDS basis of the CDS holdings (BLP CDS BASIS MID), market spread
of CDS, as well as underlying bond z spread and asset swap spread from Bloomberg16.
We pick the issue with 5 years to maturity whenever possible (or closest) to collapse
14Notice Morningstar also has CDS and other derivative holdings recorded for the funds, yet the
quality of the data is questionable and the underlying of the CDS is usually not recognizable. Researchers
usually resort to Edgar for CDS holdings. In order to check the data quality of Morningstar for usual
bonds holdings, we calculate the sum of the market values (and sum of notional values) of all portfolio
holdings for each fund quarter as reported by Morningstar, and compare it with the TNA as reported
by CRSP. We find that in 84% of the fund quarters the difference between total Morningstar holdings
and CRSP TNA is less than 10% (of the respective CRSP TNA value), and in 91% of the cases the
difference is less than 20% of the CRSP TNA. The Morningstar (non-derivatives) holding data has been
widely used. For example Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny and Ozelge (2010) and Cici and Gibson (2012)
suggest the data is of high quality. Elton, Gruber and Blake (2011) recommend Morningstar holdings
over Thomson holdings. There are potential biases with the Morningstar data since it is voluntarily
reported. The authors compare the fund characteristics of reporting Morningstar funds with those of
CRSP fund universe, and they find no significant difference. We have a problem, however, for the top
100 bond funds sample in 11 out of the 2557 fund quarters we are missing Morningstar holdings and
this could be due to voluntary reporting. All of the 11 cases are in 2004 or 2005. We therefore conduct
robustness checks on our CDS strategy definitions and determinants studies with data after 2005 and
find no observable difference for the coefficients and significance levels in the determinants studies. In 2
out of the 11 cases the CDS strategy definitions are affected yet it is minimum to change the landscape
of the defined CDS strategies.
15We take average for manager age and experience with team setting. For female dummy, top-20
university dummy, and master degree and Ph.D. degree dummies, the team has a dummy value equals
to one if at least one of the team members is attached with a value one in the respective dummy.
16We extract the bid, ask and mid values of these data items. Liquidity of bond or CDS is calculated
by ask minus bid price.
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the data from issue to issuer level following common practice17. We measure coun-
terparty risk by the default probabilities (1-month, 3-months, 12-months, 24-months,
and 60-months)18. This information is obtained from National University of Singapore
Risk Management Institute (RMI). For the factors model calculating risk adjusted fund
performance we obtain Barclays indices including Barclays aggregate, Barclays Corpo-
rate High Yield, Barclays Intermediate Gov, and Barclays GNMA from Datastream.
We additionally collect industry classifications based on SIC codes from Fama-French
repository. A sample summary statistics table is provided below19.
[Table 2.1 about here.]
The funds in the sample have a median TNA of more than 2 billion U.S. dollars. Man-
agers of these funds are on average 44 years old with more than 2 years of experience
in the top 100 funds. Roughly half of the management teams have at least one man-
ager that graduated from a prestigious top 20 university, or graduated with a master’s
degree. Ph.D. degree holders and female managers are rare in the sample funds. The 1
year default probabilities of CDS counterparties are on average 2 percent20. The CDS
basis is on average negative during the sample window, which covers the crisis period
that we observe dramatically negative basis.
Our primary data set starts with 45100 individual CDS holding entries for the top
100 funds during 07.2004 to 12.2010. In order to define CDS strategies on transaction
level, we match the CDS positions with their underlying bonds for each fund quarter.
The match is essentially being conducted on the name basis. As a first step, we iden-
tify the issuer names for each of the 45100 CDS positions’ underlying. 45100 CDS in
our sample have been written on 790 distinct issuers (e.g. General Motors). Next, we
17Bond spreads can be linearly interpolated by two option free bonds with more and less than 5 years
to maturity.
18The median holding periods of the CDS positions are 4 quarters, we therefore employ the 1 year
default probabilities in the analysis.
19Panel A of the table replicates table 2 of Galkiewicz and Ma (2017).
20Mutual funds’ CDS counterparty are predominantly major investment banks.
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collapse the CDS data from issue level to issuer level. The 45100 issue level observa-
tions for all our fund quarters are reduced to 15750 issuer level observations, with 3343
multi-name issuer level observations, and 12407 single-name issuer level observations21.
This suggests on average there are roughly three CDS entries per underlying issuer per
fund quarter. Notional values, net notional..etc. are collapsed accordingly. During the
collapse long and short CDS positions are collapsed separately, i.e. if there are both
long CDS and short CDS written on the same issuer for a fund quarter, they do not
offset each other22. Third, for each of the 790 issuers we search through Bloomberg and
Datastream for all of their possible ISINs by checking all of their bonds outstanding.
We abstract CUSIPs from the ISINs, and further the first six digits of CUSIPs from
CUSIPs. The first six digits of CUSIPs, which we call them CUSIP6, are issuer-specific
and identify issuers. Notice issuers are likely to have multiple CUSIP6s. Now we assign
the CUSIP6s to all of our 15750 issuer level observations on 790 issuers. Fourth, Morn-
ingstar portfolio holdings are coming with ISINs. In a similar way we generate CUSIP6s
for each of the holding entries for all our sample fund quarters. We collapse the holding
data from issue level to issuer level. Finally, for each fund quarter the issuer level CDS
data is merged with and matched to its holding data, with CUSIP6 as the merging key23.
Now we arrive at the data set with CDS holdings and portfolio holdings for all sam-
ple periods on issuer level. CDS and portfolio holdings are matched if they are on the
same issuer. This is the data set we base our CDS strategies definitions on. From now
on we will restrict the attention to single name CDS positions. Since funds report their
holdings instead of transactions, as an initial step we calculate quarterly issuer level CDS
position changes for each fund. Although we do not observe trades between each report-
21Multi-name CDS is on average larger in notional size per position. The total notional of multi-name
versus single-name CDS is roughly 45:55. See Galkiewicz and Ma (2017).
22CDS contracts can be closed by entering into offsetting positions. We, however, do not observe
a large number of offsetting positions (433 out of 15750) and the treatment of the positions do not
significantly affect our results.
23The process is being supplemented by direct name matches, and double checked by manual inspec-
tion. In a manual check of data in 10 random fund quarters, we do not find any errors in the matching
of CDS with their underlying bonds.
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ing period end, the CDS position changes indicate possible trades during the period. We
have 1724 cases in which funds increase issuer level CDS notional in long CDS positions
comparing with previous quarters; 2100 cases of short issuer level CDS increases; 319
cases of long CDS decreases; and 766 cases of short CDS decreases. For the 1724 long
CDS entering and 2100 short CDS entering, we define the CDS strategies in Section 2.3.
2.3 CDS Strategies and Summary Statistics
In this section we formally define CDS strategies based on observable data24. One partic-
ular concern is that the observed fund/manager actions may not be fully representative
of the true incentives and mindsets. We therefore use the word ”strategy” loosely. It
refers to the observed actions, with a good chance reflecting the thought process.
2.3.1 Negative Basis Trading
Basis is the spread difference on the same asset between cash and derivatives markets.
CDS basis is therefore the difference in spread between CDS and their underlying asset,
usually bonds, and is calculated as CDS spread minus bond spread. CDS spread can be
represented by either the reported CDS premium or market CDS spread, with market
spread being more commonly applied. We use (interpolated) z spread as a proxy for
bond spread and derive CDS basis. This solution is also provided by Bloomberg (CD-
S Basis BLP Mid). Z spread is the fixed spread adjustment to the risk free curve which
gives the market value of the bond. That is, the value of z given by the following25:
P =
c
f
N∑
n=1
1
(1 + (rf + z)/f)n
+
1
(1 + (rf + z)/f)N
24We greatly benefit from the discussion of the strategies with Tim Adam, Dominika Galkiewicz and
Andre Guettler. We thank them for the contribution.
25Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011) propose to use CDS implied bond spread. See appendix A of their
paper.
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In a frictionless market the CDS basis should be zero since bond spread (e.g. z spread)
measures the credit risk one exposed to when entering into the cash bond position.
And CDS insures the same credit risk. However, there could be liquidity risks, coun-
terparty risks, mispricing...etc26 that effectively drive the basis away from zero. Given
the existence of negative basis, negative basis trades explore the difference in spreads
by purchasing the CDS and the underlying bond simultaneously, and finance the cost
at risk free rate or repo rate. The negative basis will eventually narrow near common
maturity27. Without considering liquidity and counterparty risk factors as well as fund-
ing costs, investors can lock in a profit. The distinguishing features of negative basis
trades are entering with negative basis, simultaneous purchasing, and similar or identi-
cal amounts purchased in the cash and the derivatives market, we therefore define an
increase in long CDS positions as negative basis trading if it satisfies28:
• There is an increase in the issuer level long single-name CDS position comparing
with the previous quarter (either from zero or from a nonzero number). There
is an increase in the corresponding matched issuer level underlying bond position
comparing with the previous quarter.
• Both increases happen at the exact same quarter29.
• The notional amounts of both increases have a difference of less than or equal to
26See for example Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016), Oehmke and
Zawadowski (2015), Fontana (2011) and Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011).
27This is due to the replicability of the CDS cash flow.
28We have imposed a number of thresholds in the definitions. Some are justified by existing empirical
research. For example, according to Fontana (2011) and Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011), the entering
basis has to be less than -10 basis points for the strategy to be profitable because repo and reverse repo
rates can be different from risk free rate, we therefore choose -10 basis points as the cutoff for highest
possible basis when entering negative basis trades. Some cutoffs, however, are assigned. For example,
we need the entering notional amount of CDS and the underlying to be identical or similar to lock in the
profit of trading negative basis. We impose the 10% as the maximum acceptable difference. This value
therefore has to be subject to sensitivity analysis, in which we find slight but insignificant variation in
the number of defined strategies and determinants study with the change of the threshold.
29We do find indicative supporting evidence that funds entering into long CDS position and its
underlying at the same time target at basis trading. For all of the issuer level CDS observations for all
fund quarters, CDS basis is negative for 63% of the cases. For those observations with funds entering
into long CDS and its underlying at the same time though, CDS basis is negative for 91% of the cases.
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10% of the increase in CDS notional30.
• The CDS basis of the entering CDS position is less than or equal to -10 basis
points31.
The CDS basis was turning dramatically negative during the financial crisis. In Figure
2.1 we depict the time series of the distribution of quarterly average CDS basis for all
CDS contracts of the sample funds during the sample period.
[Figure 2.1 about here.]
The median CDS basis is close to zero and marginally positive before 2007. At the
height of the financial crisis, we observe a median basis of less than -300 basis points,
and the variance of the basis also escalated. The basis remains negative post crisis, but
the median CDS has a basis that is only slightly negative and it is unclear whether a
median CDS can still facilitate a profitable negative basis trade.
Applying the above definition of negative basis trading we find 432 out of the 1724
long CDS investments can be classified as trading on negative basis32. This result, how-
ever, should be acknowledged with caution since the cases of negative basis trading are
highly concentrated in two funds (which accounts for over 70% of the negative basis
trading cases.). Our determinants that explain negative basis trading (in Section 2.4)
are therefore heavily influenced by the characteristics of the two funds. Towards the end
of Section 2.3 the time series plot of the number of negative basis trading cases is shown
30If the difference is larger than 10%, we label the position as not classified to have clean definitions.
31Since the CDS data is on quarterly intervals and we do not have information on when during the
quarter the trade takes place, we use the quarterly average of the weekly CDS basis to decide whether
the entering basis meets our requirements. Alternative choices would be to use quarterly minimum
basis (that yields more trades fit the definition), quarterly maximum basis (that yields less trades fit
the definition) or quarter end basis. We report the number of negative basis trades for these alternative
choice of basis as well, but keep the number resulting from quarterly average basis in the follow-up
analysis.
32Using quarterly minimum basis as the qualifying condition we have 446 cases of negative basis
trading. Using quarterly maximum basis we have 409 cases. In 399 out of the 432 negative basis
trading cases the amount of the long CDS notional entered is identical to the amount of bond notional
purchased. We would have 440 cases of negative basis trades if we relax the requirements to 20% in
difference of notional values.
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together with the plot of the other strategies.
Positive basis trades are in general not possible with bond mutual funds since they
are not permitted to take short positions on fixed-income securities. However, if the
CDS basis temporarily became even wider, it may be plausible to entering into CDS
and the underlying bond simultaneously as well. We document 43 cases in which funds
entering into long single name CDS position and the underlying position with similar
notional amounts at the same quarter when the CDS basis is actually positive.
2.3.2 Hedging
Hedging with CDS involves purchasing CDS on existing bond holdings. The long CDS
position serves to insure the credit risk of underlying. The distinguishing features are
taking a long single-name CDS position, and hedging existing portfolio. In a sense
negative basis trades are also hedged since negative basis traders are effectively protected
from the credit risk of the underlying, although basis trading is for yield chasing and
arbitrage purposes and the incentives behind is very different from hedging. Hedging
and negative basis trading motive can exist at the same time as well. In the current
context, we exclude negative basis trading from the definition of hedging and classify an
increase in long CDS positions as hedging if it satisfies:
• There is an increase in the issuer level long single-name CDS position comparing
with the previous quarter (either from zero or from a nonzero number).
• There exists the corresponding matched underlying bond position in the current
quarter. There exists the corresponding matched underlying bond position in the
previous quarter.
• The transaction is not being classified as negative basis trading.
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If the increase of long single-name CDS positions makes the CDS notional on the issuer
to pass through the notional of the respective bond, then the fund is over-hedging.
Over-hedging can be due to duration matching considerations. Among the 1724 long
single-name CDS increases, 238 are defined as hedging, out of which 81 are over-hedged
by at least 10% of the underlying bond notional. This is in contrast to the public
perception that mutual funds use CDS primarily for hedging while other CDS strategies
are more common among hedge funds.
2.3.3 Speculating via Naked Long CDS
Entering into a naked long CDS position without holding or purchasing the underlying
is essentially a bet on the deterioration of the underlying company’s credit quality. The
strategy is of speculative nature since funds only profit from it if the specified credit
event was triggered. The funds are also exposed to additional counterparty risk by uti-
lizing the strategy. If the naked long CDS positions are highly volatile over time, it adds
to our confidence in defining a speculative strategy. A special case, however, would be
funds entering into naked long CDS positions written on financial institutions in order
to hedge against the counterparty risk of their various derivatives positions, including
interest rate swaps, credit default swaps...etc. The credit exposure is not properly re-
flected by observing the bond portfolio holdings only, and naked long CDS positions
on derivative dealers can constitutive hedging strategy as well. We therefore exclude
naked long CDS on financial institution underlying from cases of speculating via naked
long CDS strategy33. Due to the difficulties in quantifying the relative counterparty risk
exposed to34 and hedged in these cases, they are also excluded from the definition of
hedging strategy. We classify an increase in long CDS positions as speculating via naked
long CDS if it satisfies:
• There is an increase in the issuer level long single-name CDS position comparing
33The definition of finance industry is based on the Fama-French 12-industry classification with SIC
ranging from 6000 to 6999.
34This is not limited to the counterparty risk due to CDS trading.
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with the previous quarter (either from zero or from a nonzero number).
• There is no corresponding underlying bond position in the current quarter35.
• The issuer of the bond underlying the naked long CDS is not a financial institution.
Among the 1724 long single-name CDS increases, 781 are defined as speculating via
naked long CDS. Depending on the interpretation, the 81 cases of over-hedged CDS can
also be considered as speculating.
2.3.4 Bond Synthesizing
Synthetic bonds involves selling CDS and at the same time investing the notional amount
into treasuries. The strategy replicates the cash flow of the underlying bonds (securities).
Bond synthesizing is implemented for various reasons. Funds may diversify their portfolio
by entering into synthetic positions due to cost or liquidity reasons. Synthetic bonds are
cheaper than cash bonds when the CDS basis is positive (with low bond spread and high
bond market price), and cash bonds may be liquidity constrained for funds to purchase.
Mutual funds may also create synthetic positions to bypass the 5% diversification rule36.
Therefore, depending on market conditions, synthetic positions may have more attractive
features over cash bonds37. We classify an increase in short CDS positions as bond
35We acknowledge that funds may purchase CDS in order to hedge against the credit risk of a portfolio
bond issuer that have high correlation with the CDS underlying issuer in terms of credit worthiness. For
example, taking a naked long CDS position on Ford is likely to constitute at least a partial hedge against
the bond holding of General Motors. It is therefore a judgement call whether to match on exact issuer,
or to match on some even more loose definitions like industries. Due to the controversy in implementing
the SIC code based industry definitions, we match on exact issuers. Caution in interpretation should be
noticed. Our strategy speculating via naked long CDS refers to naked CDS positions without underlying
holding, it can be possible a correlated asset is present in the bond portfolio. But since the match is
based on issuers and not issues, correlation within issuers is not a problem here.
36We do not observe such practice in our sample funds.
37Our paper primarily focuses on single-name CDS. An interesting topic for future research is the
synthetic positions on multi-name CDS. Multi-name CDS are written on bond indices, CDS indices,
asset backed securities (ABS), and asset backed security indices (ABX). Synthesizing positions provide
handy opportunity to gain exposure to a basket of credit risks, which is otherwise difficult and costly
to achieve without CDS. Before the global financial crisis, ABS and ABX products were growing in
popularity and liquidity constrained. The CDS on ABS and ABX therefore were well accepted since
there is no limit on how many derivatives can be issued on the asset backed securities.
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synthesizing if it satisfies38:
• There is an increase in the issuer level short single-name CDS position comparing
with the previous quarter (either from zero or from a nonzero number).
• The CDS basis of the entering short CDS position is greater than 0 basis point39.
• The bid ask spread of CDS is smaller than the bid ask spread of the bond.
Among the 2100 short single-name CDS increases, 597 are defined as bond synthesizing.
2.3.5 Speculating via Short CDS and Outright CDS
Similar to holding the bond portfolio directly, short CDS positions positively expose
the funds to the credit risk of the underlying. Therefore in a sense by synthesizing
bonds, funds are also ”speculating” that the underlying is not going to default. In
this paper we refer the strategy speculating via short CDS to the speculative short
CDS strategy that does not involve bond synthesizing incentives. Selling CDS without
simultaneous investment in treasuries is cash equivalent to purchasing the underlying
bond, and borrowing the notional amount from a bank. The strategy effectively generates
implicit leverage and can be potentially significantly riskier than a cash bond position40.
If the underlying of the short CDS can be found in the bond portfolio, then the short
CDS position adds to existing bond position in terms of credit risk. If CDS position
is sold naked, which is called outright CDS, the strategy can serve to diversify the
existing portfolio, but also at the same time impose additional implicit leverage. CDS,
especially either speculative naked long CDS or speculative short CDS, can be motivated
by market timing. Purchasing CDS at low credit risk premium and selling similar CDS
during periods with high credit risk premium may realize an arbitrage gain. However,
38We do not incorporate the changes in treasuries into the definition. Cash and cash equivalent
holdings can change for various reasons other than bond synthesizing and is not a clean variable to use.
39Similar to the definition of negative basis trading, the choice of CDS basis could be either quarterly
average, quarterly minimum, quarterly maximum or quarter end. We use the quarterly average of the
weekly CDS basis to define the synthetic bonds strategy.
40Mutual funds are required to keep the explicit leverage ratio to be below 33.33%, yet short CDS
positions may help funds to bypass this rule.
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this strategy is also of speculative nature and is not explicitly listed separately. All short
single-name CDS increases that are not synthetic bonds are classified as speculating via
short CDS:
• There is an increase in the issuer level short single-name CDS position comparing
with the previous quarter (either from zero or from a nonzero number).
• The CDS basis of the entering short CDS position is negative or zero.
• The bid ask spread of CDS is greater than or equal to the bid ask spread of the
bond.
• If there is no corresponding underlying bond position in the current quarter, the
strategy is further defined as speculating via naked short CDS, or outright CDS.
Among the 2100 short single-name CDS increases 1503 are defined as speculating via
short CDS, out of which 912 are outright CDS.
2.3.6 Summary Statistics on CDS Strategies
In this subsection we provide some summary statistics on the defined CDS strategies.
As a first step we briefly summarize the definitions in Table 2.2.
[Table 2.2 about here.]
Notice for all of the 2100 short single-name CDS increases, a strategy is assigned. Howev-
er, the defined long strategy cases do not exhaust the full set of the 1724 long single-name
CDS increases, with cases like simultaneously entering into long CDS and underlying
with positive basis, and naked long CDS on counterparties been excluded from the list.
Therefore, the number and fraction of issuer level cases in each strategy are given in
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2:
[Table 2.3 about here.]
[Figure 2.2 about here.]
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We find the short CDS speculative strategy is by far the predominant CDS strategy
employed by the top 100 U.S. fixed-income funds for the sample period of Q3.2004
to Q4.2010 and it accounts for two-fifth of all CDS deployments. Combined with the
strategy speculating via naked long CDS, around 60% of the CDS use are of speculative
nature. Negative basis trading and bond synthesizing are popular as well, although it
should be noticed that negative basis trading cases are clustered in few funds. Most
surprisingly, hedging incentive is not an important driven factor when mutual funds
considering CDS investment. Instead, yield chasing, diversification and credit exposure
seeking attract funds to invest in CDS. One natural concern is the crisis period falls into
the sample period and there was significant volatility of CDS basis during the period.
Credit environment as well as the public perception may also change following the crisis.
It is therefore interesting to check the time series development of the CDS strategy
deployments.
[Figure 2.3 about here.]
The time trend of the total number of case counts in all five strategies is in alignment
with the big picture of Adam and Guettler (2015). CDS are most widely used during the
periods leading up to the financial crisis, and dramatically declined in popularity after
the crisis. Funds build up significant speculative positions just before the crisis, and
these positions were largely resolved after 2009Q1. The number of negative basis trades
escalated in 2008Q4. Funds may have sensed the significant basis in 2008Q4 would soon
start to converge. Hedging is relatively popular during the crisis, yet the magnitude
of the number of hedging cases is still not comparable to speculative and basis trading
strategies.
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2.4 The Determinants of the CDS Strategies
In this section we further describe the data set by conducting a determinants study and
check which funds and which managers are more likely to engage in each of the CDS
strategies. The analysis is on fund quarter level41, in which we collapse the defined
strategy to fund quarter level such that as long as there exists at least one issuer level
defined CDS strategy for the fund quarter, the fund is said to have engaged in that
quarter. The estimation focuses on fund and manager characteristics and it serves to
test Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b. With a logit panel model, we estimate the
following:
Yit = αt + βXit + σZit + it (2.1)
Where Y is the CDS strategy for fund i in quarter t. X is a set of fund characteristics of
interest. Following Adam and Guettler (2015) we include TNA, fund age, institutional,
investment grade, expense ratio, and turnover ratio in the regression. Z is a set of
manager characteristics we need to test42. β and σ are vectors of coefficients. α denotes
the quarter fixed effects. We report the estimation results in Table 2.4.
[Table 2.4 about here.]
In contrast to our hypothesis that larger funds are more likely to trade CDS, we find
funds with higher TNA are only more likely to engage in long CDS strategies, among
which only two funds dominate the estimation results of negative basis trading43. This
is probably due to the sample itself contains only top 100 funds in terms of TNA. In-
vestment grade funds are more likely to hedge and to speculate via naked long CDS, yet
41The analysis is based on all 100 funds and all 26 quarters, with CDS non-users also included in the
panel.
42Manager characteristics are collapsed to fund level at well. Manager age and top 100 fund experience
are averaged across management teams. For education and gender dummy variables, as long as one of
the team member has the value of the dummies equals to one, the fund (and the team) is assigned a
value of one in the fund level education and gender dummies.
43In fact all coefficient estimates on negative basis trading are basically reflecting the determinants of
limited number of funds.
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are less likely to speculate via short CDS. We believe this can be due to the Adam and
Guettler (2015) interpretation on the excessive sensitivity of investment grade funds to
performance. Consistent with previous literature, turnover ratio and expense ratio are
in general higher for funds trading CDS.
Older managers and managers with more top 100 fund experience are possibly en-
trenched, less risk-averse and less likely to have job security concerns (Chevalier and
Ellison (1999a)and Wu, Wermers and Zechner (2016)). The empirical observation is
completely in line with this argument. Manager age is positively correlated with the
probability of short CDS strategies, and is negatively correlated with hedging. Man-
agers graduated from a top 20 university or with a master’s degree have 4.3% and 3.6%
less probabilities to hedge comparing with their counter groups respectively. Top 20
University and master variables are also positively correlated with short CDS strategies
with economically large and statistically significant coefficients44. Adam and Guettler
(2015) find female managers are less likely to trade CDS, especially short CDS. We find
female managers have a 17.4% higher chance to hedge comparing with their male peers.
In order to address the interdependencies in the CDS strategies, we conduct an alterna-
tive set of tests that employ the multinomial logit model. Since CDS strategies are not
mutually exclusive, a fund can enter into multiple strategies in one quarter. We define
the dominant strategy of each fund quarter as the strategy with the highest notional of
CDS. This categorical variable is then used as the dependent variable in the multinomial
logit analysis. We acquire qualitatively similar results as in the previous discussions in
this section. The details of the analysis is reported in Appendix B.
44There are few managers with Ph.D. degree, therefore the coefficients on Ph.D. are driven by few
candidates.
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2.5 Conclusion
The focus of the paper is to classify and document CDS strategies of fixed-income funds
and to take a trial on analyzing cross-fund-within-family CDS strategies. There is an
extensive list of literature that studies CDS strategies with aggregate market data, and a
few papers on mutual funds’ use of CDS. Yet the CDS underlying has not been matched
with the portfolio of the holding entity. Only by matching the two one can define CDS
strategies on transaction level.
We employ the top 100 U.S. fixed-income mutual funds as the laboratory to facilitate
the matching, with CDS data covering the period from 2004Q3 to 2010Q4. The financial
crisis period is included so that the time series variation of each CDS strategy deploy-
ments during and outside of the crisis can be inspected. We find, in contrast to the
public perception that mutual funds as regulated and transparent investment companies
predominantly trade CDS for hedging purposes, that speculative strategies, including
speculating via naked long CDS and speculating via short CDS, accounts for around
60% of total CDS use for the sample fund period, with speculating via short CDS as the
most frequently used strategy. In an effort to determine the factors that are correlated
with the decision to conduct each of the CDS strategy, we document older and more
experienced managers, managers with advanced degree or graduated from a prestigious
university are more likely to speculate via short CDS and less likely to hedge, while
female managers hedge more than their male peers.
We match the naked CDS positions to portfolio holdings of other funds in the fam-
ily in order to disentangle between two conjectures. The first one being the family
level trading, diversification, subsidization and corporation story which predicts diverg-
ing performance for funds that form opposite direction cross-fund trades in the family.
The other one is the within-family fund tournament hypothesis that predicts funds take
opposite direction cross-fund trades when their competition is fierce and performance
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is close. We find when funds formulate opposite direction cross fund trades via CDS,
there is a significant difference in terms of quarterly 5-factors alpha of 0.38% between
the identified cross fund traders. We conclude family level strategies story dominates in
this regard.
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Appendix
2.A Appendix A: Cross-Fund Strategies within Fund
Families
In this appendix we further explore the implications of the CDS strategies and test
whether these could be proxies of broader fund as well as fund family level strategies.
According to ICA 1940 article 17a-7, cross trades and cross subsidization of money man-
agement firms are permitted as long as there are fair valuation of the assets and equal
treatment of both trading parties. It has long been noticed these cross trades are wide-
spread phenomenon in the industry. For example, financial times writes on this issue:
In house trades (cross trades)...It has happened many times in the past, ...In 2008 it
was one way to ensure that prime money market funds would be protected, says Jean-
Baptiste de Franssu, a former chief executive of Invesco Europe. I am aware that it
happens, ... I suspect it is quite widespread, says another senior European industry fig-
ure who wishes to remain anonymous.45
There is a sizable literature that studies within fund family competition and corporation.
One the one hand, some argues that fund families as incorporated companies have their
strategic values in manipulating fund level strategies. Fund families could explore the
45See Financial Times article No surprise at backroom dealing charge [https://www.ft.com/
content/875e7e80-42e5-11e2-aa8f-00144feabdc0, visited on 22.08.2016]
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convexity of the flow-performance relationship as there are asymmetric responses of flow
for good and bad performing funds46. Thus having a good and a bad performing fund
would attract more flow than having two similar average fund. In this case it makes
sense to take opposite directions in fund level transactions and for those families that
do they could attract more inflows after implementing cross strategies proxied by CDS
cross strategies. There are also values in family level diversification, product differenti-
ation, information sharing within families. Eisele, Nefedova, Parise, Peijnenburg et al.
(2017) find cross trades exhibit significant mispricing which leads to manipulated su-
perior performance of star funds in the family. If wealth transfer through cross trades
is possible, it provides the rational to implement cross fund strategies involving CDS.
Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) and Evans (2010) document that families strategically
transfer performance across member funds to favor those with high fees at the expense
of low value funds. Goncalves-Pinto and Sotes-Paladino (2016) model cross trades as a
way to smooth liquidity shocks in the family47. On the other hand, fund tournaments
and within family competition are also well documented in the literature, starting from
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) that look at how mid-year losers gamble for end of the
year performance. Kempf and Ruenzi (2007) provide evidence on tournaments within
fund families. Basak and Makarov (2014) model the dynamic portfolio choice of funds
competing in the family. Two risk averse fund managers would choose to gamble in
opposite directions when their performances are close.
It is therefore an open question whether funds that take opposite directional trades
within families would exhibit similar or diverging performances. If the fund family level
strategies story dominates, these funds would have differentiable performances either due
to product differentiation and diversification, star fund creation or convexity exploration
concerns. We are, however, not able to further distinguish among the three arguments
46For flow-performance relationship see Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997).
47See also Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004), Massa (2003), Bhattacharya, Lee and Pool (2013), Brown
and Wu (2016), Eisele, Nefedova and Parise (2016), and Cici, Jaspersen and Kempf (2017)
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in this paper. If the within family tournament story dominates, these funds should have
similar performances as funds that are tied are more likely to engage into competition.
For each entering naked positions that we have defined (both long and short), we match
them to the portfolio holdings48 for all other funds in the fund family in the same time
period. Since mutual funds are restricted to take short positions on bonds, we define
trades that are on the same direction (SD) as the CDS using fund is selling naked while
the underlying is found in other fund in the family. Similarly, trades are on the opposite
direction (OD) if the CDS using fund is purchasing naked while the underlying is being
held by its peers. We are able to match the underlying with similar notional in other
member funds in 122 cases (out of 895) for naked long CDS positions, and 89 cases (out
of 912) for naked short positions. For each quarter and each family, we define two funds
to be on the same side (SD) or opposite side (OD) according to the netted number of
SD cases or OD cases respectively.
We estimate a panel regression with the following specification. The panel variable
is fund pairs (paired within fund families).
abs[∆α(ij)t] = OD(ij)t + SD(ij)t + abs[∆β(ij)t] + δt + γ(ij) + (ij)t (2.2)
where abs[∆α(ij)t] is the absolute value of the difference between fund performances of
fund pairs. Following Adam and Guettler (2015) bond fund performances are proxied
by raw return, 1-factor alpha, 3-factors alpha, 4-factors alpha and 5-factors alpha49.
48Again since the CDS positions are collapsed to issuer level, portfolio holding are also collapsed to
issuer level.
49The factors includes are: 1-factor alpha: return on Barclays aggregate index minus the risk free
rate; 3-factors alpha: Fama-French three factors returns; 4-factors alpha: Barclays aggregate index
return in excess of risk free rate, an equity market excess return as in Fama-French, Barclays Corporate
High Yield Index return minus Barclays Intermediate Gov index return that accounts for default risk,
as well as a mortgage market factor Barclays GNMA index return minus Barclays Intermediate Gov
index return; 5-factors alpha: Fama-French three factors returns, adding the previous default factor and
mortgage market factor. See Adam and Guettler (2015).
94
OD and SD are dummies variables indicating whether the paired funds make opposite
trades or same direction trades. Paired funds are not directional-related if both OD and
SD are equal to zero. abs[∆β(ij)t] is the absolute value of fund level control differences.
Control variables included are fund pair differences of fund TNA, flow, age, institutional,
investment grade, expense ratio, and turnover ratio. δ and γ are time and fund pair fixed
effects, respectively. We report the estimation results in the following table.
[Table 2.5 about here.]
We observe from column (1) to column (5) that funds take opposite directional trades
within the family exhibit significantly different performances. For example, fund pairs
have performance difference of 0.38% in terms of quarterly 5-factors alpha if one of the
fund is purchasing naked CDS while its peer purchase the underlying bond of the very
CDS. The results confirm our conjecture that cross-fund strategies do exist and fund
family level concerns in trading CDS dominate in-family fund tournament. However, in
the untabulated follow-up analysis, we do not find consistent support that families aim
to create star funds at the cost of their peers in facilitating cross-fund CDS trades50.
2.B Appendix B: The Determinants of the CDS S-
trategies: The Multinomial Approach
The definitions of the CDS strategies are interdependent. We therefore employ the
multinomial logit model in this appendix to further confirm the determinants of the
defined CDS strategies. We define the categorical dependent variable ”strategy” as
50We further decompose the OD dummy to indicate the CDS trading party and the underlying trading
party (OD CDS and OD U). We hypothesize that the CDS trading party (that take a naked long CDS
position) would hedge for the underlying party’s position for family value purposes. This would incur
a cost to the CDS trading party. In panel regressions on fund quarter level with fund performance
(returns and alphas) as the dependent variable, we find OD CDS funds do exhibit inferior performance.
However, OD U does not have consistently significantly positive coefficient.
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the dominant CDS strategy of each fund quarter, since multiple CDS strategies can be
entered into in one fund quarter51. The relevant marginal effects on the determinants
with multinomial logit are reported in the following table.
[Table 2.6 about here.]
The multinomial analysis produces consistent predictions in terms of the effect of man-
ager characteristics on CDS strategies. Manager age, experience and education are
positively correlated with short CDS strategies. Female managers hedge more than male
managers. However, there are a few notable differences comparing with Table 2.4. Invest-
ment grade funds are not more likely to hedge with the current specification. Turnover
ratio and expense ratio are insignificant in explaining the strategies.
51An alternative way of executing the multinomial model would be to analyze the determinants on
CDS issuer level. For each issuer quarter, CDS strategies are mutually exclusive. The marginal effects on
the determinants are very similar to those described in this appendix with the dominant CDS strategy
approach. We therefore skip the issuer level study but the results are available upon request.
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Table 2.1: Sample Summary Statistics
The table shows the fund, manager and CDS issuer summary statistics. The sample
covers top 100 U.S. fixed-income mutual funds with a period from 07.2004 to 12.2010.
Panel A is on fund quarter level, while Panel B is on issuer quarter level. The definitions
of top 100 funds and fixed-income funds are as given in Section 2.2. Quarterly Flow
is calculated by [TNAt − TNAt−1(1 + rt)]/TNAt−1.Institutional is the fraction of fund
TNA held by institutional investors. Investment Grade is a dummy variable that equals
to one for investment grade funds. Investment grade funds have Lipper classes of one
of the following: corporate debt funds A-rated, corporate debt funds BBB-rated, short
investment grade, short-intermediate investment grade, intermediate investment grade.
Manager Exp is the number of years the manager worked for top 100 funds. Manager
Age and Manager Exp are average values of the team. Top20 Uni is a dummy variable
indicating at least one of the team member graduated from one of the top 20 universities.
Master and Ph.D. are dummy variables that equal to one if at least one of the team
members attained such degrees. Female is a dummy that equals to one if there is at
least one female manager in the team. Counterparty Risk (1 Year) is the one year
default probability of the counterparty investment bank. CDS Basis is the difference
between CDS market spread and z spread as provided by Bloomberg. Bond Liquidity is
the difference between ask z spread and bid z spread. CDS Basis, Bond Liquidity and
Z spread are measured by the issue with 5 years to maturity or closest to 5 years to
maturity.
Variable N Mean Median
Panel A: Fund Level
TNA(ln) 2557 7.9091 7.7466
Fund Age(ln) 2557 2.9798 2.9957
Expense Ratio 2557 0.7712 0.7411
Turnover Ratio 2557 1.4122 0.8200
Quarterly Flow 2533 -0.0015 -0.0054
Institutional(%) 2557 0.3338 0.1251
Investment Grade 2557 0.6117 1.0000
Manager Age 2366 44.1117 43.0000
Manager Exp 2555 2.5766 2.2000
Top20 Uni 2557 0.5487 1.0000
Master 2557 0.4258 1.0000
Ph.D. 2557 0.0919 0.0000
Female 2549 0.1844 0.0000
Panel B: Issuer Level
Counterparty Risk (1 Year) 15649 0.0199 0.0090
CDS Basis 14995 -69.0158 -34.9590
Bond Liquidity 9768 11.1322 3.1621
Z Spread 14995 494.1673 236.0290
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Table 2.2: The Definitions of CDS Strategies
The table summarizes the CDS strategies defined in Section 2.3. For all definitions the bond notional refers to the notional of the
underlying bond that is matched to the CDS. In the strategy hedging, over-hedged positions are included. In the strategy speculating
via short CDS, if there is no corresponding underlying bond position in the current quarter then the strategy is defined as outright
CDS.
Strategy Definition
Negative Basis Trading ∆bond notionalt ≈ ∆long CDS notionalt > 0 and CDS basist ≤ −10
Hedging ∆long CDS notionalt > 0 and bond notionalt 6= 0 and bond notionalt−1 6= 0 and Nbasist = 0
Speculating via Naked Long CDS ∆long CDS notionalt > 0 and bond notionalt = 0 and SIC 6∈ [6000, 6999]
Bond Synthesizing |∆short CDS notionalt| > 0 and basist > 0 and CDS Liquidity is Better
Speculating via Short CDS |∆short CDS notionalt| > 0 and basist ≤ 0 and Bond Liquidity is Better
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Table 2.3: Number of Issuer Level Cases in Each CDS Strategy
The table summarizes the issuer level CDS strategies defined in Section 2.3. The sample
covers the top 100 U.S. fixed-income funds for the period 07.2004 to 12.2010. For all
definitions the bond notional refers to the notional of the underlying bond that is matched
to the CDS. In the strategy hedging, over-hedged positions are included. In the strategy
speculating via short CDS, if there is no corresponding underlying bond position in the
current quarter then the strategy is defined as outright CDS.
CDS position change Case count Strategy Case count
Increasing long 1724
Negative basis trading 432
Hedging 238
(Over-Hedged) 81
Speculating via Naked Long CDS 781
Increasing short 2100
Bond Synthesizing 597
Speculating via Short CDS 1503
(Outright CDS) 912
Decreasing long 319
Decreasing short 766
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Table 2.4: The Determinants of the CDS Strategies
The table presents the determinants analysis of CDS strategies involving fund and man-
ager characteristics in a panel logit setting. The regressions are on fund quarter level.
The dependent variables are dummy variables indicating CDS strategies as defined in
Section 2.3. The strategy dummies are collapsed to fund quarter level and are assigned
a value of one as long as there is at least one case of the strategy in the fund quarter.
The construction of all fund and manager characteristics, as well as a summary statis-
tics table for these variables, are provided in Section 2.2. In each cell the reported are
marginal effects and t statistics. All standard errors are clustered at fund level. In all
columns time dummies are included.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N.Basis Trading Hedging Speculating Naked Long Bond Synthesizing Speculating Short
TNA(ln) 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0982∗∗∗ 0.0847∗ 0.110 0.0580
(10.87) (7.34) (1.77) (0.48) (0.93)
L1.Alpha5F 0.323 0.0449∗ 0.331 0.113 -0.271
(0.58) (1.81) (0.39) (0.20) (-0.28)
Fund Age(ln) -0.00170 0.00568 -0.0897 -0.113∗∗ 0.0468
(-0.04) (0.16) (-1.37) (-2.51) (0.75)
Institutional(%) -0.0258 -0.0241 0.00501 -0.0211 0.0168
(-0.59) (-0.43) (0.06) (-0.35) (0.31)
Investment Grade 0.111 0.0502∗∗ 0.0615∗ -0.171 -0.093∗∗∗
(1.31) (2.13) (1.82) (-0.52) (-2.99)
Turnover Ratio 0.0156∗ 0.000236 0.00182 0.0354∗∗ 0.0391∗∗∗
(1.76) (0.02) (0.10) (2.18) (4.18)
Expense Ratio 0.00540 0.127 0.307∗∗ 0.228∗ 0.185
(0.07) (1.41) (2.04) (1.87) (1.59)
Top20 Uni -0.00843 -0.0433∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(-0.29) (-3.19) (3.03) (2.89) (3.83)
Master -0.0546∗∗ -0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0840 0.218∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(-2.02) (-3.57) (1.02) (5.12) (2.88)
Ph.D. -0.180∗∗∗ -0.0674 0.0621 -0.129 -0.0277
(-2.59) (-0.98) (1.18) (-0.92) (-0.22)
Manager Age -0.00400 -0.00683∗∗ -0.000699 0.000678∗∗ 0.00448∗
(-1.58) (-2.16) (-0.17) (2.11) (1.82)
Manager Exp -0.00721 -0.0424∗∗∗ -0.0261 0.00171 0.00516∗∗∗
(-0.41) (-2.87) (-1.01) (0.10) (4.27)
Female 0.0788∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.0960∗∗∗ 0.0670 -0.156
(2.48) (4.09) (3.27) (0.85) (-0.78)
Observations 2277 2277 2277 2277 2277
Pseudo R2 0.1611 0.1032 0.1159 0.0813 0.1153
Time Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Std Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Trade Directions and Fund Family Level Concerns
The table presents fund performance differences between fund pairs when same direction
or opposite direction trades are undertaken as proxied by naked CDS trades and their
matched underlying trades in other funds in the fund family. The regressions are facil-
itated in a panel setting with fund pairs (within fund families in each quarter) as the
panel variable. The dependent variables are absolute values of performance differences.
Fund performance is measured by raw return, 1-factor alpha, 3-factors alpha, 4-factors
alpha and 5-factors alpha as described in the text. OD is a dummy variable that equals
to one if one of the funds is taking a naked long CDS position while its matched peer
in the family hold the underlying of the CDS. SD is a dummy variable that equals to
one if one of the funds is taking a naked short CDS position while its matched peer in
the family hold the underlying of the CDS. Control variables included in the regressions
but are not shown are fund pair differences of Fund TNA, Age, Institutional, Investment
Grade, Expense Ratio, and Turnover Ratio. In each cell the reported are coefficients
and t statistics. All standard errors are clustered at panel variable level. In all columns
time dummies and fund pair dummies are included.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
|∆Fdret| |∆Alpha1F| |∆Alpha3F| |∆Alpha4F| |∆Alpha5F|
OD 0.00199∗∗∗ 0.00428∗∗∗ 0.00387∗ 0.000583∗∗ 0.00381∗∗∗
(4.01) (3.60) (1.90) (2.22) (8.64)
SD 0.0000283 -0.00321∗∗ 0.00812∗∗∗ -0.00304∗∗∗ -0.000944
(0.68) (-2.07) (5.11) (-2.98) (-0.70)
Observations 38625 38601 38625 38601 38556
R2 0.007 0.236 0.290 0.126 0.309
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.236 0.289 0.126 0.309
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Pair Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Std Fund Pair Fund Pair Fund Pair Fund Pair Fund Pair
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
101
Table 2.6: The Determinants of the CDS Strategies: The Multinomial Approach
The table presents the determinants analysis of CDS strategies involving fund and man-
ager characteristics in a multinomial logit setting. The regressions are on fund quarter
level. The dependent variables is a categorical variable indicating the dominant strategy
of the fund quarter. The construction of all fund and manager characteristics, as well
as a summary statistics table for these variables, are provided in Section 2.2. In each
cell the reported are marginal effects and t statistics. All standard errors are clustered
at fund level. In all columns time dummies are included.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N.Basis Trading Hedging Speculating Naked Long Bond Synthesizing Speculating Short
TNA(ln) 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.000349 0.0189∗ 0.0136∗ 0.00776
(2.66) (0.08) (1.76) (1.92) (0.96)
L1.Alpha5F 0.0171 0.0130 -0.0830 -0.308∗ 0.101
(0.12) (0.18) (-0.43) (-1.72) (0.38)
Fund Age(ln) 0.0178 0.0301 0.0227 0.00392 0.0323
(0.87) (0.65) (0.80) (0.18) (1.42)
Institutional(%) 0.00348 0.0159 0.0271 0.0506∗∗ 0.0259
(0.38) (1.41) (0.73) (1.98) (0.98)
Investment Grade -0.0209∗∗ -0.00363 0.0549 -0.0320 -0.0526∗∗
(-1.98) (-0.46) (1.53) (-1.15) (-2.54)
Turnover Ratio 0.00151 -0.00739 -0.00610 0.00628 0.0126∗∗
(0.73) (-0.74) (-0.98) (0.87) (2.41)
Expense Ratio -0.0166 -0.0211 -0.00238 0.00725 0.0448
(-1.20) (-1.05) (-0.04) (0.21) (1.27)
Top20 Uni -0.0100∗ -0.00583 0.0680∗∗∗ 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0857∗∗∗
(-1.72) (-0.80) (3.07) (3.58) (4.01)
Master -0.0116∗∗ -0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0376 0.277∗∗∗ 0.0982∗∗∗
(-2.07) (-3.66) (1.37) (3.78) (2.92)
Ph.D. -0.182∗∗∗ 0.00551 0.0543∗∗ 0.00281 -0.0157
(-4.50) (0.45) (2.28) (0.05) (-0.41)
Manager Age -0.000963∗ -0.00135∗∗ 0.000552 0.00108∗∗∗ 0.00288∗∗
(-1.84) (-2.24) (0.40) (4.13) (2.15)
Manager Exp -0.00190 -0.00109 -0.00291 0.00949∗∗ 0.00329∗∗∗
(-1.05) (-0.80) (-0.61) (2.35) (3.73)
Female 0.0137∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.0477∗∗∗ -0.0209 -0.0702
(2.51) (4.36) (3.20) (-0.73) (-1.24)
Observations 2277 2277 2277 2277 2277
Pseudo R2 0.2382 0.2382 0.2382 0.2382 0.2382
Time Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Std Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2.1: The Time Series Distribution of CDS Basis
The graph depicts the distribution (box plots) of quarterly average of weekly CDS basis
for the sample CDS contracts over time. The CDS basis is on issuer level with 5 years
to maturity (or the closest). The basis, displayed on the x-axis, is calculated as the
difference between market CDS spread and z spread. In each quarter the shaded box
contains CDS basis that lies within the 25th percentile (Q1) to 75th (Q3) percentile
range, with the vertical solid line in the each box denote the median (Q2). The adjacent
lines are determined by [Q1 − 1.5(Q3 − Q1), Q3 + 1.5(Q3 − Q1)]. The solid dots are
outliers.
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Figure 2.2: Percentage of Issuer Level Cases in Each CDS Strategy
The graph depicts the percentage of each CDS strategy’s issuer level case counts within
the scope of 1724 long single-name CDS increases and 2100 short single-name CDS
increases. The category ”not classified” refers to increases in long single-name CDS and
is not classified as negative basis trading, hedging or speculation via naked long CDS.
The sample covers the top 100 U.S. fixed-income funds for the period 07.2004 to 12.2010.
All CDS strategies and their use of thresholds are as defined in Section 2.3 and are on
issuer level.
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Figure 2.3: The Time Series of CDS Strategies
The graph shows the time series development of the number of cases in each defined
CDS strategy category. The sample covers the top 100 U.S. fixed-income funds for the
period 07.2004 to 12.2010. All CDS strategies and their use of thresholds are as defined
in Section 2.3 and are on issuer level.
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Chapter 3
Tail Risk, Fund Performance and
Credit Derivatives Trading:
Evidence from the Lehman Collapse
Abstract
This study provides a comprehensive overview of the credit default swaps (CDS)
investments by the universe of U.S. mutual funds, corporate bond funds in particu-
lar. Employing the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the resulting sudden closures
of CDS positions as a natural experiment, we find funds on average load up on
a significant amount of tail risk by trading CDS. While CDS users benefit when
market conditions are favorable, they suffer during periods of clustered defaults.
Funds forced to unleash their Lehman CDS contracts exhibit persistent inferior
performance in the post-crisis period comparing with their matched peers. How-
ever, their immediate losses result from fund outflows were offset by the reduced
obligations to fulfill in the crisis period.
Keywords: Mutual funds, Credit default swap, Lehman collapse, CDS counter-
parties, Fund performance, Tail risk
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JEL classification: G11, G14, G23, G28, G33
History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does
rhyme.
(most commonly attributed to) Mark Twain
3.1 Introduction
In this paper we study the use of credit default swaps (CDS) by the universe of U.S.
mutual funds from 2006 to 2014, a much broader sample than those used in the previous
literature. In particular, we investigate the scope of CDS use by mutual funds, their in-
centives in using CDS, as well as the resulting risk and performance implications. Bank
of International Settlement (BIS) estimated the total notional amount of CDS outstand-
ing as 9.857 trillion as of the end of 20161. CDS is an agreement between two parties
(CDS buyer and CDS seller) under which the CDS seller agrees to compensate the CDS
buyer in the event of a loan default (or other credit event) for which the seller receives
a premium. The size of this highly controversial market is now comparable to that of in
the 2005, and is only a fraction of its almost 60 trillion peak during 2007-2008 just before
the global financial crisis. This is not surprising given the higher level of awareness of
risk involved in CDS, as well as the public perception that CDS helped fuel the crisis.
Global leaders joined forces to reform this market by improving its transparency and
price competitiveness, for example by the introduction of central clearing and swap ex-
ecution facilities. These reforms are incorporated in the Dodd-Frank Act in the United
States.
According to the BIS data, we observe the notional amounts of CDS outstanding have
been relatively stable since 2015. Moreover, there is a visible discussion on the use of
1Bank of International Settlement derivative statistics [http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/
d10.1, visited on 09.06.2017]
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”Bespoke Tranche Opportunity” (BTO). While BTO works in a very similar way as col-
lateralized debt obligations (CDO), it is highly customizable and the existence of debt
obligations are not required. With low volatility in credit markets and high prices for
corporate bonds, the demand of this completely over-the-counter (OTC) traded, unregu-
lated security, CDS BTO2, has been increasing significantly. Comparing with the 10 bil-
lion issuance in 2015 and the 15 billion in 2016, the new issuance of this security reached
30 billion for the first 7 month in 20173. Therefore, it is important that we revisit the
lessons learned from the crisis, and review the role of CDS in funds’ investment portfolio.
According to the requirement of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the
SEC, all mutual funds have to file their portfolio holdings periodically4. From these
reports we identify 768 CDS using funds in the sample period, among which 430 are
fixed income funds. CDS is predominantly used by bond funds especially viewing as a
percentage of the total number of funds in each fund category. Therefore we restrict our
analysis to fixed income funds throughout the paper.
CDS is redundant in a perfect market since its payoff structure can be replicated by
the underlying securities. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016) propose the rationale of the
CDS market as a liquidity device especially when the underlying bonds are fragmented.
Jiang and Zhu (2015) and Aragon, Li and Qian (2017) empirically confirm this argument
and show funds tend to sell CDS when the synthetic bond market is more liquid than the
cash bond market. Jiang and Zhu (2015) also point out the yield chasing incentives by
comparing the CDS spreads with the portfolio spreads, and additionally the behaviour
story of herding that funds tend to follow PIMCO’s lead in CDS investment.
2This involves combining a series of CDS, and further cutting the pooled portfolio into slices to fit
investors with varying risk appetite.
3See Financial Times article Investors pour back into crisis-era credit product by Joe Rennison
[https://www.ft.com/content/c4d815b2-86bc-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787, visited on 21.09.2017]
4The holding reports have to be filed semi-annually before 2004 in NCSR and NCSR/A reports and
afterwards quarterly in NQ and NQ/A reports as well as above mentioned semi-annual reports.
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To pin down the performance and risk implications of CDS is challenging. Apart from
the concurrent events and missing factors that potentially contaminate the results, the
reverse causality that funds decide on their CDS strategy because of performance and
risk overlook is a sound argument. We use an exogenous shock during which a significan-
t number of CDS positions were forced closure. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy
on September 15, 2008. All CDS contracted with Lehman had to be early terminated.
Following the International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA) protocol and its
master contracts for derivative transactions, which is accepted by virtually all present
day CDS trades, CDS contracts with Lehman cease to be effective on September 15, 2008
or shortly afterwards, depending on whether automatic early termination is elected. The
positions between Lehman and each of its counterparties are netted, and funds become
general unsecured creditor of Lehman (Arora, Gandhi and Longstaff (2012)). Although
CDS positions are usually collateralized and enjoy a super-senior status, which mean-
s funds may liquidate the collateral Lehman posted to collect their receivables without
subject to automatic stay (Bolton and Oehmke (2015)), funds may still suffer from losses
given the deep discount of settlement prices following the Lehman bankruptcy. In any
case, CDS contracts in which Lehman served as the counterparty were concluded5.
We employ this natural experiment to classify our treatment and control groups as
the shock only affects a subset of funds that contracted with Lehman to sell or purchase
CDS prior to its bankruptcy. To the extent that the collapse is not anticipated by funds,
and funds that contract with Lehman are not systematically different with those do not,
we can have an exogenous shock applied to a randomized sample of funds. In both the
control and the treated sample we rule out funds that have significant Lehman exposure
other than as CDS counterparty. Because these exposures process a threat to inspecting
the real effects of CDS closure. We conduct several robustness checks to show that the
5Respective guidelines were posted by ISDA on its website. See item 3 of [http://www.isda.org/
companies/lehman/pdf/FAQ-Filing-DLM-9-15.pdf, visited on 22.09.2017] as well as [http://www.
isda.org/companies/lehman/pdf/FAQ-Close-out-DLM.pdf, visited on 22.09.2017]
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anticipation before the event is unlikely, and the selection issue that funds may opt in to
contract with Lehman for spread chasing purposes does not drive our results. There is
potentially another concern that funds may switch to other investment banks to rebuild
their closed positions, and if they do, the magnitude of the shock is limited. While we
keep all switchers in the treatment group as it is (since otherwise there is an additional
endogeneity issue), we find the switchers are neither significant in numbers nor implying
anything that contradicts our main results.
In contrast to the -2% immediate return post Lehman bankruptcy Aragon, Li and Qian
(2017) find on the performance of funds using Lehman as the counterparty, we do not
find our treated funds perform significant differently than their matched peers shortly fol-
lowing the event. We confirm this finding in both a multi-period difference-in-difference
setting and an event study. We interpret the difference in results as the negative impact
due to the loss of reputation is offset by the funds’ reduced obligation to fulfill during
the period when there is a clustering of defaults, especially given the well documented
evidence that mutual funds are on average CDS net sellers (Adam and Guettler (2015),
Jiang and Zhu (2015) and Aragon, Li and Qian (2017)). The negative impact is also
partially offset by the immediate proceeds collected due to the superior status of swaps
and derivatives. In addition, we estimate on a matched sample so that our treated and
control funds are similar in terms of the extend of CDS use6 and fund characteristics
before the event. We find the treated funds underperform significantly over the long
run. We rule out the possibility that it is only reputation loss that drives our results
by constructing a secondary match using both pre- and post-bankruptcy data. There is
no evidence that funds that contracted with Lehman exhibit different performance than
those that do not with similar fund characteristics and number of CDS positions for the
6We require a fund to have significant number/portion of Lehman CDS in order to be qualified as
treated, so that our treated and matched control funds tend to be heavy CDS users. The likelihood of
our treated funds to benefit from the closure of Lehman CDS positions for the period with high amount
of defaults following the bankruptcy is therefore even higher than those funds that use Lehman as a
counterparty as defined by Aragon, Li and Qian (2017).
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entire sample period. We conclude that the closure of CDS positions is related to the
long run underperformance in the post-crisis period.
These findings are consistent with the following stylized facts that we summarize. Funds
use significantly more CDS during periods of high bond spreads or CDS spreads. We
do not find high yield funds are heavier CDS users comparing with investment grade
funds, yet CDS-using high yield funds on average underperform non-CDS-using high
yield funds, which is in contrast to the respective relation with investment grade funds.
CDS trades do not seem to improve funds’ index tracking ability, however, funds load up
on tail risk by entering into this market. Funds benefit from their CDS positions in the
pre as well as post crisis sample periods, during which we observe a positive correlation
between spreads and fund performance. This effect is reverted in the course of the crisis
when CDS users suffer from significant losses, and high spreads are correlated with even
worse performance.
Our study is related to several literatures. First, it is directly related to the earlier
efforts to derive the risk and performance implications of derivative use in the mutu-
al fund industry. The empirical evidence is mixed in this regard. In a pioneer paper
Koski and Pontiff (1999) document while derivative using equity mutual funds have risk
exposure and performance similar to nonusers, their changes in risk are less volatile.
Johnson and Wayne (2004) test the findings in a Canadian sample and conclude Cana-
dian derivative using equity funds have lower return but higher risks than nonusers, and
Canadian derivative using fixed income funds have higher return and higher risks than
nonusers. However, these effects are mostly due to warrants. In a more recent study
Cici and Palacios (2015) challenge these previous evidences and find that option using
equity funds underperform their peers, while hedging was the dominant motivation that
effectively lower risk. We add to this literature by inspecting a particular type of credit
derivative that potentially provides us with a clean set up to distinguish from risk in-
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creasing versus risk decreasing purposes. In addition, we explore a natural experiment
to rule out alternative explanations such as concurrent events or reverse causality that
could potentially compromise the identification of the research question.
Second, our paper also adds strong empirical support for the literature on tail risk taking
of asset management companies. Noting that apart from hedge funds, many other asset
management companies have entered into the CDS market, Rajan (2006) pictures the
possibility of heightened risk if there is a serious downturn in the market. Since fund
managers are evaluated over a relatively short period of time when the outcome of the
CDS positions may not materialize, they are incentivized to sell such contracts in order
to benefit from the immediate proceeds collected. Therefore, they are effectively selling
diaster insurance and loading up on hidden tail risk. The hypothesis is confirmed by
Jiang and Kelly (2012) and Gao, Gao and Song (2016) in the hedge fund industry, while
Gao, Gao and Song (2016) further differentiate between fund managers that are skilled
and unskilled in exploiting rare disaster concerns. We provide direct and clear evidence
that mutual fund managers are involved in tail risk taking as well by trading CDS, and
their incentives are especially high in CDS with flying spreads.
Third, there is a stream of literature that focuses on mutual fund coordination and
competition. On the one hand, due to the well documented convex flow-performance
relationship (Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997)), fund families
benefit from high variation in their investment strategies across funds (Nanda, Wang
and Zheng (2004)) in terms of fund inflows. This ”star fund” effect spills over to other
funds in the family and lower skilled families are more likely to pursue such a strategy7.
On the other hand, there is a sizable literature that classifies mutual fund competition
7See also Massa (2003) who shows the cross-fund product differentiation in fund families, as well as
recent studies that document cross-fund trading, learning and subsidization for example Gaspar, Massa
and Matos (2006), Bhattacharya, Lee and Pool (2013), Brown and Wu (2016), Eisele, Nefedova and
Parise (2016), and Cici, Jaspersen and Kempf (2017). Evans (2010) analyze family values in the context
of incubation. Basak and Makarov (2014) formulate a theoretical framework to study these issues.
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as tournaments. Starting with Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) who record mid-year
losing funds are more likely to increase their risk levels relatively to mid-year winners.
The authors attribute this finding to manager compensation structure that base salary
is based on asset under management. And since the flow-performance relationship is
asymmetric (Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997)), mid-year losers
have the incentives to gamble for year-end performance and attract fund inflow8. There
is rationale for funds to load up on tail risk from both a coordination and a competition
point of view, i.e. either to create star funds in families, or to gamble for favorable
returns. We add to this strand of literature by documenting a subset of mutual funds
are engaged in CDS trading due to these incentives.
Forth, our paper is most related to the other three papers that examine how CDS are
used by mutual funds, namely Adam and Guettler (2015), Jiang and Zhu (2015) and
Aragon, Li and Qian (2017). While the data set we employed is similar to the other
papers, we have different research focuses. Adam and Guettler (2015) find that while
team-managed CDS using funds outperform single-managed funds, the relationship is
reversed during the financial crisis. The authors attribute the evidence to the costs and
benefits of team management including more expertise, experience and skills but more
coordination problems and longer decision times. Jiang and Zhu (2015) essentially test
and confirm the theory of Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015) on the liquidity provision role
of the CDS market. They additionally argue that smaller funds follow leading funds in
risk taking and mutual funds use CDS also for yield chasing purposes since the average
spread of funds’ CDS positions is higher than that of their rest of the portfolio. We add
to their analysis by pinning down the resulting risk and performance consequences of
CDS use, and extend to include multi-name CDS in the analysis. Aragon, Li and Qian
8Koski and Pontiff (1999) detail similar behavior specifically targets at derivative use of mutual funds.
Kempf and Ruenzi (2007) provide evidence of tournaments within fund families. Some other authors
interpret from a manager job security perspective, for example Qiu (2003) and Hu, Kale, Pagani and
Subramanian (2011). In a recent paper Evans, Prado and Zambrana (2017) theoretically and empirically
report the existence of both competition and cooperation within fund families.
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(2017) exam a number of hypotheses related to general CDS use in the industry with a
focus on counterparty risk. The authors compare, for those funds that have at least a
CDS contract with Lehman with the rest of the funds, the average fund return 15 days
following the Lehman bankruptcy on 15th September 2008. A -2% annualized under-
performance is documented. We add to this literature by first to have a clearly defined
treatment and corresponding matched control group, as Lehman CDS exposure can be
a proxy of various missing variables. Second, instead of focusing on the immediate effect
due to the loss of reputation, i.e. counterparty risk, we realize there are sudden closures
of CDS positions and employ them as a natural experiment to test the effect of CDS use
in terms of risk and performance and track it through time. Even the immediate effect
shortly following the event can be attributed to three reasons: the loss of reputation or
counterparty risk, the reduced obligation to fulfill since mutual funds are on average net
short CDS users and there are a cluster of defaults following the event, as well as the
immediate proceeds collected due to the super senior status of derivatives.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the testable hypotheses.
Section 3 discusses the data sources, sample construction and summary statistics. Panel
analyses on the use of CDS and its risk and performance impact are given in Section
4. Section 5 details our identification strategy that addresses the endogeneity problem,
model set up and results. A number of robustness checks are provided in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Hypothesis Development
The three papers with detailed CDS holding data of mutual funds (Adam and Guettler
(2015), Jiang and Zhu (2015) and Aragon, Li and Qian (2017)) all confirm mutual funds
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are on average net sellers of CDS. Becker and Ivashina (2015) document yield chasing
phenomenon in a sample of insurance companies that they disproportionably bias to-
wards bonds with higher yield and higher CDS spreads within the same credit rating
categories. Although Jiang and Zhu (2015) provide evidence that mutual funds’ selling
of single name CDS has a low correlation with their bond yield chasing behavior, the
underlying logic is rather analogous in these two scenarios. In addition, given the tour-
nament hypotheses and the resulting tail risk taking, especially taking into account that
CDS sellers will generate immediate cash inflow while their outcomes are not reviled for
a period of time that maybe longer than the evaluation horizon (Jiang and Kelly (2012)
and Gao, Gao and Song (2016)), it is especially beneficial for funds to trade CDS during
the period of high CDS spreads and thus maximize the potential immediate benefit. This
trading strategy could potentially be more pronounced for high yield funds since they
are usually less constrained in excessive tail risk taking. However, Adam and Guettler
(2015) find investment grade funds are more likely to trade CDS than high yield funds.
The authors attribute the observation to two effects, a supply effect that CDS written
on high yield bonds are less liquid which is dominated by a relative performance effect,
that investment grade funds have clustered performance and a small improvement could
results in big change in the ranking.
According to Jiang and Kelly (2012) and Becker and Ivashina (2015) yield chasing of
hedge funds and insurance companies introduces significant tail risk and systematic risk.
CDS selling, and CDS trading more broadly however, can be used for multiple incentives,
many of which may not necessarily increase credit risk exposure (Adam and Guettler
(2015)). Purchasing CDS can be motivated by hedging existing bond portfolio or trading
on basis apart from speculating the default of the underlying, while selling CDS allow
synthetic bond positions when the cash bond market is not that liquid. In particular,
even speculative short multi-name CDS positions can be a natural hedge against market
risk since multi-name CDS is built upon a variety of underlying assets and is more di-
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versified than bond positions alone (Aragon, Li and Qian (2017)). In addition, gaining
exposure to CDS written on indices, either on CDS indices or bond indices, may help
funds to track their benchmarks. It is an open question whether CDS traders on aver-
age load up on tail risk and credit risk, or merely use CDS to hedge or reduce tracking
errors. Our first set of hypotheses is therefore related to funds’ incentives in trading CDS.
Hypothesis 1a: Funds are on average more likely to trade CDS when the CDS spread
is high.
Hypothesis 1b: Mutual funds load up on tail risk in terms of Kelly and Jiang (2014)
tail risk measures by trading CDS. Their incentive to increase credit exposure dominates
tracking error management considerations.
Regarding the performance implications of CDS trading, on the one hand, consistent
with Rajan (2006) and Jiang and Kelly (2012)’s evidences of tail risk taking and the
”disaster insurance” argument, we could imagine if mutual funds decided to trade CDS,
and if they traded CDS to gain risk exposure, there will be differential effects on mutual
fund performance during and outside the ”disaster” periods. The mutual fund in-family
tournament and coordination stories are reasonable only if funds may indeed benefit
from proceeds collected from CDS trading that are otherwise difficult to produce with
conventional portfolio holdings. On the other hand, as noticed by Adam and Guettler
(2015), mutual funds use CDS for at least the following five incentives: 1. to sell CDS
protection to increase credit exposure, therefore effectively to sell diaster insurance in
a speculative way; 2. to explore the liquidity benefits in the CDS market and to trade
CDS as a synthetic bond position. This would be equivalent to cash bond investments
except for the difference in spreads between the cash and synthetic bond markets; 3. to
explicitly target at the negative basis9 by purchasing the CDS and the underlying bond
at the same time. Funds lock in profits as long as the basis narrows from entering to
9i.e. the spread difference between the CDS and the underlying bond.
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exit, or the assumption that the basis will narrow approaching maturity materializes;
4. to hedge credit exposure by purchasing CDS on the bond holdings; and 5. to enter
into a speculative long position in which funds only benefit if an event was triggered
for the underlying but otherwise lose premium payments. Our second set of hypotheses
concentrates on the performance implications of funds’ CDS use, taking into account
that mutual funds are on average CDS net sellers (Adam and Guettler (2015), Jiang and
Zhu (2015) and Aragon, Li and Qian (2017)).
Hypothesis 2a: Comparing with funds not using CDS, CDS users perform better out-
side the crisis, and worse during the crisis. In addition, CDS users benefit more from
their positions outside the crisis when the CDS spread is high, and they suffer more dur-
ing the crisis when CDS spread is high.
Hypothesis 2b: Comparing with their matched peers, funds with significant CDS posi-
tions contracted with Lehman Brothers experience significant underperformance in the
post crisis period. The effect is separable from counterparty risk considerations.
Hypothesis 2c: Funds with significant CDS positions contracted with Lehman Brothers
do not exhibit significant performance difference after the Lehman bankruptcy during the
crisis comparing with their matched peers. This is due to the immediate benefit resulting
from a reduction in CDS positions and therefore reduced obligation to fulfill during the
period of clustered defaults as well as the immediate proceeds collected are offset by the
fund outflow resulted from loss of reputation.
117
3.3 Data, Sample Construction and Summary Statis-
tics
3.3.1 Data Sources and the Sample
U.S. Mutual funds that fall into the justification of the Investment Company Act 1940
are required by Securities and Exchange Commission, the SEC, to disclose their portfo-
lio holdings quarterly in NQ, NCSR and NCSRS reports10. Our primary data source is
these SEC filings. We extract from these filings the Series IDs11 ,CIK, Tickers, Report
date (rdate), Filing date(fdate), a dummy variable indicating CDS use, the number of
CDS contracts, and the contracted counterparty information12.
We match the SEC filings data with MFlinks wficn by tickers and fund names. 87%
of the funds in the SEC filing universe are matched with a wficn. We further merge
the matched database with CRSP mutual fund database using the matches provided by
MFlinks in order to retrieve fund level characteristics. Fund flows are calculated using
TNA and fund returns following previous literature. We keep wficn as our fund identifi-
10The holding reports have to be filed semi-annually before 2004 in NCSR and NCSRS reports and
afterwards quarterly in NQ as well as the above mentioned annual and semi-annual reports.
11NQ, NCSR, and NCSRS reports keep series IDs as the identifier on fund level. The reports are filed
on Fund company level, e.g. PIMCO funds, which is identified by central identification key (CIK). Thus
in each report there can be multiple funds filed.
12We thank Thomas Verchow for the help in extracting the CDS data. The extraction uses texture
analysis technique and follows Adam and Guettler (2015) in identifying CDS strings, including the
appearances of the words ”Credit Default”, ”Default Swap”, ”CDS”, ”Default Contract”, and ”Default
protection”. The extraction starts with dividing the files into subparts of each series ID. CDS keywords
are then searched through the subfiles. The next steps are extracting the following in order: tables (text
or html) following CDS keywords, header and body of tables, columns, and desired information. After
automatically extracting the information we manually inspect 100 randomly selected fund reports from
the sample for quality control. Notional amount of the CDS positions, buy and sell directions, underlying
information are deemed not of high quality and discarded. The contracted counterparty information
is of high quality since there are a limited number of counterparties available, namely major global
investment banks. See Appendix A for a list of identified counterparties. For each treated funds we
manually check their reports to verify the information of their CDS counterparties. In order to rule out
the possibility that some funds that fit our treated definition may end up in the control sample and
thus bias our results, for each matched control funds we manually screen for their CDS counterparties.
If a control fund fit into the treated definition we put it into the treated and redo the entire matching
to generate the new control set. The procedure goes on until all treated and control are screened to be
correct. We have only 1 fund that we need to replace.
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er13 and the CRSP mutual fund sample as our universe. In the final sample we have 768
distinct CDS using funds covering the sample period from January 2006 to December
2014. At this stage we keep funds of all types to generate summary statistics but we will
narrow to CDS using fixed income funds, which is counted at 430, in our analysis since
CDS is only significantly used in this fund category. We keep CRSP objective code as
the major fund type identifier to distinguish between fixed income funds, equity funds,
money market funds, index funds...etc. We merge Lipper objective code, Strategic in-
sight code and Wberger code (following Fang, Kempf and Trapp (2014)) to enrich the
definitions of high yield and investment grade fund. A fund is classified as a high yield
fixed income fund if it has a CRSP code of ”ICQY”, or a Lipper code of ”HY” or ”MS”,
or a Strategic insight code of ”CHY” or a Wberger code of ”CHY”. A fund is considered
to be investment grade if it fits one of the following: CRSP code of ”ICQH”, or Lipper
code of ”A”, ”BBB”, ”IID”, ”SID”, ”SII”, or Wberger code of ”CBD”, or Strategic
insight code of ”CHQ”, ”CGN”, ”CIM”, ”CMQ”, ”CSM”.
In order to compute risk and performance measures we obtain bond indices values from
Datastream, including ”LHAGGBD” ”LHYIELD” ”LHGOVIN” ”LHGNM30”14. We
additionally acquire credit spreads from Datastream and 10-year BAA corporate bond
spread from Federal Reserve of St. Louis data repository.
3.3.2 Risk and Performance Measures
Our risk and performance measures are constructed primarily following Adam and Guet-
tler (2015). In particular, if not otherwise specified all measures are calculated on a
13Wficn and edgar series IDs are fund level identifiers and CRSP fund number is on fund class level.
We follow previous literature to collapse CRSP data to fund level when necessary by TNA weighted
averages.
14The four terms stand for Barclay’s US Aggregate Bond Index, Barclays US Corporate High Yield
Index, Barclays US Government Intermediate Index, and Barclays 30-year GNMA Index respectively.
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monthly basis using daily data and a rolling estimation window of three months15. Our
standard derivation, kurtosis and skewness measures are estimated in the same way as
Adam and Guettler (2015), and we summarize the benchmarks we used to construct
certain other measures as follows16.
For the one factor alpha, beta, upbeta and downbeta, we use return on Barclays ag-
gregate index minus the risk free rate, the bond market excess return, as the benchmark
return.
For the three factors alpha, we use Fama-French three factors returns as the bench-
mark returns.
For the four factors alpha, we use Barclays aggregate index return in excess of risk free
rate, an equity market excess return as in Fama-French, Barclays Corporate High Yield
Index return minus Barclays Intermediate Gov index return that accounts for default
risk, as well as a mortgage market factor Barclays GNMA index return minus Barclays
Intermediate Gov index return as the benchmark returns.
For the five factors alpha, we use the Fama-French three factors returns, adding the
previous default factor and mortgage market factor.
We additionally calculate funds’ tracking errors and tail risks in order to add evidence
to funds’ incentives in trading CDS. Tracking errors are computed as:
TE =
√
SSR
DFR
(3.1)
15We have also constructed quarterly measures without rolling estimation windows, the results are
quantitatively similar. In the event studies section, however, we have of course completely different
estimation windows.
16Our analysis is mostly focused on fixed income funds for which these measures apply.
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where SSR is the sum of squared residuals from the factor regressions, and DFR is the
respective degree of freedom of the residuals. Therefore with one, three, four and five
factors model listed above we can compute one, three, four, five factors tracking errors.
Kelly and Jiang (2014) assume the tail distribution of asset returns follows the char-
acterisation:
P (Ri,t < r|Ri,t < ut) ∝ ( r
ut
)−αiςt (3.2)
where r < ut < 0. Ri,t is the stock return, ut is a tail threshold that is common to
all stocks at time t, α is a constant and ς is a time-varying tail variable. The equation
essentially states that conditional on exceeding a predetermined threshold, the tail of
returns follow a power law distribution. The tail risk is governed by 1/ςt as a higher ςt
shrinks the lower tail of the distribution. Kelly and Jiang (2014) show that by applying
Hill et al. (1975)’s power law estimator to the cross section of daily returns in a given
month t the tail risk component can be estimated by:
1
ςt
=
1
Kt
Kt∑
k=1
ln
Rk,t
ut
(3.3)
Where Kt is the total number of daily returns in month t across all funds to exceed
the preset threshold ut, which we define as the lower 5% of the daily returns in the
cross section. We then compute, for each fund, a tail risk measure for each month. We
standardize the tail risk measure in all of our analysis:
TR =
1
ςt
− Eˆ( 1
ςt
)
σˆ( 1
ςt
)
(3.4)
3.3.3 Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis
Figure 3.1 presents the time series of CDS using funds in our sample. The general pattern
is consistent with those documented in Adam and Guettler (2015), Jiang and Zhu (2015)
and Aragon, Li and Qian (2017). The number of CDS using fixed income funds peeked
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at over 120 during the first three quarters in 2008, followed by a consistent decline. A
similar trend is shown for equity funds as well.
[Figure 3.1 about here.]
We additionally observe a few stylized facts. Fixed income funds are predominant users
of CDS among mutual funds due to the nature of CDS. The fraction of equity funds
with CDS positions is negligible comparing with bond funds, especially considering the
equity fund universe is more than 4 times larger than that of bond funds. This is also
confirmed in Table 3.1 in which we compute the fraction of CDS using funds in each fund
category over the entire sample period17. Besides, for funds that are CDS users, we find
bond funds on average trade more CDS than equity funds by comparing the 2 graphs
in each panel in Figure 3.1. We also notice the total number of funds (both equity and
fixed income) experienced a significant dip following the financial crisis, this is consistent
with the recent literature on fund liquidation and mergers. The similar pattern is also
documented in Investment Company Institute (ICI)’s fact books18.
[Table 3.1 about here.]
CDS holdings are presented in close to 15% of fixed income fund-quarters. We cannot
distinguish high yield funds from investment grade funds in terms of their CDS trading
intensity. Interestingly, bond funds with a foreign focus are heavily engaged in the CDS
market, although their incentives in trading these positions may differ from other funds
as the credit and liquidity environment are distinct. In untabulated results we find the
time trend of these percentages in each fund category with major CDS exposure follow
closely with the previous pattern depicted in Figure 3.1. Since fixed income funds are
predominantly the major players in the field among mutual funds, we focus on these
17As shown in Table 3.1, the only equity fund category that has significant faction of CDS users is
EDSC, domestic equity commodity sector funds. The fund category, however, has only three funds thus
we decide it is not representative of equity funds in general and difficult to research due to the tiny
sample size.
18See for example 2017 Investment Company Fact Book [https://www.ici.org/research/stats/
factbook, visited on 02.10.2017].
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funds throughout the paper.
We start our analysis by a number of univariate analyses that draw comparative sum-
maries between CDS users and nonusers in terms of their various performance and risk
measures. In panel A of Table 3.2 we tabulate the differences in the mean of risk adjust-
ed returns and basic risk metrics between the two group, and test for the significance
levels of these differences. CDS users on average exhibit statistically significant higher
risk adjusted returns over their CDS nonuser peers. The results are obtained using data
of fixed income funds across all sample period from 2006 to 2014. For example, CDS
users have on average 0.5% p.a. higher 5 factors adjusted returns over nonusers over
2006 to 2014. The consistency of the results for all fund performance measures strongly
suggests the superior performance of CDS users, yet with univariate analyses only we
cannot conclude this is due to CDS trading. In contrast to the previous literature on
derivative usage in the fund industry in general, we find evidence in line with Jiang and
Zhu (2015) and Aragon, Li and Qian (2017) that CDS users on average present higher
risk levels especially in terms of return volatility in our analysis.
We further break down the fixed income funds and examine whether the same com-
parison holds also for high yield funds and investment grade funds in panel B. While
investment grade CDS using funds on average outperform 1.4% p.a. during the sample
period, high yield funds on average lose value if they used CDS. Adam and Guettler
(2015) document that although the average percentage of investment grade funds’ junk
CDS is higher than their percentage of junk bonds, they are still by far smaller than
that of high yield funds. Therefore the opposite performance results for high yield and
investment grade funds could be due to the higher amount of losses incurred during the
financial crisis when high yield funds were loaded with significant credit risk by trading
CDS. Investment grade funds on average have lower return volatility than high yield
funds, which is as expected. However, while the standard deviation of CDS using invest-
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ment grade funds is lower than that of investment grades without CDS positions, the
relationship is reversed for high yield funds. This suggests the likelihood of differences
in CDS trading motives between investment grade and high yield bond funds19. In par-
ticular, high yield CDS using funds present significantly higher down beta, which is an
indicative evidence that they suffered from more losses during the financial crisis20.
[Table 3.2 about here.]
We continue the univariate analyses by switching from the entire sample period to a
year by year and quarter by quarter analysis in Table 3.3 that serves as a preliminary
test for the performance implication of CDS use during the financial crisis. According
to panel A of the table CDS users consistently outperform from 2006 to 2014 except for
2008 and 2011. The most economically significant overperformance occurred in 2009 and
2010 during which the market was recovering from the 2008 crisis. The euro zone debt
crisis has built up in 2011 and U.S. sovereign rating was downgraded in August of the
same year. We see a clear structural break of the performance differential between CDS
using funds and other funds during the financial crisis. Since our treated event occurred
in September 15, 2008, it is important for us to check in which quarters do the structural
break initiate and end. Panel B is dedicated to a quarter by quarter analysis on the same
question. We observe a clear structural break in the quarter 2 of 2009, starting from
which the CDS users begin to beat their CDS non-using peers before a more than 4.6%
p.a. average under-performance was recorded for the CDS using funds in the quarter 1
of 2009.
[Table 3.3 about here.]
We visualize the difference in 5-factors alphas between CDS users and nonusers in Figure
3.2 with two density histograms. In panel A we check the distribution across the entire
19Adam and Guettler (2015) find investment grade funds are more likely to trade CDS, but not net
short CDS.
20In untabulated results we also check how do early CDS users (that start to use CDS in 2006) perform
in order to argue whether experiences in previous CDS trading would be an advantage for CDS trading
later on. We do not find systematic differences in performance between these funds and other CDS
using funds.
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sample period of 2006 to 2014. Funds that are not using CDS clearly exhibit higher
kurtosis with more risk adjusted returns distributed around the mean, which is consistent
with panel A of Table 3.2. CDS users have more alphas distributed at the tails, both the
left and the right, suggesting their incentive to trade CDS for yield enhancement, and
loading up on tail risk as a result. While CDS nonusers experienced a highly left skewed
distribution in 2008 as depicted in panel B, CDS users suffer from even more losses. A
significant number of CDS using funds recorded a 5-factors alpha on the far left tail,
with minimum amount of right tail distribution comparing with nonusers.
[Figure 3.2 about here.]
3.4 The Determinants of CDS Use and its Perfor-
mance and Risk Implications
In this section we present our results on the determinants of CDS use, in particular how
do CDS and bond spreads, fund type and fund size correlate with the probability to
use CDS. We also check whether fund performance and risk are affected by CDS trades,
how do spreads and fund types contribute to funds’ incentive chasing objective, and
how do the landscape change during the financial crisis. In addition, the tracking error
management hypothesis is directly contrasted against the tail risk taking motivation.
3.4.1 The Decision to Use CDS
If CDS trading is incentivized by yield chasing and thus effectively analogous to selling
disaster insurance (Rajan (2006)), one can reasonably expect funds’ decisions to use
CDS, as well as the timing of CDS trades to be influenced by CDS as well as bond
spreads. CDS spread is directly related to how effective CDS is as a yield chasing device,
and bond spread of the underlying converges to CDS spread as maturity is approaching.
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Funds may indeed take advantage of the basis between the CDS and the underlying bond
market21, and this is exactly due to the rational expectation that the basis will converge
to zero. Therefore, although there could be temporary divergence, bond and CDS basis
usually move in similar directions. We formally test for these in Table 3.4.
[Table 3.4 about here.]
The table reports marginal effects from probit regressions using CDS dummy as the de-
pendent variable. Consistent with Adam and Guettler (2015)’s conjecture, larger funds
are more likely to trade CDS, with PIMCO total return funds as the most prominent
CDS user. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are positively correlated with CDS use as
expense ratio is related to the level of sophistication that funds offer, and turnover ratio
is a proxy of liquidity needs as adopted in Jiang and Zhu (2015). Fund performance is
positive in explaining CDS use, which is not surprising given the univariate result that
CDS users on average outperform their peers over the entire sample period. In column
(1) we find CDS spread is both statistically significant and economically meaningful in
predicting CDS using funds as a 100 basis points increase22 in CDS spread is correlated
with a 7% higher probability of CDS trading. A natural concern is of course this effect
maybe driven by time trends, as CDS spreads peaked during the financial crisis, funds
also tend to be heavily CDS users especially before the burst. We therefore include time
fixed effects in column (2) to address this concern. While we believe it is highly unlikely
that the co-movement of CDS spread and CDS use during the financial crisis is unrelated
and we should not completely remove this time trend, the effect is not fully absorbed by
controlling for time dummies.
In columns (3) and (4) we test the probability for high yield fund to use CDS compar-
ing with other fixed income funds in general. We do not observe high yield funds with
more tendency to trade CDS, which contradicts our prior but is in alignment with the
21Funds may trade on negative basis, but positive basis trading is difficult since mutual funds are not
allowed to take short positions on cash bond.
22The mean value of CDS spread is 293 basis points in our sample.
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univariate analysis result. We also cannot find strong supportive evidence that spreads
in the previous period affect current CDS investment decisions in columns (5) and (6)23.
In column (7) we test whether funds experience a shift in their CDS trading strategy
after the clustering defaults break out. Funds seem to learn from past lessons and have
a lower probability of CDS trading after 2008Q3.
3.4.2 How do CDS Trades Affect Fund Performance and Risk
In this subsection we check how do funds perform if CDS were used, especially the
differential effect in and out of the crisis period. Fund tracking errors and tail risks
are also examined directly in order to infer the motivation behind the CDS trading. We
report these findings in Table 3.5 with pooled panel regressions with the following models
(for columns (3) and (4))24:
αi,t = β1CDSi,t + β2Crisist + β3Spreadt
+ β4CDSi,t × Crisist + β5CDSi,t × Spreadt + β6Crisist × Spreadt
+ β7CDSi,t × Crisist × Spreadt
+ Controlsi,t + Const.+ i,t
(3.5)
23Interestingly, in results not reported we find bond funds’ CDS use during the previous period is
correlated with higher current CDS and bond spreads. If yield chasing is the predominant strategy, this
may be interpret as benefiting the funds. However, it is not clear whether this predicative power is due
to active and intentional market timing or bad risk management.
24The correlation between the default factor that we used in 5-factors alpha estimation with BAA
10-year bond spread is 0.0104, while the correlation between the mortgage market factor with the spread
is 0.0172.
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as well as (for columns (6) and (8)):
TE/TRi,t = β1CDSi,t + β2Crisist + β3HYi
+ β4CDSi,t × Crisist + β5CDSi,t ×HYi + β6Crisist ×HYi
+ β7CDSi,t × Crisist ×HYi
+ Controlsi,t + Const.+ i,t
(3.6)
[Table 3.5 about here.]
We observe from columns (1) and (2) that while overall CDS use is positively corre-
lated with performance, the relationship reversed during the financial crisis with close
to 3% of underperformance for CDS users comparing with nonusers. We further check
how CDS spreads affect fund performance for CDS users and nonuser in and out of the
crisis. The comparison can be made over two horizons25. First, during the financial
crisis, funds using CDS give a 2.2% underperformance26 than nonusers with a 100 basis
points increase in the CDS spread. However, in absent of the crisis CDS using funds,
comparing with CDS nonusers, benefit from higher CDS spreads with 3.3% higher alpha
for 100 more basis points of the spread. Second, for funds with CDS positions, a 8.3%
underperformance27 is documented during the crisis with 100 basis points higher CDS
spread comparing with the non-crisis period with the same amount of change in the
CDS spread. To conclude, CDS users benefit substantially from higher CDS spreads
with normal market conditions, but suffer from high spreads during the financial crisis,
which suggests funds are indeed loading up on tail risk and selling disaster insurance.
Columns (5) to (8) test directly the tail risk taking hypothesis and contrast it with
25We use three way interactions as it made possible to test our hypotheses. For example, the dif-
ferential effect of spreads on performance for CDS users and nonusers during the crisis is given by the
coefficient of CDS × CDSP. However, without a three way interaction term the differential effect of
spreads on performance for CDS users and nonusers out of the crisis period is also given by the term
CDS × CDSP. We therefore check the second differences by including the term CDS × Crisis × CDSP.
26This is computed as (0.000325− 0.000541)× 100.
27This is computed as (−0.000284− 0.000541)× 100.
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the tracking error management incentives. Given the significant portion of short multi-
name CDS positions written on CDS indices, bond indices and asset backed securities,
funds may potentially use the instrument to diversify or to track their intended indices.
Not surprisingly larger funds on average have lower tracking errors and Kelly and Jiang
(2014) tail risk. Funds have elevated values for these two terms during the financial
crisis. We find little support for the tracking error management hypothesis. On the one
hand, tracking errors do not appear to be properly managed by trading CDS as CDS
users exhibit significantly higher tracking errors. On the other hand, directly measuring
tail risk shows CDS using funds indeed have more far-left tail returns, with around 3%
higher standardized tail risk, and this value is more than doubled during the financial
crisis. High yield funds have significantly higher tail risk during the crisis than other
funds, but there is no affirmative evidence the effect is due to high yield funds’ trading
of CDS.
We test how fund risk measures of Adam and Guettler (2015) are related to CDS use.
The results are reported in Table 3.6. With an average fund return standard deviation of
around 0.002, being a CDS user in general increases return standard deviation by 5.9%,
and during the financial crisis by 14.1%. CDS users also have fatter double tails and
are more left skewed. These effects are both statistically significant and economically
meaningful, and they hold for both normal periods and crisis periods, with more extreme
risk levels during the financial crisis.
[Table 3.6 about here.]
3.4.3 A Two Stage Least Squared Approach
Following the literature on the cross fund learning and information diffusion within the
fund family28, it is reasonable to assume the CDS use could spread across funds within
28For example, Cici, Jaspersen and Kempf (2017) document the speed of information diffusion increase
fund performance due to higher informational precision.
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families. Familiarity and experiences in trading CDS are likely correlated with actual
CDS use. In an effort to partially address the endogeneity concern, we therefore employ
CDS use of other funds within the family for each fund quarter as an instrument, together
with other independent variables in the first stage regression to predict funds’ probability
to use CDS. In particular, for each fund quarter we survey whether other funds in the
family are using CDS in that quarter. In the second stage we implement the predicted
probability of CDS use and regress outcome variables on this predicted value and other
independent variables. Although family level coordination and competition are possible,
it is not clear how other funds’ use of CDS would affect current funds’ performance and
risk29. We report the relevant results in Table 3.7. Notice the first stage is omitted yet
its Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic is reported30.
[Table 3.7 about here.]
We test the validity of the instrument by checking the first stage Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM statistic31, which is 97.869 and shows high relevance of the instrument employed.
The decision to use CDS of other funds in the family meaningfully affect current funds’
probability to trade CDS. Both qualitatively and quantitatively similar results are ob-
served for the second stage regression comparing with Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 without
the instrumented first stage32. CDS users on average overperform, but reported more
losses during the financial crisis. They exhibit higher tracking errors and tail risk, which
is likely to suggest the tail risk taking incentive dominates the needs to manage tracking
errors with CDS.
29It can be argued that other funds use of CDS affect current funds’ performance not through current
funds’ probability to use CDS but through other funds’ performance. However, there is little evidence
that fund performances within families are harmonized.
30In addition to the underidentification test that checks the relevance of the instrument, the correlation
between CDS dummy and the instrument is 0.34.
31The first stage under-identification LM statistic, as well as other validity statistics are produced
with one instrument (CDS use of other funds in the family), one endogenous variable (CDS use) and
other independent variables. Interaction terms are not included in the first stage.
32With an exception of the coefficient on Crisis × CDS in the regression with SD as dependent
variable. CDS users do not show higher return standard deviation comparing with nonusers during the
crisis.
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3.5 Identification, Model Set Up and Results
We have so far discussed a number of implications of funds’ CDS use. Yet these corre-
lations are to be confirmed with a proper identification. In this section we explore the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the resulting sudden closures of CDS contracted
with Lehman as a natural experiment to inspect the causal inferences of funds’ CDS use.
3.5.1 The Event
Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, mutual funds that
contracted with Lehman Brothers to write or purchase CDS protections have to resolve
these positions. While CDS contracts are highly customized and largely unregulated,
the standard protocol to follow is set forward by International Swap and Derivatives
Association (ISDA). ISDA was chartered in 1985, and since then a common framework
and a uniform standard regarding CDS contracting, transaction, among others, have
been established. The vast majority of the market participants in the derivatives market
now follow the ISDA standards.
ISDA set up master contracts for derivative transactions with detailed protocol to follow
when there is default of one of the counterparties. In short, with the default of Lehman,
all CDS contracts funds established with Lehman (i.e. so that Lehman was their coun-
terparty, not the underlying) were automatically early terminated. All liabilities of one
fund with Lehman are netted, so that the values of each CDS contracts are summed up
to a net liability and the CDS contracts cease to be effective33. If the net liability of
33See for example, ISDA master agreement version 2002, section 6 early termination and closed out
netting as well as 6(a) right to terminate following event of default and 6(b) right to terminate following
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the funds is negative, they become general unsecured creditor of Lehman. Although as
pointed out by Bolton and Oehmke (2015), CDS positions are not subject to automat-
ic stay and therefore there is a possibility for funds to liquidate the collateral Lehman
posted in order to collect the receivables if there is any, the market values of CDS are
usually tiny comparing with notional or the value exchanged with a triggering event of
the underlying34. If due to the reasons such as a significant drop in the value of the col-
lateral, funds cannot immediately collect their receivables, then due to the low priority
in the claimants and a large number of still ongoing lawsuits, it is highly unlikely that
Lehman can fulfill their liability to funds.
Following the standards, CDS positions disappear in the funds’ report to the SEC in
the immediate quarter following the Lehman collapse. For each of the treated funds
that we defined later we manually double check their reports in 2008Q3 to make sure
that there is no existence of Lehman CDS contracts, and there is none35. Some funds ex-
plicitly document the reason for the disappearing of Lehman contracted CDS positions36.
3.5.2 The Construction of the Treated Sample
The sudden collapse of Lehman Brothers gives us a unique opportunity to exam those
funds that face an exogenous disclosure of their CDS positions. In essence, we need the
Lehman event to be exogenous to funds, so that funds did not anticipated the collapse
and did not actively terminate their contracts with Lehman before the event. The con-
termination event.
34While the market values of CDS contracts can be tiny because the CDS contracts are usually
initiated such that the value of CDS is zero at the beginning, the payments exchanged between CDS
buyers and sellers in an event can be significant.
35Other Lehman assets for example Lehman issued securities may still exist after the collapse of
Lehman. But any funds that have significant amount of Lehman investments in their portfolio other
than CDS are discarded as treated funds as their other Lehman investments may have impacts on fund
performance, flow and risk and therefore contaminate our results.
36For example, fund with series ID S000000181 stated regarding their CDS position with Lehman
as the counterparty: ”Contracts were closed upon the declaration of bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. on September 15, 2008.”
132
tracts are passively forced to closure after Lehman bankruptcy.
It is unlikely that treated funds have anticipated the collapse of their counterparty before
2008Q3 as otherwise there is less rationale to contract with Lehman to start with, or
they should have closed their CDS contracts with Lehman before 2008Q3. The treated
funds are defined as those have at least 10 CDS contracts with Lehman as reported in
2008Q2, or those that have at least 5 Lehman CDS contracts, but at the same time the
fraction of Lehman CDS contracts is at least 20% of all their CDS contracts in 2008Q237.
While funds are not likely to anticipate the Lehman collapse before 2008Q3, it is possi-
ble, however, that funds anticipated the collapse of Lehman some time during 2008Q3.
This is likely since Lehman has already gone into trouble during that time38. Due to
data limitations and the quarterly report frequency, we cannot confirm whether funds
actively close their CDS contracts with Lehman before 15th September, or passively do
so after 15th September. This possess a potential threat to our identification since funds
could close their CDS contracts with Lehman because of better management, corporate
governance or risk management. If this is the case, any effects we observe are contami-
nated by funds’ active decision.
We offer three explanations to address this issue. One, If funds worried about coun-
terparty risk and ceased to contract with Lehman actively some time during 2008Q3,
then either they were taking a long position and worried about the default of the underly-
ing and the default of Lehman at the same time, so that their losses from the underlying
cannot be covered by Lehman, or they were taking a short position and worried about
not getting periodic payments. In either case they would try to rebuild their position
with some other counterparty. We provide detailed analysis on the limited number of
37As the threshold is self-defined we conduct sensitivity analysis for the definitions of treated funds
and rule out the possibility that there is qualitatively different results.
38Aragon, Li and Qian (2017) provide evidence funds are likely to close existing buy-protection CDS
with greater counterparty credit risk.
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CDS positions that were rebuilt following the Lehman event in Section 3.6 Robustness
checks39. If funds were taking a short position and worried about the default of the
underlying, then there is less rationale to end their CDS contracts with Lehman if they
anticipate the Lehman default since their CDS contracts will be concluded. Question
only remains if funds anticipated the default of the underlying but not the default of
Lehman. This is highly unlikely given that Lehman was the focus of the market during
the time.
Two, although Lehman’s situation already deteriorated, the eventual collapse was not
the market consensus. In fact, the Lehman stock was traded at almost 10 dollars on
12th September, the Friday before collapse, and was kept a price of more than 15 dollars
for the vast majority times during the month with all the restructuring plans, before it
dropped to negligible values after 15th September. Similarly, average bond value dropped
to less than 9 cents per dollar only after 15th September.
Three, there is empirical evidence suggests that while before Lehman collapsed coun-
terparty risk is priced in CDS prices, it is only after the collapse of Lehman counterparty
risk is much more significantly priced (Arora, Gandhi and Longstaff (2012)), which
suggests the market awareness of counterparty risk was low before the Lehman event.
Although CDS contracts are marked to market. The calculations of periodic payments
as well as unrealized gains and losses are based on notional amount, notional price, re-
covery rate, and coupon (premium) rates40 , but not counterparty risks.
39In our main results we keep the limited number of treated funds that rebuilt their CDS that were
contracted with Lehman with some other counterparty, and we keep the limited number of CDS recon-
structed. Dropping these funds from the treated sample introduce one additional layer of unnecessary
endogeneity as the decision to reconstruct is endogenous. Instead we provide detailed analysis on the
specifications of these special funds, and conduct a number of robustness checks to rule out the possibility
that these funds drive our results.
40The amount that the protection buyer has to pay is calculated as the notional price minus the
fraction of price that can be recovered in an event of default. This is due to in an event of default, the
protection seller takes the defaulted bond from the buyer and pays buyer the principle. And the seller
can recover a certain amount from the defaulted bonds. The recovery rates are updated periodically.
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Funds may have other business associations with Lehman Brothers other than as the
counterparty of CDS contracts. These business associations are certainly affected by the
collapse of the company and thus have potential effects on fund performance, flow and
risk. In order to exam a clean effect of the sudden closure of CDS positions, funds that
have any other investment with Lehman other than CDS are dropped from the treated
fund set. After the screening process we are left with 31 treated funds. CDS contracts
are largely collateralized. Problem arises if Lehman rehypothecated the collateral posted
by funds to some third party. In that case, given the default of Lehman, the third party
seeks the possession of the collateral and the funds become general unsecured creditors
and this affect the fund performance. However, this effect is likely to be short lived.
Moreover, since the collateral is posted both ways, only the net effect counts, which is
likely to be much smaller. No matter whether the CDS contracts are collateralized or
not, they have to be terminated and netted following the bankruptcy of one party.
There is, however, potentially a selection issue. Treated funds select Lehman Brothers to
serve as their CDS counterparty. And counterparty risk is certainly relevant during this
selection. During normal time periods, this is not of great concern. But Lehman’s credit
worthiness has already deteriorated before its collapse. This affects Lehman’s bargaining
position when CDS contracts were written. And funds may select Lehman because of
favorable rates. Thus being a treated fund may be a proxy for certain fund investment
style.
In order to address this concern we define a different treated group among which funds
have CDS contracts with Lehman already in 2007Q4. Fortunately among the 31 treated
funds, 27 have already contracted with Lehman way before Lehman’s financial status is
made focus of the market. This different group of treated funds serve as a robustness
check and the results we get on fund risk and performance are both qualitatively and
quantitatively similar.
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In Figure 3.3 we depict the time trend of average number of CDS contracts for the
treated funds and all other CDS using funds. Treated funds experience a dramatic de-
crease in the number of CDS contracts they hold following the Lehman event, and their
hesitation lasts for a significant period of time. In contrast, other CDS using funds only
slightly step back from CDS after the outbreak of the financial crisis and retain almost
the same level of average number of CDS before and after the crisis. The significant drop
in the number of CDS contracts allows us to estimate treatment effects on various fund
level outcomes.
[Figure 3.3 about here.]
3.5.3 The Construction of the Control Sample
Figure 3.3 observes our treated funds have a natural tendency towards heavy CDS user-
s41. The average number of CDS positions per treated fund quarter is more than double
than that of other non-treated CDS using funds. Therefore although treated funds expe-
rienced a significant dip in CDS use, they are still heavy CDS users comparing with other
funds. It is not a fair comparison to check how treated funds behave differently than
other funds following the drop in the number of CDS positions. This result is mechanical
due to the definition of our treated sample. And heavy CDS users are more likely to be
treated, this contrasts the randomization assumption of allocating the treated group.
In order to account for this dispersion as well as other potential covariates that could
introduce a bias to our estimation, we construct a propensity score matched sample. We
follow common practices and transform the data into wide format to run the following
41This is mechanical since when defining treated funds we need them to have significant amount of
Lehman CDS and therefore CDS so that the drop in the number of CDS is meaningful. We could, of
course, take all funds that have Lehman CDS and compare them with all other CDS using funds, but
the fraction of CDS contracts with Lehman accounts for less than 7% of total number of CDS contracts
in the sample, thus the effect would be hardly detectable.
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probit regression42 and calculate the propensity scores:
Treatedi = α1CDS 2006Q1i + α2CDS 2006Q2i + ...+ α10CDS 2008Q2i
+ β1Hits 2006Q1i + β2Hits 2006Q2i + ...+ β10Hits 2008Q2i
+ γ1FundCha 2006Q1i + γ2FundCha 2006Q2i + ...+ γ10FundCha 2008Q2i
+ Const.+ i
(3.7)
where treated is a dummy for treated funds, CDS is a dummy for CDS use for that fund
quarter, and Hits is the number of CDS contracts. At this stage we match funds based
on their CDS use and fund characteristics before the event. The number of CDS con-
tracts is added in the probit predicting propensity scores so that we have a comparable
sample between treated and control in term of the extend of CDS use. The predicted
outcomes of this probit regression are used as propensity scores for each fund. Next we
generate propensity score matched funds with nearest 5 neighbors. For the 31 treated
funds we matched 90 control funds with closest propensity scores43. Our further analy-
sis is based on the sample consists of these treated funds and their matched control funds.
3.5.4 Difference in Differences Analysis Set Up and Results
In this subsection we estimate the treatment effects in a difference in differences (DiD)
setting. Notice, however, the DiD results should be interpreted with caution since the
number of CDS positions per fund for the treated funds continue to decline after the
Lehman collapse. The decline is certainly not directly caused by the treatment. DiD
42We also calculate the propensity scores using cross sectional probit with the snapshot data in 2008Q2,
and using panel probit and then take the average scores for each fund. All of the three methods yield
similar final treatment effects despite somewhat different matched pairs.
43We also use the nearest 1 neighbor technique, for which we match 25 control funds, 3 nearest
neighbors, for which we match 59 control funds, as well as kernel propensity score matching technique,
for which we get the weights of each fund. The treatment effects resulting from these different matched
control groups are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar and thus omitted.
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will capture these effects given the relative long post event estimation period. The DiD
results therefore can be taken together with the event study results in the next subsec-
tion to get a full picture of the treatment effects44.
The univariate results in Section 3.3 suggest there is a structural break in terms of
the performance of CDS using funds during the crisis. The CDS users perform worse
during crisis periods comparing with non-users, but have better performance outside
the crisis periods. Therefore we estimate the treatment effect in a DiD setting with a
structural break, namely with 2 post treatment periods:
OutcomeV ari,t = α1post 1t + α2Post 2t + α3Treatedi
+ β1post 1t × Treatedi + β2Post 2t × Treatedi
+ γ1FundChai,t + Const.+ i,t
(3.8)
where post 1 is a dummy variable that equals to 1 for 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, and post 2
is a dummy variable that equals to 1 from 2009Q2 on. Treated is a dummy indicating
treated funds. β1 is the DiD treatment effect following Lehman collapse but during crisis.
Similarly β2 captures the DiD treatment effect post crisis.
Since the parallel trend assumption is critical for all DiD estimations, in Figure 3.4
we plot the time series of various performance and risk measures for the treated funds
and control funds.
[Figure 3.4 about here.]
As we are estimating using the propensity score matched sample, the treated funds
and control funds behave similarly and thus parallel trend is observed before treatment.
44The continuous declining CDS per fund for the treated funds is unlikely to be a proof that the
treatment effects are reputation story only. If the reputation loss is due to contracts with Lehman, then
there is less rationale to decrease it further post event since Lehman contracts are resolved anyways. If
the reputation loss is due to the fact that funds hold CDS, it still cannot properly explain the decline.
Because even the number of CDS per fund for the treated funds is at its lowest, it is still over three
times larger than other CDS using funds.
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Moreover, there are consistent differences between the two group post treatment in both
their performances and risk levels, and the differences are generally of similar magnitude
across time. We present the results of the DiD estimates in Table 3.8.
[Table 3.8 about here.]
The coefficient of the first difference in differences estimator measures the treatment
effect during the two quarters following the collapse of Lehman and our treated event:
2008Q4 and 2009Q1. The second difference in differences estimator captures the treat-
ment effect after 2009Q1 when the market started to recover.
In terms of fund performance, we find that with a sudden decrease in the number of
contracted CDS, funds experienced both statistically significant and economically mean-
ingful drop in measurable alphas after the financial crisis (period 2). This is consistent
with our univariate result which shows funds on average benefit from their CDS trad-
ing with normal market conditions. Economically speaking, the sudden drop of CDS
positions has led the treated funds to have on average 2.1% lower annualized 5-factors
alpha comparing with their matched peers with similar fund characteristics as well as the
number of CDS contracts booked before the Lehman event. The decrease is consistent
over different alpha measures that appropriately adjust for bond market risk factors. We
cannot draw any conclusion regarding the immediate treatment effect on fund perfor-
mance in period 1 during the crisis. Various alphas give conflicting results and are not
statistically significant. It seems treated funds suffered from inferior raw returns for all
sample periods after the event.
We confirm our hypothesis that funds using CDS maintain on average higher risk levels.
The treated funds with a sudden reduction in their number of CDS contracts have on
average 5.8% lower annualized standard deviation45 of their daily returns comparing with
their matched peers in the post crisis period. Apart from the total fund risk, treated
45This is computed as 0.000229 × 252.
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funds also have lower systematic risk post crisis as measured by betas. In addition, we
cannot find strong evidence that investors react to the fact that the treated funds have
to close their CDS positions with Lehman.
3.5.5 Event Study and Results
The DiD approach could be challenged for two reasons. One, it does not provide suffi-
cient time series details on the impact of CDS on fund outcomes during the crisis and
afterwards, as the effects of CDS are distinct in the two periods. Two, we observe in
Figure 3.3 treated funds and other funds use CDS differently after the event, so that
these differences are incorporated in the post event treatment effect. This could poten-
tially be addressed by matching on the CDS use over the entire sample period, yet it is
still questionable whether the effect of Lehman collapse and the CDS closures can last
for a number of years.
We therefore conduct event study analyses to exam such effects over a relatively shorter
period46 of time around the event, and we are able to compare the differences between
treated and control funds on a daily basis, and track it through time. As the average
holding period of CDS positions is around 4 quarters, within a limited period of time
the effects of sudden CDS closures should be more pronounced.
The definitions of treated and control groups are identical to the previous section. We
employ daily return data with an estimation window of [-405, -270]47. We use the
5-factors model to estimate the estimation window coefficients and the event window
abnormal returns48. Concerning that the factors may not be representative of the risk
levels during the crisis, we also accompany, separately to the 5-factors model, with a
46The reduction in the number of CDS is unlikely to cause immediate return reaction as well.
47We are of course aware that an estimation window long before the event can be problematic since
many could have changed during this time. However, we wish to have an estimation window that is free
of financial crisis concerns.
48Results are robust to use 4-factors model and so on.
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self-defined index that uses the weighted average daily return of all mutual funds in the
same fund category as the benchmark return. The time series of cumulative average
abnormal returns (CAAR) are reported in Figure 3.5 for the 5-factors model and the
defined-index model respectively.
[Figure 3.5 about here.]
Consistent with the results we obtained so far, treated funds significantly underperform
in the post crisis period. Treated funds have lower CAAR starting from around 60
trading days after the event, and have 5% lower CAAR over the entire event window.
This implies starting from 3 calendar quarters after 15th September 2008, funds that
close their CDS contracted with Lehman started to experience underperformance since
they benefit less from selling disaster insurance in a non-crisis period. This finding also
holds for the specification with defined index as the benchmark. It is not apparent,
however, whether there is statistical difference between the treated funds’ return and
control funds’ shortly after the event, which we address in the following Table 3.9.
[Table 3.9 about here.]
While treated funds show less negative return at 10% significance level within the 20
days following the event, there is virtually no difference between the groups of funds in
terms of abnormal returns during the (20,60) window. Starting from 60 trading days
post event, treated funds on average exhibit 2.6 basis points lower abnormal return per
day comparing with control funds, and this result is robust to using the defined index
model, with which treated funds also have on average 2.5 basis points lower abnormal
return per day that is significant at 5% level.
3.5.6 Funds That Reconstruct the CDS Positions
A valid concern is funds may opt to rebuild their CDS positions with some other coun-
terparty after Lehman’s bankruptcy. Given the liquidity of CDS contracts especially
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those more popular ones written on CDS and bond indices, funds are not likely to have
to spend too much effort on rebuilding such positions. This certainly is an endogenous
choice. If those funds that choose to reconstruct the positions are special in terms of
fund management or investment style, then they could potentially drive our results. If
this is the case, we have a serious endogeneity issue49.
For each treated fund we manually look into their filings to check if any Lehman con-
tracted CDS was rebuilt post event50. The 31 treated funds had in total 3193 distinct
CDS positions in 2008Q2, among which 1056 were contracted with Lehman Brothers51.
None of these 1056 positions survived in the 2008Q3 reports. However, 4 out of the 31
treated funds rebuilt in total 40 CDS positions that have identical underlying as the
Lehman contracts with some other counterparties. That is, a fraction of roughly 4% of
positions were rebuilt. Among these 40 positions, 4 are written on corporate bonds, 12
are on ABX and the rest are written on CDS indices.
96% of the Lehman contracted CDS positions held by treated funds were closed per-
manently without reconstruction. If it is the 4 funds that rebuilt the 40 positions that
drive our results, we should expect them to have consistently inferior performance post
crisis since our result indicate treated funds have lower post crisis performance. In con-
trast, if the rebuilding funds are not special so that our general implication of CDS use
apply to them as well, we should expect them to have superior performance post crisis
comparing with other treated funds that did not rebuild any positions since the 4 funds
can potentially benefit from the reconstructed CDS positions in the post crisis period.
49Although we keep those funds that rebuilt in the treated to avoid an additional selection issue, we
do not have any insight whether the funds that did not rebuild the positions actively choose not to do
so or passively did not react to the closures. Therefore we still have the concern that our results may
be driven by a subset of funds’ active decision, which is endogenous.
50Our primary data set does not contain detailed information of the underlying, for the treated funds
we check for these positions manually.
51By the definition of treated funds they are heavily Lehman fund users, a much higher fraction of
CDS are contracted with Lehman. See Appendix A for a general overview of all counterparties.
142
We split our treated sample into two groups, the 4 funds that rebuilt, and the rest.
In the sample of treated funds, we study the performance and risk implications of the 4
funds that rebuilt their positions. Effectively, our new treated sample is now the 4 funds
that rebuilt, and the new control sample is the rest of the original 31 treated funds. We
report the results in Table 3.10.
[Table 3.10 about here.]
Funds that rebuilt the CDS positions possess higher performance than those did not in
period 2, which makes it impossible to drive the inferior performance our treated funds
in the same period. We confirm our hypothesis that funds rebuild the positions benefit
from such actions in the post crisis period, and other treated funds that have a reduction
in the number of CDS positions have inferior post crisis performance. Our main results,
although partially offset by a small number of funds that rebuilt, still show off significant.
We further randomize the 4 funds that rebuild as a placebo test. In Table 3.11 we
do not find any significance in the interaction terms. Funds that actually rebuilt indeed
benefit in terms of post crisis performance, and funds that did not rebuilt and thus had
a more significant dip in the number of CDS positions perform worse comparing with
their rebuilding peers, which is consistent with our main message.
[Table 3.11 about here.]
Overall, both the DiD approach and the event study confirm our hypothesis that funds
with an exogenous closure of CDS positions perform worse in the post crisis period.
Equivalently, CDS users perform better in such periods. We cannot find statistically
different performance between the treated and the control for the time periods imme-
diately following the Lehman collapse. Combining with our findings in Section 3.4, we
interpret this as the benefit of reduced CDS contracts during the crisis (since as discussed
previously CDS users suffer from significant losses during the time), as well as the poten-
tial immediate proceeds collected if sufficient collateral is posted, are offset by the fund
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outflow and reputation loss due to Lehman transactions documented by Aragon, Li and
Qian (2017).
3.6 Conclusion
Studying the risk and performance implications of mutual fund’s use of CDS is challeng-
ing due to endogeneity concerns. Apart from concurrent events and other missing factors
that prevent one from establishing causal relationships, the reserve causality that funds
may opt to trade CDS in anticipation of future risk and return profiles is also a valid
concern. We reduce the level of endogeneity in this problem by utilizing the collapse of
Lehman Brothers as well as the resulting sudden closure of mutual fund’s CDS holdings
with Lehman as the counterparty as a natural experiment. Treated funds are defined
as those with sufficient Lehman CDS exposures. Control funds are propensity score
matched funds with similar pre-event characteristics as the treated funds but without
Lehman exposure.
We employ the greatly enlarged sample-the universe of U.S. fixed-income mutual funds
as the subject of research. We find CDS users load up significant tail risk in trading
CDS. They perform well outside of the crisis period, but suffer from significant losses
during. The two predictions are even stronger with high CDS spreads. The sudden drop
of CDS positions in the treated funds introduces on average a 2.1% lower annualized 5-
factors alpha comparing with their matched peers post crisis. During the financial crisis,
however, there is no statistically different performance observed between the treated and
the control.
Our analysis is subject to the drawback that funds may choose to reconstruct their
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closed Lehman CDS positions. We rule out the possibility that the results are driven by
the limited number of reconstruction cases by facilitating a further test within the treat-
ed funds. Funds that rebuilt the CDS positions possess higher performance post crisis,
which means they cannot drive the inferior performance of treated funds post crisis.
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Appendix
3.A Appendix A: List of Identified CDS Counter-
parties
Although our focused counterparty is Lehman Brothers. We provide here a more com-
prehensive list of identified counterparties to give a more general picture of CDS trading
of mutual funds.
[Table 3.12 about here.]
Notice Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, and Merrill Lynch was acquired. There-
fore counting the fraction of CDS counterparties before the financial crisis, the two would
have been more important. Lehman was the second most frequent CDS counterparty be-
fore 2008Q3 with 12.2662% of positions, just falls short after Goldman Sachs (12.5543%).
3.B Appendix B: Placebo Tests
In this appendix we additionally provide several placebo tests to support our identifi-
cation. We randomly pick 31 funds from the fund sample, calculate their propensity
scores to use CDS and match them with control samples as described in Section 3.5.
The randomly picked funds need not experience a sudden reduction in the number of
CDS positions, and since the matched control sample with similar fund characteristics
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and number of CDS holdings before the event also need not experience forced closures,
we shall expect no statistically different performance and risk to exist systematically
post event for the 2 groups of funds. We replicate our analysis in Table 3.8 and report
the results below.
[Table 3.13 about here.]
As expected, there is no differences between the treated and their control detectable.
We further visualize such comparison with CAAR time series derived from event studies.
Employing the similar event study set up as in Section 3.5.5, we plot the comparison in
the following graph.
[Figure 3.6 about here.]
The time series of CAAR for the treated and the control are almost identical (vertical
comparison). It further proves the underperformance of the real treated funds after the
financial crisis is indeed related to our treatment, the sudden closures of CDS positions.
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Table 3.1: Mutual Fund CDS Holdings by Fund Type
The table reports the average values of the CDS dummy across all fund-quarters in each
specified fund category. They measure the fraction of fund-quarters from which at least a
CDS position was observed. The measure also serves as an approximation of the fraction
of funds that used CDS in each fund category. Fund categories are defined by CRSP
objective codes, Lipper objective codes, Strategic Insight codes and Wberger codes. In
particular, fixed income funds are those with a CRSP code starting with ”I”, equity
funds start with ”E”, and money market funds start with ”IM”. The fund types in the
third column refer to a further breakdown of the corresponding fund types in the first
column. High yield and investment grade bond funds definitions follow Fang, Kempf
and Trapp (2014). Bond funds with foreign exposure have CRSP codes with first two
digits ”IF”. Commodity sector equity funds are listed separately as they are the only
equity funds that have significant CDS trading history and they are defined by CRSP
as ”EDSC” funds.
General Fund Type Mean of CDS Dummy Detailed Fund Type Mean of CDS Dummy
Fixed Income 14.51%
High Yield 18.58%
Investment Grade 19.03%
Foreign Exposure 19.68%
Equity 0.98% Commodity 25.00%
Money Market 1.91%
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Table 3.2: Comparing Risk and Performance of CDS Users Versus Nonusers
The table reports the averages of risk and performance metrics for funds in various
categories. The risk and performance metrics are as defined in Section 3.3, and they
are computed with daily data. Alphas are annualized values. CDS users are funds that
hold at least one CDS position at the fund quarter. Panel A documents the relevant
data for all bonds funds, while Panel B focuses on the high yield and investment grade
subgroups. High yield and investment grade bond funds definitions follow Fang, Kempf
and Trapp (2014). P values in the fifth column test for the statistical significance of the
economic differences in column 4.
Panel A: Comparative Statistics for Bond Funds
Bond Funds
Mean among CDS users Mean among CDS nonusers Diff p
Alpha1F .0280555 .0198445 -.008211 0.0000
Alpha3F .0399768 .0327969 -.0071799 0.0000
Alpha4F .0073872 .0023921 -.0049951 0.0000
Alpha5F .0581934 .0524833 -.0057101 0.0000
SD .002529 .0021705 -.0003585 0.0000
Kurtosis 4.251913 4.579245 .3273328 0.0000
Skewness .1601618 .1924703 .0323085 0.0626
Upbeta -.0626332 -.0777469 -.0151137 0.0226
Downbeta .487045 .4891736 .0021286 0.8211
Panel B: Comparative Statistics for High Yield and Investment Grade Bond Funds
Investment Grade
Mean among CDS users Mean among CDS nonusers Diff p
Fdret .0002312 .0002048 -.0000264 0.5159
Alpha1F .010877 -.0018337 -.0127107 0.0000
Alpha3F .0524078 .0383121 -.0140958 0.0000
Alpha4F .0055283 -.008501 -.0140293 0.0000
Alpha5F .0878593 .074499 -.0133603 0.0000
SD .0024937 .0026418 .0001481 0.0000
Kurtosis 3.423912 3.368135 -.0557764 0.0000
Skewness -.0203208 .1122578 .1325786 0.0000
Upbeta -.0452527 .0010818 .0463345 0.0000
Downbeta .8440454 .8517122 .0076668 0.0117
High Yield
Mean among CDS users Mean among CDS nonusers Diff p
Fdret .0002202 .0002566 .0000365 0.3628
Alpha1F .0022606 .0163864 .0141258 0.0000
Alpha3F .0475528 .0570915 .0095386 0.0000
Alpha4F -.0119088 -.0090995 .0028093 0.0003
Alpha5F .0860728 .0894581 .0033853 0.0472
SD .0032555 .0030977 -.0001578 0.0000
Kurtosis 3.255287 3.247045 -.008242 0.4280
Skewness -.0381526 -.0551718 -.0170192 0.0002
Upbeta -.0112053 -.1166042 -.1053989 0.0000
Downbeta 1.033193 .9204176 -.1127755 0.0000149
Table 3.3: Comparing the Performance of CDS Users Versus Nonusers as Time Series
The table reports the averages of 5-factors alpha for bond funds that with and without
CDS positions. The alpha are annualized and are as defined in Section 3.3. CDS users
are funds that hold at least one CDS position at the fund quarter. Panel A documents
the comparison from 2006 to 2014 year by year, while Panel B focuses on the global
financial crisis period with a quarter by quarter recording.
Panel A: Comparative Statistics for Bond Funds: Year by Year Analysis
Bond Funds
Mean of Alpha5F
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CDS users .0472893 .0179483 -.0466584 .0880462 .1006964 .0618575 .0830287 .0170888
CDS nonusers .0383348 .0089252 -.033558 .0633369 .0770087 .0686823 .0764292 .0089122
Diff -.0089545 -.0090231 .0131004 -.0247093 -.0236877 .0068248 -.0065996 -.0081765
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Panel B: Comparative Statistics for Bond Funds During 2008-2009
Bond Funds
2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4
Mean of Alpha5F
CDS users -.0418206 -.0016449 -.0700393 -.0590247 -.0122679 .0607305 .0827546 .0422017
CDS nonusers -.04877 .00185 -.0444415 -.0457651 .0340249 .0517659 .0930016 .0209592
Diff -0.0069494 0.0034949 0.0255978 0.0132596 0.0462928 -0.0089646 0.010247 -0.0212425
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 3.4: The Determinants of CDS Use
The table presents factors that are correlated with funds’ decisions to trade CDS with
a probit setting. The regressions are estimated on fund-date level yet some of the inde-
pendent variables are available of different frequency thus are represented by repeated
values in the data set. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals to one
if at least one CDS position is observed for the fund quarter. CDSP is the average CDS
spread obtained over Datastream is on basis point terms. BAA10Y is the 10-year BAA
rated corporate bond spread in basis points. Expense ratio and turnover ratio are on
percentage terms. 5-factors alpha is defined as in Section 3.3 and is annualized. HY
is an indicative dummy variable that equals to one for high yield funds as defined by
Fang, Kempf and Trapp (2014). CDS and bond spreads at t-1 are the respective spreads
on the last day of the previous quarter. Time t-1 alpha is the estimated alpha for the
last month of the previous quarter. In each cell the reported are marginal effects and z
statistics. All standard errors are clustered at fund level. In columns (2), (3) and (4)
time dummies are included. Marginal effects of coefficients are reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ln(TNA) 0.0370∗∗∗ 0.0379∗∗∗ 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗ 0.0368∗∗∗ 0.0369∗∗∗ 0.0372∗∗∗
(7.43) (7.46) (7.22) (7.15) (7.35) (7.35) (7.36)
Expense 0.112∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.0812∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.0980∗∗∗ 0.0942∗∗∗
(5.32) (5.29) (3.69) (4.09) (5.39) (4.99) (4.86)
Turnover 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0204∗∗∗
(5.25) (5.19) (5.51) (5.66) (5.23) (5.45) (5.47)
Alpha5F 0.0349∗∗∗ 0.0511∗∗∗ 0.0404∗ 0.0374∗∗ 0.0770∗∗∗
(3.02) (2.67) (1.83) (2.18) (3.52)
CDSP 0.000708∗∗∗ 0.000204∗ 0.000459∗∗ 0.000885∗∗∗
(4.12) (1.70) (2.05) (4.33)
BAA10Y 0.0000386∗∗ 0.000136∗∗∗ 0.000285∗∗∗
(1.99) (4.85) (6.00)
HY 0.0223 0.0000779
(0.66) (0.02)
CRSP(T-1) -0.000269
(-1.16)
BAA10Y(T-1) -0.0000821∗∗
(-2.79)
Alpha5F(T-1) 0.00534 0.0337∗
(0.27) (1.80)
Post08Q3 0.0122
(0.72)
Post08Q3 × BAA10Y -0.000178∗∗∗
(-3.58)
Observations 2322760 2322760 2322615 2767275 1711215 1962634 2767275
Pseudo R2 0.0825 0.0853 0.0841 0.0836 0.0851 0.0830 0.0828
Time Fe No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Clustered Std Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund
Marginal effects; z statistics in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 151
Table 3.5: CDS Use and Fund Performance, Tail Risk, and Tracking Error
The table evaluates fund performance, tail risk and tracking error in a pooled OLS
setting. The dependent variables are fund performance and risk measures. 5-factors
alpha is defined as in Section 3.3 and is annualized. Tracking errors are computed
from with 5-factors model. Tail risk definition follows Kelly and Jiang (2014) and is
standardized. CDS is a dummy that equals to one if at least one CDS position is observed
for the fund quarter. CDSP is the average CDS spread obtained over Datastream is on
basis point terms. BAA10Y is the 10-year BAA rated corporate bond spread in basis
points. Crisis equals to one for the period 2007Q3 to 2009Q2. HY is an indicative
dummy variable that equals to one for high yield funds as defined by Fang, Kempf and
Trapp (2014). In each cell the reported are coefficients and t statistics. All standard
errors are clustered at fund level. Fund fixed effects are included in all specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alpha5F Alpha5F Alpha5F Alpha5F TE TE TR TR
Ln(TNA) -0.00303∗∗ -0.00613∗∗∗ -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0148∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0115∗∗∗ -0.0394∗∗∗ -0.0381∗∗∗
(-2.37) (-4.50) (-9.60) (-9.96) (-3.39) (-3.52) (-3.41) (-3.29)
Expense 0.00111 0.0143∗∗ 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0191 0.0199 -0.0285 -0.0299
(0.27) (2.53) (4.18) (4.11) (1.17) (1.23) (-0.48) (-0.50)
Turnover -0.000368 0.00150 0.00109 0.000212 0.00405∗ 0.00377∗ -0.0177∗∗ -0.0170∗∗
(-0.57) (1.35) (0.92) (0.22) (1.77) (1.65) (-2.40) (-2.29)
CDS 0.00466∗ 0.0199∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗ 0.00596 0.0224∗∗∗ 0.0254∗∗∗ 0.0319∗∗ 0.0295∗∗
(1.90) (5.68) (2.04) (0.99) (4.36) (4.46) (2.23) (2.32)
Crisis -0.0725∗∗∗ -0.0641∗∗∗ 0.00232 0.240∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ -0.0178 -0.0280∗∗
(-33.95) (-20.49) (0.77) (63.06) (60.18) (-1.34) (-2.02)
CDSP 0.000368∗∗∗
(51.45)
CDS × Crisis -0.0286∗∗∗ -0.0193∗∗∗ -0.0268∗∗∗ 0.00455 0.00824 0.0635∗∗ 0.0547∗
(-5.22) (-5.73) (-4.67) (0.51) (0.94) (2.26) (1.91)
CDS × CDSP 0.000325∗∗∗
(4.39)
Crisis × CDSP -0.000284∗∗∗
(-27.98)
CDS × Crisis × CDSP -0.000541∗∗∗
(-4.59)
BAA10Y 0.000321∗∗∗
(47.69)
CDS × BAA10Y 0.000242∗∗∗
(5.38)
Crisis × BAA10Y -0.000317∗∗∗
(-28.65)
CDS × Crisis × BAA10Y -0.000412∗∗∗
(-6.66)
HY -0.0226 -0.0269
(-0.76) (-0.24)
CDS × HY -0.0120 0.00986
(-0.92) (0.19)
Crisis × HY -0.0368∗∗∗ 0.0843∗∗∗
(-4.49) (2.74)
CDS × Crisis × HY -0.0201 -0.0767
(-0.91) (-1.18)
Observations 2767275 2767275 2322615 2767275 2767255 2767255 2767432 2767432
Adjusted R2 0.314 0.095 0.321 0.207 0.304 0.305 0.002 0.002
Fund Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fe Yes No No No No No No No
Clustered Std Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: CDS Use and Fund Risk
The table evaluates the effect of CDS use on various fund risk measures of Adam and
Guettler (2015) in a pooled OLS setting. The dependent variables are fund risk measures
as defined in Section 3.3. CDS is a dummy that equals to one if at least one CDS position
is observed for the fund quarter. Crisis equals to one for the period 2007Q3 to 2009Q2.
In each cell the reported are coefficients and t statistics. All standard errors are clustered
at fund level. Included fund level controls are fund TNA, expense ratio and turnover
ratio. Fund fixed effects are included in all specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BETA SD KURTOSIS SKEWNESS DOWNBETA UPBETA
CDS -0.0119 0.000118∗∗∗ -0.139∗ -0.0627∗∗ -0.0146 -0.00298
(-1.08) (4.31) (-1.96) (-2.50) (-1.23) (-0.25)
Crisis -0.0241∗∗∗ 0.00121∗∗∗ -0.788∗∗∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.0211∗∗∗ -0.0654∗∗∗
(-4.82) (62.47) (-18.22) (-13.73) (-3.58) (-14.67)
CDS × Crisis 0.0447∗∗∗ 0.000164∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗ -0.0729∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0103
(4.13) (3.83) (-2.16) (-2.32) (4.29) (0.84)
Observations 2767275 2767275 2767209 2767209 2767272 2767275
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.304 0.034 0.021 0.005 0.008
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Std Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
153
Table 3.7: CDS Use and Fund Outcomes: An IV Approach
The table evaluates the effect of CDS use on various fund outcome variables. The
dependent variables are fund performance and risk measures as defined in Section 3.3.
CDS is a predicted variable results from the first stage regression. Crisis equals to one
for the period 2007Q3 to 2009Q2. In the first stage we regress a CDS dummy on other
funds’ use of CDS dummy, as well as other independent variables and fund controls.
The fitted value of CDS is plugged into the second stage. In each cell the reported are
coefficients and t statistics. All standard errors are clustered at fund level. Included
fund level controls are fund TNA, expense ratio and turnover ratio. Fund fixed effects
are included in all specifications in both the first and the second stage.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alpha5F Alpha4F Alpha3F Alpha1F RET SD TE TR
CDS 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.000532∗∗∗ 0.000516∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.181∗
(5.77) (3.14) (6.56) (6.71) (6.75) (3.75) (4.32) (1.79)
Crisis -0.0696∗∗∗ -0.0342∗∗∗ -0.0591∗∗∗ -0.0756∗∗∗ -0.000251∗∗∗ 0.00123∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ -0.00302
(-28.98) (-18.86) (-19.22) (-21.83) (-17.14) (62.52) (62.54) (-0.22)
CDS × Crisis -0.0733∗∗∗ -0.0233∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.000462∗∗∗ -0.0000298 -0.0422∗∗ -0.0150
(-6.72) (-3.46) (-7.86) (-8.30) (-7.97) (-0.36) (-2.57) (-0.26)
Observations 2614886 2614886 2614886 2614886 2613672 2614886 2614872 2615000
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.043 0.030 0.084 0.001 0.304 0.299 -0.001
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Std Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund
First Stage Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic: 97.869; p = 0.0000
First Stage Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic: 6.4e+ 04 Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic: 125.308
First Stage Hansen J statistic: 0.000
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Fund Performance and Risk Following Sudden CDS Closures: The DiD Analysis
The table evaluate the treatment effects of sudden CDS closures on fund performance and risk. The dependent variables are fund
performance and risk measures as defined in Section 3.3. DiD 1 and DiD 2 are difference in differences estimators for period 1 and
period 2 respectively. Period 1 includes 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, while period 2 refers to the periods afterwards until 2014. Post 1 and
Post 2 are dummies variables that equal to one for these two periods respectively. Treated is an indicator for the treated group. The
regressions are based on the sample of the treated and control funds, as defined in Section 3.5.2 and Section 3.5.3. In each regression
fund level controls fund size, expense ratio and turnover ratio are included. In each cell the reported are coefficients and t statistics.
All standard errors are clustered at fund level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Alpha5F Alpha4F Alpha3F Alpha1F RET SD TE TR FLOW BETA
DiD 1 0.0249 0.0254 -0.0241 -0.0208 -0.000231∗∗ 0.000411 0.136∗∗∗ 0.129 -0.00779 -0.0714
(1.20) (1.40) (-1.12) (-1.10) (-2.23) (1.56) (3.07) (0.84) (-0.82) (-1.51)
DiD 2 -0.0212∗∗ -0.0244∗∗∗ -0.0101 -0.00349 -0.000229∗∗∗ -0.000306∗∗∗ -0.00326 -0.0559 0.000525 -0.106∗∗
(-2.27) (-3.51) (-1.10) (-0.28) (-2.85) (-3.20) (-0.22) (-0.60) (0.11) (-2.37)
POST 1 -0.0580∗∗∗ -0.0196∗∗∗ 0.0100 -0.0820∗∗∗ -0.000293∗∗∗ 0.00210∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.0336 -0.0148∗∗∗ 0.00295
(-6.56) (-2.63) (1.01) (-7.95) (-6.28) (13.07) (16.45) (0.45) (-2.97) (0.15)
POST 2 0.0987∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.0848∗∗∗ 0.000276∗∗∗ -0.000187∗∗∗ -0.0349∗∗∗ -0.0804∗ -0.00129 -0.0791∗∗∗
(19.09) (11.43) (18.82) (10.89) (9.60) (-3.72) (-4.10) (-1.73) (-0.45) (-3.14)
Treated 0.0000616 -0.000656 -0.00580 -0.00662 -0.0000353 0.000182 0.0602∗∗∗ 0.122 0.00245 0.0175
(0.01) (-0.17) (-1.26) (-1.22) (-1.54) (1.60) (2.97) (1.19) (0.52) (0.26)
Observations 181801 181801 181801 181801 181788 181801 181801 181802 181802 181801
Adjusted R2 0.170 0.081 0.172 0.172 0.006 0.284 0.277 0.011 0.005 0.178
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Std Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: AARE of the Treated and Control Funds
The table reports the mean of average abnormal return (AARE) for treated funds and
control funds. In the first step abnormal returns in each fund day are averaged within
treated and control groups. In the second step we test whether the mean of the two
AARE time series are statistically different in various time windows post event. Panel
A is dedicated to AARE computed by 5-factors alpha model, while in panel B we use
a self-defined index constructed from mutual fund returns in each fund category as
the benchmark return. The event date is 15th September 2018 when Lehman declared
bankruptcy. Treated funds are those 31 funds with significant Lehman CDS exposure and
meet all other treated definition as in Section 3.5.2. Control funds are those that have
closest propensity scores with the treated funds using 5 nearest neighbour propensity
score matching technique as described in Section 3.5.3.
Panel A: 5-Factors model AARE
Mean of Treated Mean of Control Diff p
[0,20] -.0037289 -.0043178 .000589 0.0617
(20,40] -.0010235 -.0008006 -.0002229 0.4913
(40,60] -.0022391 -.0020129 -.0002262 0.3465
(60,120] -.0002606 .0001386 -.0003992 0.0013
Panel B: Defined Index model AARE
Mean of Treated Mean of Control Diff p
[0,20] -.003766 -.0034036 -.0003624 0.2867
(20,40] -.0005019 -.0002331 -.0002688 0.3928
(40,60] -.0021925 -.0013562 -.0008363 0.0123
(60,120] -.0000254 .0004119 -.0004373 0.0293
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Table 3.10: Fund Performance and Risk Following CDS Reconstruction
The table evaluate the effects of CDS reconstruction on fund performance and risk. The sample is the original treated fund quarters.
The dependent variables are fund performance and risk measures as defined in Section 3.3. DiD 1 and DiD 2 are difference in
differences estimators for period 1 and period 2 respectively. Period 1 includes 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, while period 2 refers to the
periods afterwards until 2014. Post 1 and Post 2 are dummies variables that equal to one for these two periods respectively. Rebuild
is an indicator for the funds that rebuild Lehman contracted CDS positions within the treated group. In each regression fund level
controls fund size, expense ratio and turnover ratio are included. In each cell the reported are coefficients and t statistics. All
standard errors are clustered at fund level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Alpha5F Alpha4F Alpha3F Alpha1F RET SD TE TR FLOW BETA
Post 1 × Rebuild -0.0513 -0.0483 -0.0480 -0.0495 -0.000181 -0.000256 -0.0163 -0.114 -0.0388∗ -0.140
(-0.74) (-1.10) (-0.75) (-1.26) (-0.74) (-0.52) (-0.19) (-0.31) (-1.92) (-0.94)
Post 2 × Rebuild 0.0431∗∗ 0.0385∗ 0.0214 0.000639 0.0000287 -0.000161 -0.00438 -0.264∗ 0.00943 0.136∗
(2.59) (1.86) (1.17) (0.02) (0.34) (-1.13) (-0.17) (-1.98) (0.77) (1.82)
Post 1 0.0167 -0.0599∗∗∗ -0.0320 -0.126∗∗∗ -0.000500∗∗∗ 0.00281∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.182 -0.0178∗∗ -0.0488
(0.82) (-3.15) (-1.50) (-6.61) (-4.89) (12.14) (11.98) (1.23) (-2.10) (-1.08)
Post 2 0.105∗∗∗ 0.0383∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.000395∗∗∗ -0.000192∗∗ -0.0409∗∗∗ -0.103 -0.00300 -0.207∗∗∗
(12.92) (6.51) (17.65) (10.07) (9.38) (-2.06) (-3.08) (-1.09) (-0.66) (-4.74)
Rebuild -0.0291∗∗∗ -0.0265∗∗∗ -0.0202∗∗ -0.0189 -0.0000759 0.00000818 0.0130 0.206 -0.0138∗∗ 0.0577
(-3.51) (-3.03) (-2.73) (-1.33) (-1.68) (0.03) (0.29) (0.91) (-2.08) (0.38)
Observations 56084 56084 56084 56084 56080 56084 56084 56085 56085 56084
Adjusted R2 0.233 0.207 0.248 0.275 0.009 0.355 0.327 0.026 0.014 0.281
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Std Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.11: Fund Performance and Risk Following CDS Reconstruction: Randomized Rebuilding Funds
The table evaluate the effects of CDS reconstruction on fund performance and risk as a placebo to Table 3.10. We randomize the 4
funds that rebuilt within the treated sample. The sample is the original treated fund quarters. The dependent variables are fund
performance and risk measures as defined in Section 3.3. DiD 1 and DiD 2 are difference in differences estimators for period 1 and
period 2 respectively. Period 1 includes 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, while period 2 refers to the periods afterwards until 2014. Post 1 and
Post 2 are dummies variables that equal to one for these two periods respectively. Rebuild is a randomized indicator for the funds
that rebuild Lehman contracted CDS positions within the treated group. In each regression fund level controls fund size, expense
ratio and turnover ratio are included. In each cell the reported are coefficients and t statistics. All standard errors are clustered at
fund level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Alpha5F Alpha4F Alpha3F Alpha1F RET SD TE TR FLOW BETA
Post 1 × Rebuild Random -0.0504 -0.0210 -0.0490 -0.0106 -0.000162 0.000191 -0.0920 0.476 -0.00360 -0.195
(-1.02) (-0.63) (-0.99) (-0.28) (-0.74) (0.31) (-1.14) (1.50) (-0.14) (-1.30)
Post 2 × Rebuild Random -0.0136 0.0106 0.00177 0.0290 0.0000620 0.000108 -0.0241 0.0812 0.0173 -0.102
(-0.53) (0.38) (0.07) (0.73) (0.44) (0.43) (-0.81) (0.41) (1.30) (-1.01)
Post 1 0.0170 -0.0637∗∗∗ -0.0313 -0.131∗∗∗ -0.000499∗∗∗ 0.00275∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.0883 -0.0228∗∗ -0.0440
(0.78) (-3.21) (-1.38) (-6.76) (-4.84) (12.29) (12.50) (0.60) (-2.66) (-0.97)
Post 2 0.115∗∗∗ 0.0431∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.000390∗∗∗ -0.000222∗∗ -0.0344∗∗∗ -0.151 -0.00413 -0.163∗∗∗
(14.69) (7.26) (21.13) (11.20) (11.18) (-2.68) (-2.88) (-1.68) (-0.98) (-3.84)
Rebuild Random -0.00218 0.000686 -0.00259 -0.0117 -0.0000328 -0.000407 -0.0718 -0.294 -0.00609 -0.0656
(-0.15) (0.04) (-0.19) (-0.71) (-0.50) (-1.57) (-1.30) (-1.54) (-0.48) (-0.41)
Observations 56084 56084 56084 56084 56080 56084 56084 56085 56085 56084
Adjusted R2 0.228 0.192 0.246 0.273 0.009 0.362 0.347 0.032 0.010 0.281
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Std Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.12: Mutual Funds’ CDS Counterparties 2006-2014
The table reports the CDS counterparties that mutual funds contracted with during
the period 2006 to 2010 as in their NQ, NCSR, NCSRS reports to the SEC. A number
of counterparties with minimum number of positions observable are not included. The
fraction is expressed in percentages.
Counterparty % of CDS Positions
ABN AMRO Bank 0.0354
Bank Of America 5.6763
Barclay’s 6.8692
Bear Stearns 2.1109
BNP Paribas 1.4146
Citi 7.9911
Credit Suisse First Boston 9.7029
Deutsche Bank 12.7916
Goldman Sachs 12.2350
HSBC 0.9823
JPMorgan Chase 9.1264
Lehman Brothers 7.0865
Merrill Lynch 5.2173
Morgan Stanley 9.2306
Royal Bank of Scotland 5.5299
UBS AG 3.7029
Wachovia Bank 0.0953
Societe Generale 0.1042
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Table 3.13: Fund Performance and Risk Following Sudden CDS Closures: Randomized Treated Sample
The table evaluates fund performance and risk for a randomized sample of 31 funds following the Lehman collapse. The dependent
variables are fund performance and risk measures as defined in Section 3.3. Period 1 includes 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, while period
2 refers to the periods afterwards until 2014. Post 1 and Post 2 are dummies variables that equal to one for these two periods
respectively. Treated Random is an indicator for the randomized treated group. The regressions are based on the sample of the
treated and control funds, as defined in Section 3.5.2 and Section 3.5.3. In each regression fund level controls fund size, expense
ratio and turnover ratio are included. In each cell the reported are coefficients and t statistics. All standard errors are clustered at
fund level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Alpha5F Alpha4F Alpha3F Alpha1F RET SD TE TR FLOW BETA
Post 1 × Treated Random -0.00126 -0.00380 -0.00810 -0.0177 -0.0000417 0.000142 -0.00657 -0.0156 -0.0127∗ -0.00691
(-0.09) (-0.27) (-0.54) (-0.95) (-0.52) (0.68) (-0.22) (-0.14) (-1.72) (-0.22)
Post 2 × Treated Random 0.00117 -0.00457 0.00113 0.00225 0.0000115 0.0000254 0.00255 0.0401 -0.00633 -0.00231
(0.16) (-0.63) (0.12) (0.17) (0.25) (0.23) (0.16) (0.47) (-1.18) (-0.05)
Post 1 -0.0639∗∗∗ 0.00893 -0.0340∗∗∗ -0.0320∗∗∗ -0.000137∗∗∗ 0.00197∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.0126 -0.00345 -0.0424∗∗∗
(-9.63) (1.36) (-4.74) (-3.72) (-3.63) (21.08) (24.98) (0.26) (-0.96) (-3.09)
Post 2 0.0859∗∗∗ 0.0414∗∗∗ 0.0949∗∗∗ 0.0708∗∗∗ 0.000198∗∗∗ -0.000134∗∗ -0.0167 -0.0340 0.00243 -0.0940∗∗∗
(21.11) (11.64) (20.53) (13.00) (9.89) (-2.17) (-1.49) (-0.69) (1.03) (-5.00)
Treated Random 0.000605 0.000141 0.0000341 0.000448 0.00000178 0.0000609 -0.0126 0.0190 0.00222 0.0212
(0.15) (0.04) (0.01) (0.11) (0.11) (0.46) (-0.52) (0.18) (0.56) (0.37)
Observations 322964 322964 322964 322964 322920 322964 322964 322965 322965 322964
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.073 0.141 0.126 0.002 0.223 0.248 0.038 0.002 0.132
Fund Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered Std Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund Fund
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 3.1: Time Series of the Number of CDS Using Funds and CDS Hits
The graph depicts the time trend of the number of CDS using funds and the number of
CDS positions for fixed income funds and equity funds respectively, and contrast them
with the total number of funds in each category. The time frame is from 2006 to 2014
that covers our entire sample period. Fund type is as defined by the first letter of the
CRSP objective code, and cross checked with Lipper, Strategic Insight and Wberger
objective codes. For the first graph in each panel, the two Y variables are depicted over
two Y axis, with different scaling. The total number of funds refers to the number of
funds in our final sample that results from the match of the CRSP universe through
MFLinks with the Edgar Universe. A fund is defined as a CDS using fund if there
exists at least one CDS position in the table environment of their NQ, NCSR, or NCSRS
filings in each respective quarter. A CDS hit should be within the table environment
that details funds’ CDS holdings and the start as well as the end of the position can be
reasonably judged from the html codes.
Panel A: CDS using time series for fixed income mutual funds
Panel B: CDS using time series for equity mutual funds
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Figure 3.2: The Distribution of 5-Factors Alpha
The graph shows the distribution of 5-factors alpha for CDS users (green bar) and CDS
nonusers (black edged empty box) in two density histograms. Panel A is built upon data
across all sample periods, and panel B focuses on the comparison in 2008. CDS users are
funds that hold at least one CDS position at the fund quarter. The alpha are annualized
and are as defined in Section 3.3.
Panel A: Entire Sample Period
Panel B: Year 2008
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Figure 3.3: The Average Number of CDS Positions Per Fund Quarter: A Time Series
Comparison
The graph shows the average number of CDS positions per fund quarter separately for
treated funds and all other CDS using funds over the sample period. Panel A is dedicated
for the treated funds group, and panel B focuses on other CDS using funds. Treated
funds are defined as in Section 3.5.2.
Panel A: Treated Funds
Panel B: All other CDS Using Funds
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Figure 3.4: Average 5 Factors Alpha and Standard Deviation for the Treated and Control
Funds: A Time Series Comparison
We present here the trend of 5-factors alpha and fund return standard deviation before
and after the event for the treated funds and control funds separately. 5-factors alpha
and standard deviation are computed as defined in Section 3.3. The event date is 15th
September 2018 when Lehman declared bankruptcy. Treated funds are those 31 funds
with significant Lehman CDS exposure and meet all other treated definition as in Section
3.5.2. Control funds are those that have closest propensity scores with the treated funds
using 5 nearest neighbour propensity score matching technique as described in Section
3.5.3.
Panel A: 5 Factors Alpha
Panel B: Return Standard Deviation
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Figure 3.5: Time Series of CAAR for the Treated and Their Control Funds
The graph plots the time series of estimated CAAR for the treated funds and control
funds separately. In the two graphs on the left 5-factors model is employed, while in
the other two graphs a self-defined index constructed from mutual fund returns in each
fund category is used as benchmark return. Vertical comparison between the treated
and control groups is recommended. The event date is 15th September 2018 when
Lehman declared bankruptcy. Treated funds are those 31 funds with significant Lehman
CDS exposure and meet all other treated definition as in Section 3.5.2. Control funds
are those that have closest propensity scores with the treated funds using 5 nearest
neighbour propensity score matching technique as described in Section 3.5.3.
Panel A: CAAR Time Series Treated Funds (Left: 5F; Right: Defined Index)
Panel B: CAAR Time Series Control Funds (Left: 5F; Right: Defined Index)
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Figure 3.6: Time Series of CAAR for Randomized Treated and Their Control Funds
The graph plots the time series of estimated CAAR for the randomized treated funds
and control funds separately. In the two graphs on the left 5-factors model is employed,
while in the other two graphs a self-defined index constructed from mutual fund returns
in each fund category is used as benchmark return. Vertical comparison between the
treated and control groups is recommended. The event date is 15th September 2018
when Lehman declared bankruptcy. Treated funds are 31 funds randomly selected from
the fund universe. Control funds are those that have closest propensity scores with the
randomized treated funds using 5 nearest neighbour propensity score matching technique
as described in Section 3.5.3.
Panel A: CAAR Time Series Treated Funds (Left: 5F; Right: Defined Index)
Panel B: CAAR Time Series Control Funds (Left: 5F; Right: Defined Index)
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